Sri Lanka’s dilemma: Iranian ships at its doorstep, US sanctions in the shadows

The 19 Iranian oil tankers are stranded because the United States reinstated its naval blockade on Iranian ports in July. That action left dozens of Iranian vessels unable to return home. They anchored near Sri Lanka and neighboring countries instead.

Their isolation explains the shortages of food, fresh water, and fuel. The article does not identify one specific supply failure, but the vessels could not readily reach Iranian ports for replenishment. They therefore depended on possible deliveries from nearby countries or private shipping firms.

The tankers are within Sri Lanka’s Exclusive Economic Zone but outside its 12-nautical-mile territorial waters. Sri Lanka says it has no immediate plans to help, citing national interests and possible US secondary sanctions. The result is a humanitarian and legal dilemma: supplying the vessels could create commercial risks, while withholding supplies leaves seafarers facing shortages.

US secondary sanctions are penalties aimed at foreign companies or individuals that maintain prohibited commercial ties with a primary target such as Iran. They extend pressure beyond US borders. The United States cannot directly order every foreign company to follow its policy, but it can make continued dealings costly.

For example, a Sri Lankan shipping company supplying Iranian tankers could face restrictions under the risks described in Operation Economic Outcast. Washington could limit the company’s ability to do business with US companies or use the US financial system. That threat can make ordinary suppliers withdraw.

The article says Operation Economic Outcast, announced on August 24, expanded risks for foreign entities doing business with Tehran, including in shipping. Sri Lanka says Washington did not directly threaten sanctions, yet the possibility still shapes Colombo’s decision. Companies may comply to protect wider commercial relationships.

Sri Lankan Foreign Minister Vijitha Herath said around 47 foreign ships are currently anchored off Sri Lanka’s coast. Of those vessels, 19 are Iranian-flagged. These figures show that the situation involves a wider group of ships, although the Iranian vessels have created the main political and humanitarian controversy.

The 19 Iranian tankers are reportedly short of food, water, and fuel. They are anchored within Sri Lanka’s Exclusive Economic Zone but outside the country’s 12-nautical-mile territorial-water limit. That location matters because Sri Lanka’s responsibilities and authority may differ beyond its territorial waters.

Sri Lanka has said it will place national interests first before deciding whether to assist. The government also says private companies normally provide supplies to vessels. The number of Iranian ships, combined with possible US sanctions, makes any decision more consequential for Sri Lankan businesses and officials.

Territorial waters are the sea area extending up to 12 nautical miles from a country’s coast. A coastal state exercises much broader authority there. Sri Lanka’s foreign minister said the Iranian vessels are outside this limit, so they are not inside Sri Lanka’s territorial waters.

An Exclusive Economic Zone, or EEZ, is a larger offshore area where a coastal state has specific economic rights, especially concerning resources. It is not the same as territorial waters and does not give the coastal state identical control over every vessel. The article places all 47 foreign ships within Sri Lanka’s EEZ.

That distinction matters because the tankers’ location affects Sri Lanka’s legal responsibilities. The article says their position outside territorial waters does not automatically settle the question of assistance. Under UNCLOS, the key issue is whether people are in distress and what circumstances surround their requests for help.

Sri Lanka is not automatically required to provide every requested supply simply because a vessel lies within its EEZ or outside territorial waters. The article says the extent of Colombo’s duty depends on whether sailors are in distress and on the circumstances of their request. Location alone does not decide the issue.

Article 98 of UNCLOS requires states to promote effective search-and-rescue services. It also requires ships to assist people in distress at sea when they can do so safely. These duties focus on people facing danger, not on guaranteeing routine commercial deliveries of food, water, or fuel to every vessel.

The article therefore leaves Sri Lanka with a difficult judgment. The Iranian tankers reportedly face shortages, but the government says it has provided nothing and does not plan to do so. Colombo must weigh possible humanitarian obligations against national interests and the risk of US sanctions affecting suppliers.

The main risk is that a Sri Lankan supplier could be treated as a third party doing business with Iran. The article says Operation Economic Outcast expanded secondary-sanctions risks for foreign entities connected to Tehran, including shipping companies. A supplier could therefore face pressure even though it is not American.

The key mechanism is access. Washington can restrict its own companies and citizens from doing business with a designated foreign firm. It can also threaten the firm’s access to the US financial system. Because many international businesses depend on dollar-linked finance and US commercial relationships, the practical pressure can be severe.

The article does not say that any Sri Lankan company has already been sanctioned. It says the possibility appears to be shaping Colombo’s response. Suppliers may decide that delivering food, water, or fuel is not worth risking wider commercial ties, leaving the tankers without assistance.

The US dollar’s central role in global finance gives Washington leverage beyond American territory. The article says the United States can restrict its own companies and citizens from dealing with a foreign firm. That restriction can make the foreign firm’s wider business harder, even if it is not legally bound by every US sanction.

The mechanism is financial access. Companies that deal with Iran may fear losing relationships with US businesses or access to the US financial system. A Sri Lankan shipping company could therefore refuse to supply Iranian tankers, not because Sri Lankan law necessarily bans the delivery, but because the possible commercial penalty is too great.

This influence shapes government choices too. Sri Lanka’s spokesperson said no direct US threat had been communicated, yet the risk still affects Colombo’s position. The dollar system allows Washington to pressure foreign businesses indirectly, making sanctions concerns central to humanitarian decisions.