Former ambassador on Ukraine negotiations: “Putin seeks to keep Trump in a headlock”

A political “headlock” means gaining enough influence over the other negotiator to control the pace, agenda, and acceptable outcomes. In this case, Hannu Himanen believes Putin wants to keep the upper hand over Donald Trump. That would matter because Ukraine’s future could be decided largely through a bargain between Russia and the United States.

Russia’s approach, according to Himanen, has been to keep European countries out of the process. Moscow wants Ukraine to accept what Putin and Trump negotiate between themselves. Trump’s recent actions may strengthen that strategy. He has delayed new sanctions, blamed Ukraine for slowing the peace process, and announced an energy ceasefire that Russia did not follow.

The current situation remains uncertain. Himanen says Washington could pressure Kyiv to accept unfavorable terms if it chose to do so. A Putin-Trump-Zelenskyi meeting may eventually happen, but Himanen expects it would take time and would not necessarily produce a breakthrough.

The proposed three-way negotiations would involve Russia, Ukraine, and the United States. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyi has supported this format. Finnish President Alexander Stubb said the Oslo meeting aimed to create negotiations among the three countries. The format matters because Ukraine is the country directly fighting the war and affected by any settlement.

The article describes Russia’s preferred approach as a negotiation mainly between Moscow and Washington. Under that model, Ukraine could be forced to accept what Putin and Trump agree. A three-way format would instead allow Ukrainian representatives to present their own position directly. It would also make the process less clearly controlled by Russia and the United States alone.

The talks have not yet produced a confirmed breakthrough. U.S. envoy Steve Witkoff presented the Oslo discussions to Putin in Moscow. Putin said he was basically ready to restart negotiations in November, while Himanen said a meeting between Putin, Trump, and Zelenskyi would probably take time.

Russia’s stated approach, as described by Hannu Himanen, is that European countries should not interfere. Moscow wants the issue treated as a negotiation between Russia and the United States. This framing matters because it places the two most powerful outside actors at the center and reduces the number of governments directly shaping the outcome.

The mechanism is political control. If Putin and Trump reach an agreement first, Russia could present Ukraine with terms already settled by the two presidents. Himanen says Russia wants to create a situation in which Ukraine is forced to accept what Trump and Putin negotiate. That would make Kyiv a recipient of decisions rather than an equal participant in making them.

The proposed alternative is a three-way process involving Russia, Ukraine, and the United States. Zelenskyi supports it, and Stubb said the Oslo meeting aimed to establish it. However, Himanen does not expect an immediate breakthrough, and he believes the leaders’ meeting may still be delayed.

Hannu Himanen says U.S. support for Ukraine from the beginning of Donald Trump’s second term until the article’s present has been very small relative to the United States’ size. Measured in money, he says it amounts to half of what Finland has given Ukraine. The comparison is striking because Finland is far smaller than the United States.

This figure is used to explain why Washington’s political pressure may matter more than its recent material support. The article also says the United States is suspected of restricting Ukraine’s Starlink connections. Ukraine has used those connections, for example, to help counter Russian air attacks. At the same time, Trump has delayed new sanctions against Russia.

The article does not provide exact euro or dollar totals. It gives only the relative comparison: U.S. support under Trump’s second term has been half Finland’s support. Himanen argues that the United States could nevertheless pressure Ukraine over peace terms if it wanted to.

The article says the United States could pressure Ukraine into accepting unfavorable peace conditions if Washington chose to do so. This is possible because the United States has major political influence over the peace process, even though Himanen describes its recent financial support under Trump as limited. Pressure would matter most if Ukraine depended on Washington’s position while negotiations continued.

The key mechanism would be shifting Ukraine from participant to recipient. Russia wants Ukraine to accept what Putin and Trump agree between themselves. Trump has also blamed Ukraine for slowing the peace process and delayed new sanctions against Russia. Those actions could make Kyiv feel that resistance to the proposed terms carries political costs.

The article does not say exactly what the unfavorable terms would be. It does say that Ukraine could be pushed into accepting them. A three-way negotiation could give Zelenskyi a direct role, but Himanen expects any Trump-Putin-Zelenskyi meeting to take time and not necessarily produce a breakthrough.

Sanctions are government penalties designed to make actions more difficult or costly. They can restrict trade, financial dealings, technology, or other forms of cooperation. In this case, new sanctions against Russia would be a way for the United States and its partners to increase pressure while peace efforts continue.

The timing matters. The article says Trump has announced that he will postpone sanctions against Russia. Delaying them removes an immediate consequence for Moscow. It can also signal that Washington is prioritizing continued negotiations or is more sympathetic to Russia’s position than Ukraine’s. That may affect how strongly Russia feels it must compromise.

Sanctions alone do not guarantee an agreement. The article reports that Russia did not follow the announced energy ceasefire, showing that declarations do not necessarily change its actions. Delayed sanctions could therefore weaken negotiating pressure, while maintaining or adding them could give the United States more leverage. The article does not state what sanctions would eventually be imposed.

Peace negotiations are a process for discussing conditions, not a guarantee that the parties will accept them. An agreement requires Russia and Ukraine to settle major issues, including territory, security arrangements, and how the war would end. When their positions remain far apart, talks may continue without producing a binding settlement.

The article gives a concrete example from the latest round in February, held in the United Arab Emirates. Russia and Ukraine mainly agreed on new prisoner exchanges. That was a practical result, but it was not a comprehensive peace agreement. Himanen therefore says a future three-way meeting should not automatically be expected to create a real breakthrough.

The proposed format would include Russia, Ukraine, and the United States. Putin has said he is basically ready to restart negotiations in November, and Zelenskyi supports three-way talks. Yet Himanen says a meeting between Putin, Trump, and Zelenskyi will probably take time. Starting discussions would be only an initial step.