Russia Has Up to 700 Ballistic Missiles, 6,200 Attack Drones Ready to Strike Ukraine, Intelligence Says

Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence, known as HUR, estimates that Russia has built a large reserve of weapons for attacks against Ukraine. The reported stockpile includes up to 700 ballistic missiles, several thousand cruise missiles, and more than 6,000 attack drones. These figures indicate that Moscow is not relying only on newly produced weapons.

The missile reserve includes about 115 Iskander-M ballistic missiles, more than 450 Kalibr cruise missiles, and over 120 Zircon hypersonic missiles. Russia also holds more than 600 upgraded Oniks missiles and up to 400 RM-48U missiles adapted for ground strikes. Its drone reserve includes around 6,200 Geran drones.

HUR also says Russia continues producing weapons at a high rate. Monthly output includes more than 80 Kh-101 missiles, about 29 Kalibr missiles, and up to 10,000 drones. The combination of reserves and production could allow Russia to maintain repeated attacks, although the article does not independently verify HUR’s estimates.

The article does not define these weapon types, but standard military usage separates them by flight and purpose. A ballistic missile is launched on a powerful trajectory and then follows a largely ballistic path. A cruise missile flies through the atmosphere for much of its route and steers toward its target. Both can carry warheads and strike fixed locations.

An attack drone is an unmanned aircraft designed to hit a target, often by carrying explosives or crashing into it. The article describes Geran drones as long-range kamikaze attack drones. A decoy drone is intended to look like a dangerous incoming target without being the main explosive weapon.

Russia produces cheaper Gerbera decoys from plywood and foam. Their purpose is to consume Ukrainian air-defense resources and help locate surface-to-air missile systems. In this way, attack drones deliver strikes while decoys support the larger attack by creating confusion and forcing defensive responses.

HUR’s estimates show both a substantial Russian reserve and continuing weapons production. Russia reportedly holds up to 700 ballistic missiles, several thousand cruise missiles, and more than 6,000 attack drones. Its monthly drone output has reached 10,000 units, including attack drones and cheaper decoys designed to pressure Ukrainian defenses.

Specific missile production includes more than 80 Kh-101 cruise missiles monthly, around 29 Kalibr missiles, and about 40 RM-48U missiles. Russia produces up to 65 Iskander-M missiles each month. It also makes up to 4,000 jet-powered Geran-4 and Geran-5 drones monthly, plus up to 2,000 Geran-2 drones.

Together, these figures suggest Russia can sustain repeated attacks and replenish some losses. HUR said Russia could launch up to 100 ballistic missiles per month without exhausting its main stockpile. The article also says production targets were being exceeded, but it does not establish how long this pace can continue.

Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence, abbreviated HUR, is the Ukrainian agency providing the estimates in this report. It supplied figures to the Ukrainian outlet NV about Russian missile and drone reserves, monthly production, and weapons development. The agency also issued earlier warnings about Russia’s ability to continue its missile campaign.

These assessments matter because they cover both current stockpiles and replenishment. HUR estimates that Russia has up to 700 ballistic missiles, several thousand cruise missiles, and more than 6,000 attack drones. It also tracks production, including 10,000 drones monthly and up to 65 Iskander-M missiles monthly.

Such information helps frame the scale and likely persistence of Russian attacks. HUR previously said Russia could launch up to 100 ballistic missiles monthly without exhausting its main stockpile. However, the article presents these as Ukrainian intelligence estimates and does not provide independent confirmation or explain the collection methods.

Decoy drones are inexpensive unmanned aircraft used to complicate air defense. Russia produces hundreds of Gerbera decoys from plywood and foam alongside its attack drones. Their main value is not necessarily destruction, but forcing defenders to react as though every incoming object could be dangerous.

The article says decoys are designed to deplete Ukrainian air-defense resources and identify surface-to-air missile positions. When defenses respond, Russia can learn where those systems are located. Decoys can also accompany attack drones, creating more objects for defenders to track and distinguish during a strike.

This creates a two-part pressure effect. Ukraine may spend interceptors against decoys, while Russian attack drones continue moving toward targets. HUR says Russia’s growing drone output reflects a systematic strategy of exhausting Ukrainian air defenses through repeated attacks. The article does not quantify how many decoys are successfully intercepted or how often their locations are exposed.

Strategic reserves are stored weapons held back for later use rather than committed immediately. The article gives a specific reason for Russia’s treatment of newly produced Kalibr missiles: Ukrainian air defenses have made many attacks less effective. HUR says this has encouraged Moscow to direct most new Kalibr production into reserves.

Russia reportedly holds more than 450 Kalibr sea-launched cruise missiles and produces about 29 each month. Instead of using most newly made missiles in current strikes, Russia is using them to build its strategic stockpile and equip its fleets. This preserves a supply for future operations.

The approach can also reduce pressure on the existing reserve during repeated attacks. It means Russia can continue striking while adding some replacement capacity at the same time. The article does not say exactly when Moscow would release these stored missiles or how large the strategic reserve may become, but it links the policy directly to Ukrainian air-defense effectiveness.

Air-defense systems generally use radar and other sensors to detect incoming objects, then track their direction, speed, and altitude. Command systems assess the threat and may launch an interceptor or use another defensive weapon. The goal is to destroy or disable the missile or drone before it reaches its target. The article specifically refers to Ukrainian surface-to-air missile systems.

Large attacks complicate every stage. Russia can combine ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, attack drones, and cheaper Gerbera decoys. Defenders must sort genuine threats from decoys while deciding which targets deserve limited interceptors. Russia’s output of up to 10,000 drones monthly gives it a large pool for repeated attacks.

HUR says this pattern is intended to exhaust Ukraine’s air defenses and reveal their positions. Repeated waves can consume defensive supplies and force systems to respond again and again. The article does not detail specific radar or interceptor models, so the exact detection and interception methods vary by system.