Iran determined to keep uranium amid increased war odds, flurry of meetings

Iran is refusing to surrender its enriched uranium or abandon its nuclear programme. Its leaders call the programme national wealth and a sovereign achievement built despite attacks, sabotage, and assassinations. That makes the issue central to both national pride and negotiations with Washington.

Mohsen Rezaei said, “Not a single gram” would be removed from Iran. However, he did not reject downblending. This would reduce the uranium’s enrichment level inside Iran, while international monitors supervise the process. Iran has offered this approach before, presenting it as a compromise that keeps the material in the country.

The position reflects Iran’s fear that giving up the programme under military pressure would look like capitulation. The United States wants to dismantle Iran’s nuclear programme, while JD Vance suggested a meaningful reduction in enrichment capacity might suffice. The disagreement remains a major barrier to ending the war and reopening the Strait of Hormuz.

Enriched uranium is uranium processed to increase the share of uranium-235, an isotope that can sustain nuclear fission. Civilian reactors may use low-enriched uranium, while higher enrichment brings the material closer to weapons-grade levels. The article says Iran has used low-enriched uranium for radiopharmaceuticals and power generation.

The percentage shows how much the uranium has been enriched. The IAEA estimated that Iran held uranium enriched up to 60 percent before the attacks. The article says a nuclear bomb would need enrichment above 90 percent. That gap is technically important, although 60 percent is far above ordinary low-enriched fuel and therefore politically sensitive.

Iran says it is not pursuing a bomb. Still, its 60-percent stockpile has become a core dispute because the United States wants the nuclear programme dismantled or significantly reduced. Iran proposes keeping the material while possibly downblending it under supervision.

Before Israeli and US attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities in June 2025, the IAEA estimated Iran possessed 440 kilogrammes, or 970 pounds, of uranium enriched up to 60 percent. This figure describes the known stockpile at that earlier point, not a confirmed total today.

The uncertainty has several causes. Further US-Israeli strikes on nuclear sites in 2026 severely damaged Iran’s infrastructure. The IAEA has been unable to inspect key facilities, so it cannot independently verify how much uranium remains, where it is stored, or what condition it is in.

Iran has refused IAEA access since the war began. Its authorities accuse the agency of advancing Western interests after resolutions and a referral of Iran’s nuclear file to the United Nations Security Council. Without inspections, diplomacy is taking place without a reliable, current inventory.

Iran treats its nuclear programme as a sovereign right and a national achievement. Authorities say it was developed despite strikes, sabotage, and assassinations. They also point to civilian uses, including radiopharmaceutical production and power generation at Bushehr. Giving it up under military pressure could therefore damage both national pride and Iran’s sense of security.

The programme is also a bargaining tool. Iran refuses to remove its enriched uranium but has offered to downblend highly enriched material inside the country under supervision. That proposal preserves Iranian control while addressing concerns about enrichment levels. The United States, by contrast, has demanded dismantlement, although JD Vance suggested a meaningful reduction in enrichment capacity could meet US demands.

This creates a narrow negotiating space. Iran wants guarantees against further attacks and rejects what it sees as capitulation. Washington seeks limits on the nuclear programme. The unresolved dispute helps keep the war, sanctions, and Strait of Hormuz restrictions tied to nuclear diplomacy.

If Iran and the United States fail to agree, the conflict could continue rather than move toward peace. Iran’s foreign minister said the country remains in war conditions and faces threats of more attacks and expansive economic sanctions. The article also reports fears of renewed or broader conflict across the region.

The Strait of Hormuz is a direct bargaining point. Iran says it will not reopen the strait until Washington accepts its conditions. Those include returning to a June memorandum of understanding and recognising an Iran-Oman deal on temporary transit. Iran also expects real talks on a larger nuclear agreement.

The immediate outlook therefore remains tense. Mediators brought proposals to Tehran, but Iran said it had nothing new to tell Washington and demanded trust-building first. Unless conditions change, sanctions and military pressure may persist, while access through the strait remains restricted. The article does not state that any one outcome is certain.

The International Atomic Energy Agency is the international nuclear watchdog. It monitors nuclear programmes and inspects facilities to verify information about nuclear material and activities. In this crisis, its role matters because independent checks can help distinguish declared civilian work from activity that could raise weapons concerns.

The article says the IAEA estimated Iran’s earlier stockpile and used inspections to assess its nuclear programme. But Iran has refused access since the war began. The agency cannot inspect key facilities after attacks severely damaged nuclear infrastructure. It therefore cannot confirm the current amount, condition, or location of much of Iran’s enriched uranium.

That gap makes negotiations harder. Iran accuses the IAEA of advancing Western interests, while outside governments lack a verified picture of Iran’s nuclear capability. The uncertainty can deepen mistrust and complicate any supervised downblending proposal. Restoring inspections would provide evidence, but the article does not say when access will return.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT, is an international framework designed to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. It allows countries to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, such as energy and medicine. At the same time, countries without nuclear weapons promise not to develop or acquire them, while accepting safeguards and inspections.

The key mechanism is verification. International inspectors examine declared facilities, records, and nuclear material to check that civilian programmes are not being diverted toward weapons. Nuclear-armed states also undertake commitments related to disarmament. The treaty therefore tries to balance peaceful nuclear rights, national sovereignty, and collective security.

The article shows why that balance is contested. Iran says it is not pursuing a bomb but has questioned remaining in the NPT while its facilities are attacked. It has also refused IAEA inspections. Without access, the treaty’s verification system cannot provide a current, independent picture of Iran’s nuclear activities.