Gulf exports more oil than it did before Iran war despite surge in Hormuz attacks

Attacks in the Strait of Hormuz can raise risks without completely stopping oil exports. Tankers may still pass during safer periods, while exporters coordinate schedules, security, insurance, and loading plans. Gulf producers can also draw on storage or use routes that avoid the strait. The article does not identify which methods were used during this period.

The clearest example is the contrast between 24.6 million barrels per day exported in the week ending 18 October and 23.3 million before the war. Meanwhile, UKMTO recorded at least 12 attacks last week. A UAE-owned container ship also sank after likely being hit by a projectile. These events show danger and continued movement can coexist.

The current reality is therefore not a full blockade. Gulf exports exceeded prewar levels even as attacks surged. That may challenge Iran’s effort to cement control over Hormuz, but sustained or more accurate attacks could still reduce shipping, raise costs, and threaten future export volumes.

The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow sea passage between Iran and Oman, connecting the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea. It is a gateway for ships leaving major Gulf energy terminals. Its geography concentrates traffic into a limited route, making disruption especially important.

Oil tankers use the strait to carry crude from Gulf exporters toward customers around the world. The article illustrates this vulnerability through rising attacks on vessels and the sinking of a fully laden UAE-owned container ship after likely being hit by a projectile. At least 12 attacks occurred last week, according to UKMTO.

The waterway matters because danger there can affect more than one country’s trade. If ships slow, reroute, or avoid the passage, exporters may face delays and higher costs. The article reports that Gulf exports still reached 24.6 million barrels per day, but Iran is seeking greater control while the United States and Israel threaten another attack.

The Gulf exported 24.6 million barrels of oil per day in the week ending 18 October, according to Kpler. This figure measures the average daily flow during that week, not a single day’s shipment. It shows that exports remained exceptionally strong while maritime attacks were increasing.

Before the US-Israeli war on Iran began on 28 February, Gulf exports stood at 23.3 million barrels per day. The difference is 1.3 million barrels per day. Compared with the prewar figure, that is about 5.6 percent higher. The increase is notable because the Strait of Hormuz faced more reported attacks at the same time.

The comparison challenges the idea that rising attacks had already shut down Gulf oil trade. However, one week’s export total does not prove that shipping is safe or that future volumes will remain high. Iran’s effort to cement control over Hormuz, plus threats of another US-Israeli attack, could change the picture.

Iran can disrupt shipping by attacking vessels, threatening crews, or making passage through the Strait of Hormuz appear unsafe. The article reports at least 12 attacks last week and says a fully laden UAE-owned container ship sank after likely being hit by a projectile. Those events can force ships, insurers, and operators to reconsider voyages.

Control over a narrow, strategically important waterway can create leverage. Iran could use that position to pressure Gulf states, challenge US and Israeli influence, or influence the flow of energy exports. The article specifically says Iran is seeking to cement its control over Hormuz. It does not give a detailed explanation of Tehran’s goals.

The reported attacks have not yet stopped Gulf exports. Kpler recorded 24.6 million barrels per day in the week ending 18 October, above the prewar 23.3 million. Still, continued attacks could make shipping slower and more expensive. A wider conflict could also make control of the waterway more contested and dangerous.

A sustained disruption in the Strait of Hormuz could push oil prices higher because buyers would fear that fewer barrels can reach them. Tankers might wait, reroute, or require higher insurance and security costs. Those expenses can spread through fuel markets and make international trade more expensive. These are established effects of a major shipping chokepoint, not forecasts stated in the article.

The article provides a warning sign. UKMTO recorded at least 12 attacks last week, and a fully laden UAE-owned container ship sank after likely being hit by a projectile. Yet Gulf exports still reached 24.6 million barrels per day, above the prewar 23.3 million. Shipping has therefore continued despite serious risks.

The eventual impact would depend on duration and scale. Brief attacks might cause delays and higher costs without a major supply loss. Repeated attacks that deter tankers could reduce available oil, disrupt global trade, and tighten energy supplies. The article says US and Israeli threats of another attack add further uncertainty.

Some Gulf exporters have built ways to move oil without sending every barrel through the Strait of Hormuz. Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline carries crude from eastern fields to Yanbu on the Red Sea. The UAE’s Habshan-Fujairah pipeline carries crude to Fujairah, outside the strait. These routes connect production to ports facing different sea lanes.

Their key mechanism is simple: oil travels overland by pipeline to a port that does not require a tanker to cross Hormuz first. This can reduce exposure to attacks in the strait. However, pipelines and alternative terminals have limited capacity, and they may handle only certain grades or export flows. They cannot automatically replace all maritime traffic.

The article does not identify any alternative routes, ports, or pipelines. It only reports that Gulf exports reached 24.6 million barrels per day despite rising attacks. That suggests shipping has continued, but it does not show how much used alternatives. If attacks intensify, available bypass capacity could become strategically important but insufficient on its own.

Crude oil is petroleum in its unrefined form, before it becomes products such as gasoline or diesel. Oil exports are crude or petroleum products sold and transported from one country to another. Barrels per day, or bpd, is a standard measure of average production, shipments, or exports over a day. The article uses it to report Gulf export flows.

For example, Kpler measured Gulf exports at 24.6 million bpd in the week ending 18 October. That means the region exported an average equivalent of 24.6 million barrels each day during that week. It was higher than the prewar average of 23.3 million bpd. The measurement describes volume, not the number of tankers.

Countries depend on international shipping because oil fields and refineries are often far from one another. Tankers can carry huge volumes between ports and connect producers with buyers worldwide. In the article, attacks in Hormuz threaten that link. Yet Gulf exports continued above prewar levels despite at least 12 reported attacks.