Saudi Arabia is learning the hard way: they can’t count on Trump for protection | Mohamad Bazzi

Saudi Arabia wanted direct American military action against the Houthis after their attacks intensified. Mohammed bin Salman called Trump several times in September and asked him to launch US airstrikes against the Yemeni militia. The request reflected Riyadh’s expectation that its American partner would help defend Saudi territory and Saudi-aligned forces in Yemen.

Trump did not immediately agree. He resisted dragging US forces into the Houthi-Saudi conflict, even after a cruise missile struck Riyadh’s international airport on 10 October. The attack killed at least 13 people and wounded more than 300. When reporters asked about strikes, Trump said, “We may. We’re going to look at it.”

For now, Washington has offered only lukewarm support. Trump appears concerned that intervention would widen an unpopular regional war, increase domestic political costs, and anger parts of his own base. His position could change if attacks continue, Saudi infrastructure suffers, or hawkish Republicans demand action after the elections.

The Houthis are a militia in Yemen that the article identifies as allied with Iran. They have been fighting Saudi Arabia and Yemeni forces aligned with the Saudi-backed government. The conflict matters because it connects Yemen’s civil war to the wider confrontation between Saudi Arabia and Iran, creating risks far beyond Yemen’s borders.

The article describes the fighting as a years-long conflict. It says Trump’s war against Iran rekindled the Houthi-Saudi confrontation, while Houthi attacks intensified against Saudi territory and Saudi Arabia’s Yemeni allies. On 10 October, the Houthis fired a cruise missile at Riyadh’s international airport, killing at least 13 people and injuring more than 300.

The supplied article does not explain the conflict’s original causes in detail. It does show the present mechanism: Houthi attacks pressure Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabia seeks US strikes, and American intervention could widen the regional war. Continued attacks could also damage Saudi oil exports and infrastructure.

Saudi Arabia used enormous financial commitments to deepen its relationship with Trump’s administration. Days after Trump returned to the White House in January 2025, Mohammed bin Salman pledged $600bn in additional investment and trade with the United States over four years. He later raised that promise to nearly $1tn, although the article questions how the kingdom could move such a sum so quickly.

The military side was also substantial. During a visit to Washington last November, Mohammed sealed a defense cooperation agreement with the United States. Saudi Arabia agreed to buy dozens of F-35 stealth fighter jets, described as America’s most advanced warplane. The kingdom had already signed deals for billions of dollars in US weapons and invested billions more in American companies.

These commitments were intended to build influence and security ties. Yet the Houthi crisis exposed the gap between purchasing American equipment and receiving immediate US combat support. Saudi Arabia made large promises, but Trump still hesitated to strike the Houthis when Riyadh requested help.

Saudi Arabia expected American protection because the relationship looked like a major strategic bargain. The kingdom bought billions of dollars in US weapons, invested billions in American companies, and helped build US bases. Mohammed bin Salman also remembered that Washington had defended Saudi Arabia in the past. These actions encouraged Riyadh to believe that American support would follow when the kingdom faced attack.

The expectation was strengthened by the personal relationship between Mohammed and Trump, especially through Jared Kushner. Saudi investments also flowed into Kushner’s private equity firm and the Trump Organization. Riyadh appears to have treated those financial and personal links as leverage, while Trump’s transactional approach encouraged that assumption.

But the article stresses that no dependable guarantee existed. Trump resisted attacking the Houthis even after a missile struck Riyadh. The result is a warning: weapons purchases, investments, and access to US leaders may create influence, but they do not automatically commit Washington to war. Political calculations can override commercial ties.

If Houthi attacks continue, Saudi Arabia could face more deaths, infrastructure damage, and disruption to oil exports. Yemen’s Saudi-aligned government could lose more territory. The conflict could also widen the war involving Iran, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and the United States. That would make an already unstable regional crisis harder to contain.

The article gives a clear example of the danger. On 10 October, a Houthi cruise missile struck Riyadh’s international airport, killing at least 13 people and wounding more than 300. The attacks have also targeted Saudi territory and Yemeni allies. Saudi Arabia could respond by increasing pressure on Trump, including threatening to withhold investments from the US economy and his family business.

American restraint could prevent the United States from becoming more deeply involved in an unpopular war. But it could also leave Saudi Arabia feeling abandoned and invite further pressure from hawkish Republicans. Trump may face a harder choice after the elections if attacks continue, oil exports suffer, or the Houthis capture more territory.

The article presents Mohammed bin Salman’s relationship with Trump as a security bargain shaped by regional conflict. The Saudi-backed war in Yemen created a direct confrontation with the Houthis. Trump’s later war against Iran intensified that confrontation, because the Houthis were allied with Iran. As attacks spread, Mohammed expected Washington to help defend Saudi territory and its Yemeni allies.

The article also describes close personal and financial links. Trump visited Saudi Arabia first on his initial overseas trip, while Mohammed developed a particularly close relationship with Jared Kushner. Saudi Arabia bought US weapons, invested in American businesses, and directed money into Kushner’s private equity firm and the Trump Organization. Those ties raised expectations of American support.

Jamal Khashoggi’s killing is not discussed in the supplied article, so its specific effect cannot be established from this text. In well-established broader history, it strained scrutiny of Mohammed’s relationship with Washington, but Trump continued close engagement. The article’s immediate issue is different: Trump still hesitates to fight the Houthis.

A security alliance is an agreement or dependable relationship in which partners commit to support one another against threats. It matters because countries need to know what help will arrive during a crisis. A real alliance usually depends on clear commitments, shared interests, communication, and confidence that leaders will honor their promises under pressure.

Saudi Arabia’s relationship with Trump contained many alliance-like signals. It bought billions of dollars in US weapons, helped build US bases, invested in American companies, and developed close personal ties with Trump and Kushner. Yet when the Houthis attacked Saudi territory, Trump resisted launching US airstrikes. The mechanism was simple: transactions created access and expectations, but not an automatic military obligation.

The article shows why this distinction matters. Trump can weigh elections, public opinion, oil prices, and the risk of expanding war before deciding. Saudi Arabia may try to use investments as leverage, but Washington can still refuse combat. Dependable protection requires more than money, equipment, or personal relationships.