Iran threatens to attack undersea cables in the Strait of Hormuz, calls them 'legitimate new targets' in future conflict

Iran has not publicly named every cable beneath the Strait of Hormuz. The IRGC has described several of the routes as “legitimate new targets,” and spokesman General Hossein Mohebbi said seven large cables pass under the strait. These links carry internet traffic and commercial data between countries.

One cable mentioned in the article appears to be Asia-Africa-Europe-1, or AAE-1. It runs between Asia and Europe, passing through Oman, the UAE, and Qatar. Those countries have direct maritime borders with Iran, placing the route close to Iranian waters.

The threat matters because damage could affect countries far beyond Iran. Professor Alesso Patalano said divers could reach the seabed and cut or destroy cables. Iran has reportedly considered such action but avoided it so far, calling it an option if Trump escalates.

An undersea fiber-optic cable is a long cable containing extremely thin glass fibers. In established telecommunications systems, digital information is converted into pulses of light and sent through those fibers. Protective layers surround the fibers, helping shield them from pressure, water, and physical damage on the seabed.

At landing stations, the cable connects to a country’s terrestrial network. Routers then direct internet requests, messages, financial records, and other data through the cable to another country. The article says all internet and commercial data pass through the seven large cables beneath the Strait of Hormuz, emphasizing their role as international links.

The article does not detail the cables’ technical construction or signaling systems. It does show why they matter: a physical cable can carry huge volumes of cross-border data, while a break can disrupt or force traffic onto other routes. Several countries may therefore feel the effects of damage far from the break itself.

The IRGC spokesman General Hossein Mohebbi said seven large cables pass beneath the Strait of Hormuz. He also said internet and commercial data pass through them, making the strait a concentrated passage for international connectivity.

The article identifies one likely cable as Asia-Africa-Europe-1, commonly called AAE-1. It stretches 15,050 miles from Asia to Europe and travels through Oman, the UAE, and Qatar. Those routes bring the cable close to countries that share maritime borders with Iran.

The figures show both local concentration and global reach. The seven cables occupy one strategically sensitive area, yet at least one route extends across two continents. The article does not provide the individual lengths or names of all seven cables. It does report that Iran has treated these links as possible targets in a future phase of conflict.

If one or more cables were cut, countries using those routes could experience slower connections, interruptions, or outages. Financial transactions and business systems could be delayed because commercial data would have to use remaining paths. International communications could also become less reliable while networks adjust.

The key mechanism is physical loss of capacity. Data normally travels as light through the fiber strands. A cut breaks that path, so network operators must reroute traffic through other cables or systems. That may create congestion, especially if several links are damaged together. The article says seven large cables carry internet and commercial data beneath the strait.

The exact impact would depend on which cable was hit and how much spare capacity existed elsewhere. The article does not quantify possible outages or financial losses. It does show why the threat has broad implications: a strike near Iran could affect data flows involving Asia, Europe, Oman, the UAE, and Qatar.

The article presents the Strait of Hormuz as a conflict hot spot and a concentrated passage for international data. Seven large cables run beneath it, carrying internet and commercial information. The location matters because Iran directly borders the maritime area, while Oman, the UAE, and Qatar are linked to routes passing through or near it.

The likely example is Asia-Africa-Europe-1. This cable stretches 15,050 miles between Asia and Europe and passes through Oman, the UAE, and Qatar. A physical attack in the strait could therefore affect networks connected to a much wider route, not only Iranian systems or immediate neighbors.

The article says Iran has considered cutting the cables but avoided doing so because it could “declare war on the whole world and build new enemies.” Professor Patalano called the threat credible. If conflict enters a reported “third phase,” the cables could become part of a broader set of targets.

If an undersea cable fails, network operators can generally redirect traffic through other submarine cables. They may also use terrestrial fiber routes across neighboring countries, microwave links, or satellites. These alternatives are established communications options, although the article does not list them specifically.

Rerouting works by sending data through a different physical path. Satellite links send signals through space, while terrestrial routes move data over land. Other submarine cables can carry traffic across different seabed routes. The choice depends on where the networks connect and how much spare capacity is available.

Backups cannot always replace a major cable completely. Alternative routes may be longer, slower, more expensive, or too small for the displaced traffic. Several simultaneous cuts would make the problem worse. The article’s key warning is that seven large cables carry internet and commercial data through the strait, creating a concentrated point of concern.

Undersea cables are vulnerable because they are physical infrastructure lying on or beneath the seabed. A state or military force that reaches a cable can damage it directly. Professor Alesso Patalano told The Telegraph that divers could descend to the seabed and cut or destroy cables. The article also cites the 2022 Nord Stream 2 attack as an example of undersea infrastructure being targeted.

Communications networks are designed with multiple links rather than one universal path. When a cable fails, operators can redirect traffic through other submarine cables, land routes, or satellites. This does not require every connection to remain available, but it can preserve some service.

Redundancy has limits. If several cables in one concentrated area are damaged, replacement routes may lack capacity or create delays. The article reports seven major cables beneath the Strait of Hormuz, so the concentration itself raises concern. Iran has described them as possible targets in a future conflict phase.