Professor S.I. Keethaponcalan on Two Years of the AKD Presidency in Sri Lanka

Anura Kumara Dissanayake, widely known as AKD, is Sri Lanka’s ninth executive president. His election represented a break with political dynasties and elite backgrounds. He leads the National People’s Power, or NPP, a coalition of leftist parties that won power after promising major change.

The Janata Vimukti Peramuna, or JVP, forms the core of the NPP government. It previously launched two unsuccessful armed rebellions seeking a socialist state. The party later became more flexible, moving away from some long-standing positions, including its socialist and traditionally anti-Indian stances.

This transformation helps explain the government’s conduct. The JVP once opposed Ranil Wickremesinghe’s IMF strategy, but the NPP government continued essentially the same approach after taking office. It also kept the executive presidency, despite promising to abolish it. The article presents this adaptability as the most striking feature of AKD’s presidency.

The NPP secured more than a two-thirds majority in Sri Lanka’s parliament. That is an unusually strong mandate because ordinary legislation generally needs only a simple majority. A supermajority gives a government greater control over legislation and the political capacity to pursue constitutional amendments.

The article connects this majority directly to the executive-presidency question. It says the NPP has enough seats to push through constitutional change, and the party had promised to abolish the executive presidency. Its election victory also included strong performance in the Tamil-dominated Northern Province, making the mandate politically significant beyond parliamentary arithmetic.

The practical result has been surprising. Despite its numbers, the government has taken no significant steps toward constitutional reform. The article suggests that governing power may have changed the party’s priorities. Instead of limiting the presidency, NPP leaders may now see its extensive powers as useful for political stability and effective government.

The AKD government continued Ranil Wickremesinghe’s strategy of debt restructuring and cooperation with the International Monetary Fund. This mattered because the JVP and NPP had strongly criticized that approach while in opposition. Once in power, however, they judged the IMF program important enough to continue.

An IMF program normally links financial support to agreed economic reforms. In Sri Lanka’s case, the article identifies debt restructuring and an associated economic restructuring program. Such programs can require changes to public finances, debt management, and other economic policies. The government follows these commitments to satisfy IMF norms and maintain the agreement.

The continuation shows how governing pressures changed the NPP’s economic position. The current IMF program is scheduled to expire in March 2027. Professor Keethaponcalan says he would not be surprised if the government sought a new agreement, which would further demonstrate the JVP’s shift away from its earlier economic stance.

Sri Lanka’s executive presidency is a system in which the president holds extensive executive authority. The office is directly elected and can shape the government’s direction, appointments, and national policy. The article treats those powers as strong enough to influence political stability and the behavior of entire parties.

Under a parliamentary system, executive authority would normally be exercised by a prime minister and cabinet drawn from, and accountable to, parliament. The president’s role would become more limited or ceremonial, depending on the constitutional design. In practice, this would change how governments are formed, dismissed, and held responsible.

The article says abolishing the executive presidency was a long-standing JVP and NPP promise. Yet the NPP has taken no significant steps toward doing so, despite its parliamentary numbers. The source suggests that leaders may now value the presidency’s extensive powers. The precise replacement model is not described in the article.

When a government abandons long-standing campaign positions, it can gain room to govern under new conditions. Economic crises, institutional limits, or coalition pressures may make earlier promises difficult to implement. Adaptation can therefore produce continuity and stability, but it also changes what voters believe an election mandate means.

The article gives the NPP’s economic policy as a clear example. The JVP opposed Wickremesinghe’s IMF bailout and restructuring strategy in opposition. After taking office, the NPP continued essentially the same program to satisfy IMF norms. It also kept the executive presidency despite promising to abolish it.

Politically, this can weaken trust, especially among supporters who voted for change. It may also reduce accountability because leaders can defend reversals as pragmatism. Economically, continuity can reassure creditors and preserve an IMF relationship, but it may disappoint voters seeking a different model. The article presents this flexibility, rather than policy direction, as the presidency’s sharpest change.

Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict was a prolonged struggle involving the state and Tamil political and armed movements. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, or LTTE, fought for an independent Tamil Eelam. The article refers to the conflict, the LTTE’s destruction, and the importance of politics in addressing its unresolved consequences.

A political solution matters because military defeat does not automatically settle questions about representation, rights, power sharing, or trust. Accountability matters because allegations of wartime atrocities affect victims, communities, and confidence in state institutions. These issues are especially significant in Tamil-majority areas, including the Northern Province.

Professor Keethaponcalan says the AKD government has done very little to find a political solution. He also says there have been no significant prosecutions of people responsible for wartime atrocities. The NPP performed strongly in the Northern Province, raising expectations. Continued inaction could leave central grievances unresolved despite the government’s broader electoral mandate.

A powerful executive presidency can create a built-in obstacle to reform. Once a party controls the office, its leaders gain authority over government and may see those powers as useful. The incentive changes from limiting executive power in principle to preserving it for governing, stability, or political advantage.

The article describes this shift within the JVP and NPP. The party traditionally supported abolishing the executive presidency, and AKD was part of that movement. After winning more than a two-thirds parliamentary majority, however, the NPP took no significant steps toward constitutional reform. Professor Keethaponcalan says it may have come to appreciate the presidency’s extensive powers.

Parliamentary strength therefore provides opportunity, not certainty. Reform still requires leaders to spend political capital, agree on a replacement system, and accept reduced authority. The current government’s behavior suggests that institutional incentives can outweigh campaign commitments. Unless those incentives change, constitutional reform may remain postponed even with enough seats.