Ukrainian counteroffensives force the Russians to retreat – “The Russians have very little chance of advancing”

A counteroffensive means taking the initiative after, or during, an enemy attack. Defending focuses on holding positions and preventing breakthroughs. A counteroffensive goes further: troops attack enemy positions, disrupt their progress, and try to recover ground or improve the defensive situation. It matters because it can change who controls the battlefield and force the attacker to react.

In the article, Ukrainian forces first stopped Russia’s offensive north of Lyman during Operation Vivaldi. They then used counterattacks to push Russian troops back. Ukraine’s stated goal is to move Russian forces farther from Sloviansk and Kramatorsk, then choose terrain where its own defense will be strongest.

These actions do not mean Ukraine has decisively defeated Russia. Pasi Paroinen warns that the importance of Ukrainian counterattacks should not be exaggerated. Still, he says something has changed: Russian infiltration tactics and persistent advances are no longer working as effectively as before. The fighting remains active, especially near Dobropillia.

Ukrainian forces have pushed Russian troops back on the main front in Donetsk, according to the article. The shift followed Ukraine’s defense north of Lyman during Operation Vivaldi. Russia’s frontal attacks toward the industrial cities of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk were then repelled, and Russian units even had to withdraw in places.

Ukraine is trying to push Russian forces farther away from Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. After gaining distance, Ukrainian commanders want to find terrain that offers the best defensive positions. This shows that the counterattacks are linked to a broader defensive plan, not simply to capturing ground for its own sake.

The most serious current situation is around Dobropillia. Russia has concentrated its strongest forces there and has reportedly infiltrated perhaps a couple of dozen soldiers. The battle for control of the city is unfinished. Russian troops might still be expelled, and even losing Dobropillia would not, according to Paroinen, collapse Ukraine’s defense.

The reported Russian force around Dobropillia is perhaps a couple of dozen soldiers. The article presents this estimate from Black Bird Group expert Pasi Paroinen. Although the number sounds small, it reflects a tactic Russia has used for a long time: sending small groups or individual soldiers forward instead of relying only on large assaults.

These infiltrators do not need to capture the whole area immediately. With support from drones and artillery, they try to secure defensive positions. More small positions are then added over time. Each position can help the next group move forward and hold ground, creating a growing network of Russian footholds.

That gradual process makes the area difficult for Ukraine to retake. Paroinen says the battle for Dobropillia is still unfinished, so Russian troops could still be driven out. Even if they retain the city, however, he says this would not create a crisis for Ukraine’s overall defense. The danger is local and tactical, not automatically a general collapse.

Small-unit infiltration works through gradual accumulation. Soldiers move forward in tiny groups or alone, seeking places where they can survive and defend themselves. The aim is not necessarily an immediate breakthrough. It is to create footholds that make later movement and reinforcement possible. This matters because a scattered advance can be harder to detect and stop than one large attack.

The article gives the Dobropillia area as an example. Russian soldiers use drones and artillery for support while trying to secure defensive positions. Once one position is established, other small groups can add more positions nearby. Over time, these positions become connected or mutually useful, even if the initial force is only a couple of dozen soldiers.

When enough footholds exist, Ukraine faces a harder clearing operation. Each position may require effort to locate, isolate, and attack. Paroinen says this tactic has been used for a long time, but its effectiveness has recently declined overall. Around Dobropillia, however, the outcome remains uncertain and the fighting continues.

Starshield supports Ukraine’s extensive drone operations behind Russian lines. Those drones have disrupted and worn down Russian supply transport moving toward the front. The United States leadership and SpaceX have decided to restrict the system’s use in Ukraine, including a rule that connected devices cannot move faster than 160 kilometres per hour. That directly hampers some drone activity.

If Ukrainian drones cannot operate as freely, Russia may find it easier to resupply its forces. The effect is not only technological. Supply routes keep frontline units equipped, so better Russian logistics can support continued attacks. At the same time, Ukraine is running short of interceptor missiles. The article says Russia can strike almost anywhere with ballistic missiles because Ukraine can no longer reliably intercept them.

Patriot deliveries are being limited by the United States. European production cannot supply enough missiles for SAMP/T and Iris-T systems. Together, weaker drone disruption and thinner air defense could increase pressure on both Ukraine’s frontline forces and its cities.

Ground battles depend on more than soldiers occupying trenches. Drones help locate targets and attack or disrupt activity behind the front. Artillery provides heavy fire support against positions and helps small groups establish footholds. Supply lines keep units equipped and moving. Air-defense systems protect forces and cities from missiles, allowing the wider war effort to continue.

The article links these functions directly. Ukrainian drones have harassed Russian supply transports, making it harder to sustain troops at the front. Russia uses drones and artillery to support small groups infiltrating near Dobropillia. If Ukrainian drone operations are restricted, Russian resupply becomes easier. If interceptor missiles run short, Russian ballistic missiles can strike almost anywhere in Ukraine.

These systems work together rather than separately. Better intelligence and disrupted logistics can slow an attack. Artillery can help seize or defend ground. Air defense limits the damage from missile strikes. The article’s warning is that Ukraine’s battlefield position may be relatively stable while shortages in drones’ support systems and missiles create serious new risks.

European countries struggle to produce enough interceptor missiles because their weapons industry was built for peacetime needs. Armed forces normally bought missiles in small batches over many years. Those purchases maintained limited reserve stocks and provided enough equipment for training. High-intensity war consumes missiles far faster than that system was designed to replace them.

The article says European companies cannot produce anything close to enough missiles for SAMP/T and Iris-T air-defense systems. The same problem affects the broader supply of interceptors. Production lines, orders, and manufacturing capacity were not prepared for continuous mass output. A long war therefore does not automatically solve the shortage; demand can remain higher than production.

This creates a strategic problem for Ukraine. The United States is limiting deliveries of Patriot missiles, while Europe cannot quickly fill the gap. Paroinen describes the production volume as poor and says it cannot cover wartime intensity. Unless output rises substantially, Ukraine’s ability to intercept Russian ballistic missiles will remain constrained.