How Arab parties could hold critical balance of power in Israeli election

Holding the “balance of power” means Arab parties may not control the largest bloc, but their seats could decide which side forms Israel’s government. This matters because polls show neither Netanyahu’s bloc nor the Change Bloc has a clear route to a parliamentary majority.

Polls suggest both major blocs could win about 50 of the Knesset’s 120 seats. Arab-majority lists could win 13 or 14 seats. If anti-Netanyahu parties need those seats to cross the 61-seat majority line, Arab lawmakers could demand policy commitments or support a coalition agreement.

Their influence would depend on negotiations after voting ends. Gadi Eisenkot has ruled out forming a government with Arab parties, citing a lack of shared values. That position could make coalition-building harder. Netanyahu’s campaign is also warning against a government involving Arab parties, deepening the political conflict around their potential role.

The article reports that Arab-majority groupings could win 13 or 14 seats. Israel’s parliament has 120 seats, so that represents about 11% to 12% of all seats. Their possible influence is therefore larger than their share alone might suggest.

The two groupings are the Joint Arab List and the smaller United Arab List. The Joint Arab List brings together Hadash, Balad and Taal. The United Arab List is an Islamist party headed by Mansour Abbas. Together, these lists could hold enough seats to affect coalition negotiations.

Polls suggest Netanyahu’s religious-nationalist bloc and the Change Bloc could each win around 50 seats. Neither would reach the 61 seats needed for a majority without additional support. Arab parties could therefore become essential partners, outside supporters, or a source of parliamentary votes for a government trying to take office.

If neither major bloc reaches 61 seats, no side can easily form a government alone. The result would shift attention from election totals to coalition bargaining. Smaller parties, especially Arab-majority lists, could become decisive in determining who governs.

The article describes two possible routes for anti-Netanyahu parties seeking power. They could make a deal with Arab-majority lists, or they could go back on pledges not to work with Benjamin Netanyahu. The first option is politically difficult because Gadi Eisenkot has ruled out forming a government with Arab parties, citing a lack of shared values.

If those routes fail, coalition formation could stall. The article does not predict the exact outcome, but its polling figures point to a politically uncertain result. Around 50 seats for each major bloc and 13 or 14 for Arab groupings would leave negotiations central to what happens next.

The Joint Arab List is a coalition of Hadash, Balad and Taal. The smaller United Arab List is an Islamist party headed by Mansour Abbas. Both are Arab-majority groupings, and both could become important if the larger blocs cannot reach a majority.

The article gives limited information about differences in their goals. It presents Arab lists broadly as parties that represent Arab citizens. It identifies the United Arab List’s Islamist character, while describing the Joint Arab List through its component parties. It does not set out a detailed policy comparison between them.

Their potential approaches to Jewish parties are also politically significant. Anti-Netanyahu leaders have rejected cooperation with Arab parties, while Arab-party participation could help form a government. The article specifically reports that Eisenkot has ruled out such a government. It does not say that both Arab lists share identical conditions or negotiating positions.

Anti-Netanyahu parties face a narrow choice if they refuse to form a government with Arab parties. They could reconsider pledges not to work with Benjamin Netanyahu and explore cooperation with parties connected to him. That would be a major political reversal.

The article sets out this dilemma because polls suggest neither Netanyahu’s partners nor the Change Bloc can reach a majority alone. Each bloc could win around 50 seats, while Arab-majority groupings could win 13 or 14. Without Arab support, the opposition bloc would need another route to the 61 seats required for government formation.

The article does not describe a separate, guaranteed alternative coalition. It indicates that anti-Netanyahu parties would either need to change their position on Netanyahu or make a deal with Arab-majority lists. Gadi Eisenkot’s refusal to work with Arab parties therefore creates a central obstacle to forming a government after the election.

Many Arab citizens of Israel describe themselves as Palestinian because they are descendants of Palestinians who remained within what became Israel during the war surrounding the state’s creation in 1948. Their identity combines citizenship in Israel with Palestinian family and historical roots.

The article says hundreds of thousands of Palestinians were forced from or fled their homes during that war. Those who stayed became part of Israel’s Arab minority. Today, Arab citizens account for about a fifth of the population and often describe themselves as Palestinian citizens of Israel.

This history shapes their political position. Arab parties seek to represent a community that says it faces discrimination and is treated as a threat to Israel’s Jewish identity. After the Hamas-led assault on 7 October 2023, mistrust and hostility increased. Arab citizens reported arrests, workplace dismissals and reduced space for criticism of the Gaza war.

Under proportional representation, parliamentary seats are allocated to parties according to their share of the vote rather than awarded entirely to one national winner. This allows multiple parties to enter the Knesset. It also makes coalition governments important because one party or bloc may not command a majority.

The election figures show the mechanism clearly. Polls put Netanyahu’s bloc and the Change Bloc at roughly 50 seats each, while Arab-majority groupings could win 13 or 14. Those smaller-party seats can become decisive when the larger blocs fall short of 61 in the 120-seat parliament.

That influence creates both opportunity and tension. Arab parties could support a coalition or negotiate terms, but Eisenkot has ruled out forming a government with them. Proportional representation therefore gives Arab lists parliamentary visibility and possible leverage, even when they are not the largest political force.