U.S. Sanctions Law Firm, Shipping Agents and Nine Vessels in Iran Shadow Fleet Crackdown

The United States targeted the wider network that helps Iran move oil and other commodities. Treasury sanctioned Karnakis and Karnakis, five associated individuals, Roxette Maritime Shipping and Trading, Amigoz Singapore, and Whales Shipping Line. It also blocked nine vessels connected to those entities.

Roxette was identified as operator and ship manager for seven Panama-flagged vessels: ANEMOS, GLORIS, PRIDE, DESTINY, FLAMINGO 1, HARMONY, and PRINCE. Whales owned two UAE-flagged support vessels, WHALES DIAMOND and WHALES PEARL. Amigoz and Whales were accused of providing port, bunkering, or agency services.

The action also reached finance. FinCEN investigated a Greek bank’s potential connections to Iran and its proxies, and issued its first administrative subpoena under a Bank Secrecy Act provision. The campaign therefore targets legal, corporate, maritime, and financial support, not only cargoes or individual ships.

A shadow fleet is a loosely connected shipping network used to conceal who owns, controls, or finances vessels and cargoes. The term generally describes ships and support companies that operate outside transparent commercial structures. In this case, Treasury linked the network to Iranian petroleum, petrochemicals, steel, LPG, and crude oil shipments.

The mechanism is concealment. Karnakis and Karnakis allegedly created shell companies and registered shipping companies, while agents and ship managers handled ports, bunkering, and vessel operations. These layers can make an Iranian cargo look connected to another company or jurisdiction. The article identifies Panama, Greece, Singapore, and Dubai-based entities in the network.

This arrangement helps Iranian commodities reach international markets despite sanctions. The United States is responding by targeting the network around the ships. That means sanctions now cover legal firms, corporate agents, shipping agencies, managers, vessels, and financial relationships that support the trade.

Treasury identified nine vessels as blocked property in the new sanctions. Seven were Panama-flagged cargo vessels connected to Roxette Maritime Shipping and Trading: ANEMOS, GLORIS, PRIDE, DESTINY, FLAMINGO 1, HARMONY, and PRINCE. Two were UAE-flagged support vessels owned by Whales Shipping Line.

Three of the seven Roxette-linked ships—ANEMOS, GLORIS, and PRIDE—carried Iranian-origin goods during the previous year. Treasury specifically identified petrochemicals and steel products among those cargoes. The other two blocked vessels, WHALES DIAMOND and WHALES PEARL, were described as support vessels rather than cargo carriers.

The distinction matters because sanctions covered both transportation and support capacity. Blocking cargo ships can restrict specific shipments. Blocking support vessels and the companies operating them can also affect the services needed to keep a wider shipping network working. The action therefore addressed multiple parts of Iran’s maritime trade system.

Treasury accused Karnakis and Karnakis of helping hide the real ownership of ships carrying Iranian commodities. The law firm operates in Panama and Greece. According to Treasury, it spent years establishing shell companies and registering shipping companies that obscured who controlled vessels transporting petroleum, petrochemicals, and steel.

The firm allegedly helped create companies responsible for moving hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of Iranian commodities. Treasury also linked it to the corporate network behind Seyed Asadoollah Emamjomeh, an Iranian LPG magnate. His shipping operations transported hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of Iranian LPG and crude oil.

This structure separates the physical ship from the people and businesses benefiting from its cargo. It can make enforcement more difficult by placing ownership records across jurisdictions and corporate entities. The sanctions therefore target the law firm and associated individuals, not merely the vessels that carried Iranian-origin goods.

A U.S. sanctions designation generally freezes or blocks property under U.S. jurisdiction and prevents U.S. persons from doing business with the designated person, company, or vessel. Banks and companies commonly stop processing payments, providing insurance, arranging services, or handling cargo connected to the target. The article specifically identifies the nine vessels as blocked property.

The practical effect is to isolate the target from parts of the international commercial system. A designated vessel may struggle to obtain port services, bunkering, financing, or management. A sanctioned company may lose access to banks and counterparties. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent also warned that people supporting Iranian shipping operations would face consequences.

The article does not list every legal effect for each target. It does show the intended pressure: cut Iran’s remaining revenue sources and disrupt the networks supporting sanctions evasion. The measures can therefore affect both the named targets and businesses considering whether to work with them.

A cargo is only one part of an international shipment. Ships need owners, managers, port agents, brokers, banks, corporate registrars, bunkering providers, and other services. Targeting those links can affect multiple vessels and future cargoes, rather than stopping only one shipment after it has already moved.

The article gives several examples. Amigoz allegedly provided port services for Iranian light crude and bunkering for the vessel ZIXUAN. Whales acted as a shipping agent and owned two support vessels. Karnakis and Karnakis allegedly created corporate structures that concealed vessel ownership. Each provider helped make maritime trade possible or harder to trace.

That is why the campaign increasingly focuses on ship managers, brokers, port agents, financial institutions, and corporate service providers. Removing or frightening those intermediaries can make sanctions evasion more costly and difficult. FinCEN’s investigation of a Greek bank adds pressure at the financial end of the same network.

In normal maritime trade, a producer sells oil to a buyer through traders or other commercial firms. A vessel operator arranges transport, a ship manager runs the vessel, and port agents coordinate arrival and cargo handling. Banks process payments, while corporate and legal services support contracts, registrations, and ownership structures. The cargo then reaches the buyer through international ports.

Sanctions can interrupt that chain at many points. Authorities can block a vessel, prohibit dealings with its owner, restrict a bank, target a port agent, or sanction a corporate service provider. In the article, Treasury targeted all these kinds of links, including companies connected to cargoes, support vessels, and ownership structures.

The aim is broader than stopping one tanker. Cutting access to finance, port services, management, and corporate structures can make future shipments harder to arrange. The article says Washington is using this approach to restrict Iran’s maritime trade and isolate the country economically while pressure continues around the Strait of Hormuz.