Supo: Russia often uses third countries to evade sanctions

Using third countries to evade sanctions means routing goods through countries that have not imposed sanctions on Russia. The products may begin in the EU, move through several companies and countries, and then reach Russia. This can make the final destination harder to see and enforcement more difficult. It matters because restricted technology can support Russia’s military industry despite EU export controls.

The article describes Finnish citizens who sent electronics to Russia through Serbia and Hong Kong. Their shipments were worth tens of millions of euros. Supo says procurement chains often start inside the EU and continue through multiple intermediaries abroad. Companies, ownership arrangements, and logistics can help conceal the Russian connection.

This activity remains active in Finland, according to Supo. Russia continually seeks more subtle ways to bypass sanctions. The networks may have existed before the war in Ukraine, but tightened sanctions activated them. Their participants change over time, while the chains continue serving Russia’s state and war industry.

Russia is trying to obtain Western technology that can support military production and warfare. Supo identifies electronic components and dual-use products as important targets. Dual-use goods can have civilian applications but may also be used in warfare. The technology matters because sanctions have restricted Russia’s direct access to many products needed by its armed forces and industry.

The article lists measurement equipment, machine tools, materials technology, optics, maritime technology, and quantum expertise. Russia may seek both advanced technology and basic components, spare parts, and the equipment used to manufacture them. In the reported case, electronics worth tens of millions of euros were sent to Russia.

Supo says Finnish companies and universities possess internationally respected expertise and advanced technology. That makes them potential targets for Russian procurement efforts. The risk is not limited to headline-making innovations. Ordinary components and production equipment can also support Russia’s military capabilities and long-term war effort.

Russia’s procurement networks are international, layered, and deliberately difficult to follow. Supo says chains often begin inside the EU and continue through several intermediaries to other countries. The article does not provide a fixed number of countries or middlemen. It does show that the structure can involve companies, ownership arrangements, and logistics spread across borders.

The reported Finnish case illustrates this pattern. Electronics were sent to Russia from Serbia and Hong Kong, both outside the EU. The two Finnish citizens involved lived in Luumäki, South Karelia. Their exports were worth tens of millions of euros, making the case the largest component export to Russia known in Finland during the sanctions period.

Supo says these networks remain active in Finland. Participants change over time, and Russia searches for newer, subtler methods of bypassing sanctions. The chains ultimately connect to the Russian state and serve its military industry, while disguising the links between suppliers and the final user.

Countries such as Serbia and Hong Kong can help route goods because they are outside the EU and, according to Supo, Russia uses countries that have not imposed sanctions on it. This does not automatically prove that every company or shipment there breaks the law. It shows how different jurisdictions can be used in a procurement chain that separates the original supplier from the Russian recipient.

In the case investigated by MOT, two Finnish citizens sent electronics to Russia from Serbia and Hong Kong. Both lived in Luumäki, Finland. Their shipments were worth tens of millions of euros. Supo says chains often start within the EU, then pass through several intermediaries and countries before reaching Russia.

The key mechanism is distance and complexity. Companies, ownership structures, and logistics can obscure Russian connections. Supo says the networks are still active in Finland and that Russia keeps searching for more discreet ways to bypass sanctions. The article identifies the route, but does not establish that all involved entities violated the law.

The GRU, Russia’s military intelligence service, plays a central role in obtaining technology covered by sanctions. Supo says GRU intelligence officers participate in planning and implementing sanctions evasion. This matters because the activity is not presented only as private commercial trade. It can connect international procurement networks to the Russian state and its military industry.

Supo does not say the GRU acts alone. Other Russian state-linked actors and network participants are also involved. The networks contain different companies and ownership arrangements. Their supply chains may begin in the EU and pass through several intermediaries in other countries. At the end, the chains connect to the Russian state and serve its war industry.

The article gives no complete list of the other actors or their individual tasks. It does state that the networks remain active in Finland. Russia continually seeks more discreet ways to bypass sanctions, so intelligence involvement supports planning, coordination, and implementation as the networks and participants change.

Russia’s procurement networks did not necessarily begin after its invasion of Ukraine. Supo says some may have existed earlier. However, they became active when sanctions were tightened. The reason is straightforward: Russia needed new ways to obtain Western electronic components and dual-use products after direct access became more restricted.

The MOT case shows this change over time. Finnish citizen Denis Emelianov founded a company in Hong Kong years before the invasion. That company already supplied components to Russia, but the volume of deliveries increased after sanctions were imposed. Emelianov denies breaking the law or helping Russia’s war machine. He says the products were for civilian use.

Supo says Russia is constantly looking for newer and more subtle ways to bypass sanctions. Participants in the networks change over time, while the overall procurement logic remains. Chains continue through countries outside the EU and multiple intermediaries, helping conceal connections to Russia’s state and military industry.

Continued access to restricted components helps Russia maintain military production despite sanctions. Supo says sanctions evasion directly supports Russia’s armed forces. Electronics, machine tools, optics, and other goods can therefore strengthen the country’s ability to produce or sustain military equipment. This turns a supply-chain problem into a national security issue for Finland and other countries enforcing sanctions.

The article links the flow of goods to Russia’s military industry. Procurement chains can begin in the EU and cross several countries before reaching their final destination. The reported Finnish case involved electronics worth tens of millions of euros. Supo also identifies the GRU as a central actor in planning and carrying out efforts to obtain sanctioned technology.

Supo warns that the effects create long-term national security threats for Finland. Russia continues to search for subtler evasion methods, and its networks remain active in Finland. If participants and routes keep changing, enforcement must confront not one fixed channel but a shifting international system tied to Russia’s war effort.