What a Lula or Bolsonaro victory would mean for Brazil and the world

A presidential runoff is a second election held after the first round fails to produce a clear winner. It narrows the contest to the leading candidates, giving voters another chance to choose the president. Brazil’s October 25 vote matters because the result could redirect trade, relations with Washington, and Brazil’s global position.

Lula and Senator Flávio Bolsonaro both survived Brazil’s closely contested first round. Neither candidate secured enough support to settle the presidency immediately. The runoff therefore turns a broad first-round contest into a direct choice between two political paths.

Polls showed Bolsonaro holding a narrow lead as the second round approached. The final result could also determine how the executive works with a Congress that shifted right. That matters because Bolsonaro could find support for constitutional changes, while Lula would need broader negotiations to advance his domestic agenda.

The first-round results strengthened Brazil’s right-leaning Congress. Bolsonaro’s Liberal Party and its allies gained greater influence in both chambers. This matters because Congress will shape what either president can actually accomplish, including constitutional reforms and domestic legislation.

On October 4, Bolsonaro’s Liberal Party won nineteen of fifty-four Senate seats and will hold the largest bloc next year, with twenty-eight of eighty-one senators. With allies included, the right would command roughly forty-nine senators. That reaches the Senate’s three-fifths threshold for advancing constitutional amendments.

The shift also brings the right closer to the fifty-four votes needed to remove a Supreme Court justice. For Bolsonaro, this could create a favorable governing environment. For Lula, the same Congress could block or dilute proposals, forcing wider negotiations before his agenda can move forward.

Congressional alignment determines how easily a president can turn proposals into law or constitutional amendments. A right-leaning legislature would generally be more receptive to Bolsonaro’s proposed changes, including judiciary reforms and altered presidential reelection rules. It would be less naturally aligned with Lula’s agenda.

The key mechanism is voting power. Bolsonaro’s Liberal Party and allies could command roughly forty-nine senators, reaching the Senate’s three-fifths threshold for constitutional amendments. They would also move closer to the fifty-four votes needed to remove a Supreme Court justice. Those numbers could give Bolsonaro leverage over major institutional changes.

Lula would not be powerless, but he would face a more difficult political environment. The article says he would need broader negotiations to advance his domestic agenda. His foreign policy could continue emphasizing sovereignty and diversified trade, yet domestic priorities would depend on building agreements across a right-leaning Congress.

An Agreement on Reciprocal Trade, or ART, would provide a framework for Brazil and the United States to negotiate trade barriers and seek more balanced market access. Bolsonaro would likely pursue one quickly if elected. It matters because tariffs have become both an economic burden and a source of diplomatic tension.

The United States imposed Section 301 tariffs in July, hurting Brazil’s economy and bilateral trade relationship. Brazil also faces US scrutiny over its tariffs on US ethanol, its digital payment system, Pix, and enforcement of anti-corruption laws. These issues form a checklist Bolsonaro could address while seeking relief.

Relief would not be automatic. Argentina secured exemptions for more than a thousand products, but steel and aluminum tariffs remain under review, and its agreement still awaits ratification. Brazil could face a harder process, especially because Mercosur’s common external tariff may limit its negotiating flexibility.

A common external tariff is a shared tariff policy applied to imports from countries outside a regional trade bloc. For Brazil, Mercosur’s rules can make trade negotiations less flexible. Brasília may want to adjust a tariff to win US concessions, but the bloc’s common framework can limit unilateral action.

The article identifies Mercosur’s common external tariff as a constraint on Brazil’s room to maneuver while pursuing an Agreement on Reciprocal Trade. This matters because Washington is scrutinizing Brazilian measures, including tariffs on US ethanol. Changing those measures could require working within Mercosur’s trade arrangements rather than acting entirely alone.

That constraint could make a Brazil-US agreement slower or more complicated. Bolsonaro might still address the issues on the US checklist, but the result would depend on what Brazil can change independently. The tariff framework therefore connects domestic trade decisions to Brazil’s wider regional commitments.

Critical minerals are important here because they could deepen US-Brazil cooperation and connect Brazil to strategic supply chains. The article highlights Brazil’s rare earth potential as a major opportunity for Washington. Estimates cited in the article place Brazil’s reserves at the world’s second-largest, making the issue economically and strategically significant.

The proposed mechanism is partnership. Washington could conclude its minerals agreement with Brazil, expand financing through the US International Development Finance Corporation and Export-Import Bank, and explore links to US initiatives and its strategic reserve. Those steps could help develop supply connections between both countries.

Brazil is likely to insist on processing minerals domestically rather than exporting them only as raw materials. The article calls this a priority for any Brazilian president. Lula declined Washington’s February minerals alliance, leaving the framework unfinished, but the processing goal would likely continue regardless of the election outcome.

The election could redirect Brazil’s external relationships in three connected areas: security, trade, and global positioning. Bolsonaro is presented as more likely to deepen cooperation with Washington, while Lula would likely continue stressing sovereignty and diversified trade partnerships. The choice could therefore affect how Brazil balances US ties with broader international relationships.

Under Bolsonaro, Brazil might join the US-led Shield of the Americas security initiative. His administration could also designate the PCC and Comando Vermelho under domestic anti-terrorism laws, while expanding intelligence sharing, port security, and financial cooperation. On trade, he would likely seek an Agreement on Reciprocal Trade and tariff relief.

Lula’s approach would likely focus on negotiating with Washington while keeping trade partnerships diversified. Critical minerals could remain a shared opportunity, but Brazil would insist on domestic processing. Security cooperation could move quickly under Bolsonaro, although joint operations in Brazil require congressional authorization and carry political costs.