Pakistan and the US factor as China looks to sell its J-35 stealth jets

Pakistan has publicly indicated that it wants China’s J-35 stealth fighter. In May, its air force said it had signed an “initial collaborative agreement,” but gave no delivery schedule or purchase details. A previous report said the first jets might arrive by early 2026, yet none had arrived by then.

This plan sits alongside a major American programme. The United States published details of a US$686 million F-16 upgrade covering data links, encryption equipment, and a refit. The work is intended to keep Pakistan’s F-16s operational until 2040. It also requires Pakistan to protect the technology almost as securely as the US government.

The two programmes create a difficult balancing act. Pakistan already separates its American and Chinese aircraft, but the J-35 would bring Chinese stealth technology into the same air force. Beijing and Washington could demand different controls over bases, maintenance, software, and data. Pakistan has not announced where the J-35s would operate or under what rules.

The J-35 is a Chinese stealth fighter developed by the Aviation Industry Corporation of China, or AVIC. Stealth fighters are designed to make detection and tracking harder, especially by radar. That can improve their chances of approaching targets, gathering information, and surviving in heavily defended airspace.

The aircraft represents more than a newer airframe. Modern fighters depend on sensors, mission computers, encrypted communications, and shared data. These systems help pilots build a clearer picture of the battlefield and coordinate with other forces. The article calls the J-35 a generational leap and says AVIC pitches it as a cheaper F-35, America’s stealth fighter.

The J-35 first flew at the Zhuhai air show in 2024, and China displayed the J-35A at the Dubai Airshow the following November. Its importance therefore includes the technology surrounding the jet. Buyers must also resolve who controls software, mission data, engines, maintenance, and secure links.

The reported Chinese offer listed 40 J-35 stealth fighters. It also included KJ-500 early-warning aircraft and HQ-19 air-defence systems. Pakistan’s government briefly published that offer on social media in June last year, then removed the post. No final package price has been announced in the article.

The proposed fleet would be large relative to Pakistan’s stated air-force resources. The country’s defence budget for the current financial year is 3.01 trillion rupees, or US$10.7 billion. The air force receives 573 billion rupees from that total, and this allocation must also cover salaries. The J-35 purchase would therefore compete with existing personnel and operating costs.

Pakistan’s finances are further constrained by a US$7 billion International Monetary Fund loan. The article does not give a J-35 price or say how the purchase would be financed. It does say delivery timing depends on how many aircraft China can spare after meeting domestic orders, adding an industrial constraint to the budget problem.

Operating both fleets would create a technology-security problem. The upgraded F-16s will use new data-link systems and encryption gear, while the J-35 depends on sensitive stealth, sensor, software, and mission-data technologies. If one country gained access to the other’s systems, it could learn how those systems work or how to counter them.

The United States has already treated this kind of proximity as a serious risk. It removed Turkey from the F-35 programme after Turkey bought Russia’s S-400 air defence system. Washington argued that the Russian system could collect intelligence near F-35 facilities. Pakistan’s F-16s therefore require controlled access, and its Chinese aircraft are kept separate.

Pakistan will likely need separate bases, maintenance arrangements, and access rules if it buys the J-35. The article says neither government has announced where the aircraft would go or what rules would apply. A breach could damage trust, restrict support, or limit Pakistan’s ability to integrate its fleets.

The United States has protected its fighter technology in Pakistan through physical separation and direct oversight. When Pakistan bought advanced F-16s after September 11, Washington required Islamabad to host and pay for a US technical security team at the Shahbaz and Mushaf airbases. Access was tightly controlled, and the F-16s had to remain apart from Pakistan’s Chinese-built JF-17s.

Turkey faced a harsher consequence after buying Russia’s S-400 air-defence system. In 2019, Washington removed Turkey from the F-35 stealth-fighter programme because the Russian system could collect intelligence near F-35 repair and storage facilities. The United States said the two systems could not safely coexist in that environment.

In July this year, Donald Trump said sanctions could be lifted and Turkey’s programme participation considered again. But Marco Rubio said this month that a sale could not proceed until the S-400 issue was settled. These examples show how access rules can shape entire fighter programmes.

Pakistan keeps its F-16s apart from Chinese-made aircraft because the American jets contain protected technology. The United States requires strong controls over access, and Pakistan must protect the equipment to almost the same degree as the US government. Separation reduces the chance that foreign personnel, systems, or maintenance work will reach the F-16s.

The arrangement is visible in Pakistan’s basing choices. Chinese-made J-10CEs, which first arrived in 2022, are based at Minhas, well away from F-16 bases. The F-16s also remain subject to rules about approved locations. After the 2019 clash with India, the US State Department rebuked Pakistan for moving F-16s to unapproved bases.

These restrictions can reduce flexibility during training, maintenance, and combat operations. Pakistan may need separate crews, facilities, supply chains, and security procedures. The article says it is likely to separate J-35s too, but Beijing may impose its own conditions. One past movement already showed that such arrangements can slip.

Modern air warfare depends on an aircraft’s digital systems as much as its airframe. Sensors collect information, software interprets it, mission data helps identify threats, and secure data links share the picture with other aircraft and commanders. If those elements are restricted or poorly integrated, a sophisticated fighter may lose much of its operational value.

Pakistan’s JF-17 experience shows why maintenance access matters. The aircraft complex at Kamra builds 58 per cent of the JF-17’s airframe and keeps the fleet flying. Yet when the first JF-17 needed a major overhaul in 2017, it had to go to AVIC in Chengdu. Buying complete Chinese systems can leave Pakistan with less control over data links, weapons, and integration.

The J-35 raises sharper questions because it is a stealth aircraft. The article says key details remain unpublished: who overhauls the engines, who accesses software, and who controls sensor mission data. Those decisions will affect independence, security, upgrades, and the aircraft’s long-term usefulness.