Will China's weaponising of tunnel-boring tech hit India's border infra push?

China has introduced export controls covering tunnel-boring machines, or TBMs, and related equipment. Exporters will need licences before shipping items covered by the rules. Beijing says the controls respond to national-security and non-proliferation obligations. The announcement came from China’s Commerce Ministry on October 19.

The new licensing requirement matters because India relies heavily on specialised tunnelling machinery from China and other countries. TBMs are used for major railway, highway and underground projects. Chinese-made machines or components can therefore become a supply risk even when India buys equipment from a foreign company. A 2024 delay involving German-made Herrenknecht TBMs manufactured in China showed this exposure.

The controls begin on November 18. Their immediate effect on every Indian border project is uncertain, because several important tunnels were built without full-face TBMs. However, long railway tunnels in difficult Himalayan terrain can depend heavily on such machines. Licences could add uncertainty, delay deliveries and raise costs for projects using Chinese equipment or controlled components.

A tunnel-boring machine is expensive, technically complex equipment built to excavate a tunnel of a particular diameter through particular geological conditions. It cuts through the ground while supporting or managing the surrounding rock and soil. This makes it useful for creating long tunnels without repeatedly opening the surface. TBMs have become especially important for railway tunnels and underground infrastructure.

The machine must match the tunnel’s size and the ground it will encounter. Engineers cannot easily replace a TBM once construction has started. If a machine or a critical component arrives late, excavation schedules can be disrupted and project costs can rise. The article identifies this supply risk as a reason China’s export controls matter to India.

TBMs are not suitable or necessary for every tunnel. The Zojila Tunnel, for example, was excavated primarily using the New Austrian Tunnelling Method, involving sequential excavation, drilling and blasting. Still, difficult Himalayan railway projects, such as Rishikesh–Karnaprayag, demonstrate why TBMs remain strategically important.

China dominates the tunnel-boring machine industry. It accounts for an estimated 70% of the global TBM market and manufactures around 95% of the machines used inside China. Germany, Japan, the United States and France are also major producers. Some foreign companies assemble their machines in China, giving Beijing influence beyond Chinese-branded equipment.

India currently relies majorly on specialised tunnelling machinery from China and a few other countries. The article does not provide a precise percentage for India’s Chinese dependence. Its vulnerability is broader than direct purchases: a machine bought from a German manufacturer may still be made in China or contain components covered by Chinese controls.

A 2024 shipment delay illustrated the problem. TBMs manufactured in China by German engineering company Herrenknecht were delayed, prompting Piyush Goyal to raise concerns with Robert Habeck. India received the delayed machines in March 2026, but the new licensing regime creates another layer of uncertainty.

If Chinese TBM exports or deliveries are delayed, Indian railway, highway, metro and underground projects could face slower excavation and higher costs. TBMs are built for specific tunnel diameters and geological conditions. Once construction begins, replacing one is difficult. A delivery delay can therefore affect the entire work schedule rather than simply postponing one purchase.

The mechanism is already visible. In 2024, TBMs manufactured in China by German engineering company Herrenknecht were delayed. The episode showed that buying from a German firm does not necessarily remove exposure to Chinese controls. Manufacturing location and Chinese-made components can still determine whether equipment reaches India on time.

The article does not identify specific metro, hydropower or highway projects that would be halted. It does show that India’s long railway tunnels in challenging Himalayan terrain can depend heavily on TBMs. The new licensing regime may add uncertainty, while alternative methods could limit the impact on some border tunnels.

India has rapidly expanded roads, bridges and tunnels along the Line of Actual Control since the 2020 Galwan clashes. The purpose is to improve access to forward areas and strengthen military deployment near the Chinese border. The push is particularly important in eastern Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh, where terrain and weather can restrict movement.

All-weather tunnels are central to that effort. They reduce dependence on mountain passes that can be vulnerable to difficult conditions. They also create more reliable routes for moving troops and supplies. The article presents this infrastructure expansion as the strategic reason TBM technology has acquired importance beyond ordinary construction.

The LAC stretches 4,056 kilometres, making the infrastructure challenge extensive. China’s export controls therefore raise concerns for projects that need specialised machinery. Yet the immediate threat is not universal: the strategically important Zojila Tunnel was excavated primarily with NATM rather than a full-face TBM. Different projects may consequently face different levels of exposure.

India can build some strategic tunnels without using full-face TBMs. The article identifies the New Austrian Tunnelling Method, or NATM, as one alternative. NATM excavates the tunnel in stages, using drilling and blasting, then supports the exposed rock with rock bolts and shotcrete while monitoring geological conditions. This approach can work where a TBM is unsuitable or unnecessary.

The Zojila Tunnel provides the clearest example. The 13.15-kilometre project achieved its final breakthrough in June 2026. Despite its strategic role on the Srinagar–Kargil–Leh route, it was excavated primarily using NATM. This shows that Chinese TBM controls do not automatically threaten every Indian border tunnel.

Cut-and-cover construction is another established tunnelling method, but the article does not discuss its use in these projects. Its suitability depends on the route and ground conditions. TBMs remain highly important for long railway tunnels, especially in challenging Himalayan terrain, so alternatives cannot automatically replace them everywhere.

Engineers choose an excavation method by studying the ground and defining the tunnel’s required diameter. TBMs are technically complex machines designed for particular diameters and geological conditions. A machine suited to stable rock may not work well where the ground changes unexpectedly. The tunnel’s purpose, size and route also influence the choice.

Mountain geology is especially important in the Himalayas. The article notes that unpredictable geology can make TBM use difficult. With NATM, workers excavate sequentially, then use drilling, blasting, rock bolts, shotcrete and geological monitoring. This allows the support system to respond to what engineers find underground rather than relying entirely on one machine.

The decision also affects supply risk. A TBM is difficult to replace after excavation begins, so delays can disrupt schedules and raise costs. Some strategic tunnels, including Zojila, used NATM primarily. Yet long railway tunnels such as those on the Rishikesh–Karnaprayag project show why TBMs remain valuable where conditions and tunnel requirements permit.