Pakistan-Taliban conflict: How India could benefit from shifting regional dynamics

The Pakistan-Taliban conflict is an escalating dispute between Pakistan and Afghanistan’s Taliban authorities. It involves repeated border clashes and Pakistani strikes inside Afghanistan. The central issue is security: Pakistan says militants based in Afghanistan attack Pakistan, while Kabul denies giving them sanctuary. The fighting matters because it is weakening relations between neighboring countries and disrupting regional trade and diplomacy.

The latest round began in February 2026, when Pakistan launched strikes targeting Taliban militants in Afghanistan. In March, Pakistan’s defense minister said the country was at “open war” with Afghanistan. Violence continued periodically, including Pakistani strikes on alleged Afghan Taliban “terrorist hubs” reported in October.

The conflict has also affected India’s calculations. Pakistan’s influence in Afghanistan may be weakening, while Kabul is seeking more outside partners. India sees room for diplomacy and assistance, but experts caution that the opening does not amount to a Taliban-India alliance. The crisis also carries serious consequences for Afghan civilians.

The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, or TTP, is a militant group identified in the article as targeting Pakistan from Afghan territory. It is separate from the Taliban authorities in Kabul, but its alleged presence there has made it central to the conflict. Pakistan accuses Kabul of allowing the TTP to operate from Afghanistan. Kabul rejects that accusation and denies providing the group with sanctuary.

This disagreement creates a direct security dilemma. Pakistan responds to alleged cross-border attacks with military strikes inside Afghanistan. The Taliban authorities then face pressure over sovereignty and civilian consequences. The dispute has contributed to repeated border clashes and a sharp deterioration in relations between the two neighbors.

The TTP issue also shapes India’s possible role. Indian experts say New Delhi should seek assurances that Afghan territory will not be used by anti-India militant groups. That shows why the group matters beyond Pakistan: its activity affects regional security, diplomatic engagement and the limits of India’s relationship with Kabul.

India and Afghanistan recorded about $908 million in bilateral trade during the 2025-26 fiscal year. That figure shows meaningful economic activity, but it does not mean India can easily replace Pakistan. Pakistan has traditionally offered Afghanistan the more direct geographic route to external markets, even though their trade has suffered during the current crisis.

The contrast is striking because Pakistan-Afghanistan trade fell sharply amid repeated border closures. India restored air freight links between Kabul and Delhi and between Kabul and Amritsar in December 2025. On October 14, Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi also stressed the importance of relations with India during talks with Indian charge d’affaires Yatin Patel.

These developments give India an opening to expand commercial ties. Yet air freight is expensive, and India lacks a simple land route. New Delhi is seeking access through Iran’s Chabahar port, but regional instability and complications surrounding Iran have limited that plan. Trade is growing as an option, not replacing geography.

Closer ties could help India recover some strategic ground lost when the Taliban returned to power in 2021. India could expand diplomatic engagement, humanitarian assistance, development projects and trade. These steps would improve contact with Kabul and give India more influence over issues affecting regional security and connectivity.

A practical gain would be assurances that Afghan territory will not be used by anti-India militant groups. India could also support Afghans through education, scholarships, medical treatment and economic cooperation. Restored air freight links and growing bilateral trade provide existing channels for engagement. Taliban interest in relations with India was highlighted during Amir Khan Muttaqi’s October 14 talks with Yatin Patel.

The opportunity has limits. India’s treatment of Afghans, including visa restrictions, may undermine trust. India also lacks Pakistan’s geographic advantages and economic leverage. Experts therefore describe an opening, not strategic alignment. The Taliban is likely to keep relations with several countries and preserve its autonomy rather than depend on New Delhi.

India cannot easily replace Pakistan because geography makes Pakistan a more direct transit route for Afghanistan. India must rely heavily on air freight or seek access through Iran. Both options are more complicated than a neighboring land route. This matters because influence depends not only on diplomatic promises, but also on the reliable movement of goods, people and aid.

India restored air freight links between Kabul and Delhi and between Kabul and Amritsar in December 2025. Bilateral trade reached about $908 million in 2025-26, showing that commerce is possible. However, the article notes that air freight is expensive. India has also pursued Iran’s Chabahar port to reach Afghanistan and Central Asia.

Chabahar has not solved the problem. Regional instability and complications involving Iran have constrained India’s connectivity plans. D'Souza specifically said the ongoing conflict in Iran limits Chabahar’s usefulness. Pakistan’s trade with Afghanistan has suffered from border closures, but its geographic position still gives it advantages India cannot quickly reproduce.

The Taliban can use multiple foreign relationships as a balancing strategy. India may provide diplomatic contact, humanitarian help, development projects and trade. China, Russia, Iran and Gulf states offer other potential political or economic connections. Keeping these relationships active prevents Kabul from relying completely on any single partner.

The article gives a clear example of this approach. Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi emphasized relations with India during talks with Indian charge d’affaires Yatin Patel. At the same time, experts say the Taliban can maintain relations with China, Russia, Iran and Gulf states. Kabul can therefore seek Indian assistance while preserving broader diplomatic options.

This strategy would help the Taliban avoid exchanging dependence on Pakistan for dependence on India. It also reflects the absence of ideological alignment between India and the Taliban. India may gain access and influence, but the Taliban is likely to pursue a diversified foreign policy. Its goal would be autonomy, not exclusive alignment with New Delhi.

Geography determines how easily a country can reach Afghanistan. Pakistan has a major advantage because it is a neighboring transit route, while India must use expensive air freight or routes through Iran. Transport infrastructure then determines whether trade and assistance can move reliably. Without dependable roads, ports or air links, diplomatic influence is harder to sustain.

The article illustrates this through Chabahar. India hopes the Iranian port will connect Afghanistan and Central Asia, but regional instability and complications surrounding Iran have limited that ambition. Political stability matters because border closures and conflict can interrupt trade. Pakistan-Afghanistan commerce has already fallen sharply during repeated closures. More broadly, sanctions can restrict finance, shipping and investment; the article does not provide specific sanctions details.

These factors mean influence cannot be created by diplomacy alone. India can expand engagement, but it cannot quickly reproduce Pakistan’s geographic advantages. Afghanistan’s partners must therefore combine political access with workable transport, stable conditions and legally usable economic channels.