Pentagon Launches 120-Day “Sprint” to Field Counter-UAS Armed USVs

Counter-UAS armed uncrewed surface vessels are remotely supervised or autonomous boats equipped to find and attack aerial threats. The proposed vessels would also counter maritime targets, adding a mobile defensive layer for surface fleets. Their purpose is to challenge inexpensive weapons that can threaten much more costly warships.

The Pentagon, Defense Innovation Unit, and Direct Reporting Portfolio Manager for Unmanned Systems are seeking production-ready USVs. They must integrate existing weapons such as Hellfire, JAGM, APKWS, or Stinger missiles. They also need sensors, autonomous navigation, station-keeping, and collision avoidance.

The target is rapid fielding within 120 days of the search. Companies must demonstrate integrated systems within 30 days of selection. Operational testing is planned at Joint Expeditionary Base Little Creek in Virginia in early 2027, with potential follow-on funding for prototypes and production.

The solicitation sets demanding mobility requirements for the proposed USVs. Each vessel must have a minimum operational range of 200 nautical miles. It must also sustain a cruising speed of at least 10 knots, allowing it to patrol, reposition, and support surface-fleet operations over useful distances.

The boats must detect, track, and engage low-flying aerial threats at ranges exceeding three nautical miles. Those threats include Group 1–3 drones and helicopters. The Pentagon considers the ability to engage larger Group 5 aircraft highly valuable, although the article does not make that capability mandatory.

These figures define the minimum operational package, not a guaranteed performance level for every submission. The vessels also need 360-degree sensors for aerial and surface tracking. Their navigation, station-keeping, and collision avoidance must continue supporting operations when communications or satellite navigation are degraded or denied.

Inexpensive drones, explosive USVs, helicopters, go-fast vessels, and low-flying aircraft can threaten surface fleets without costing as much as the ships defending against them. Their low cost and low signatures make them difficult to detect and defeat in contested environments. A single successful attack could also endanger major naval operations.

The article highlights Iran’s Shahed drone family as especially difficult for existing U.S. Navy counter-UAS capabilities aboard guided missile destroyers. These threats can arrive from the air or sea, forcing warships to monitor several approaches at once. The proposed USVs would provide another defensive layer.

The concern is not only physical damage. Defenders may spend expensive missiles, sensors, or ship resources against much cheaper targets. Loss-tolerant uncrewed vessels could absorb risk while helping interdict threats traveling toward surface ships. That could reduce pressure on crewed warships during contested operations.

The proposed USVs would not depend entirely on continuous remote control. The solicitation requires autonomous navigation, station-keeping, and collision avoidance. These functions would help the vessels move, hold position, and avoid other objects when links to operators are degraded or unavailable.

Onboard sensors must provide 360-degree detection and tracking of aerial and surface threats. That lets the vessel monitor its surroundings directly rather than relying only on information transmitted from another platform. The system would use those sensors to support detection and tracking in disrupted environments.

Weapons employment would remain under human supervision. The article does not specify the exact navigation software, sensor types, or backup positioning methods. It does state that the vessels are expected to operate where communications and satellite navigation are degraded or denied. Their design therefore combines autonomous movement with human oversight of firing decisions.

Rapid rearming would make loss-tolerant USVs easier to keep in the fight. The solicitation highly desires rearming by a two-person crew with minimal support equipment. That process could happen pier-side, in austere environments, or aboard ships, rather than requiring extensive specialized infrastructure.

After completing a mission or expending weapons, a vessel could be rearmed and redeployed. The article describes these boats as another layer of uncrewed ships able to interdict hostile airborne systems heading toward their targets. Their uncrewed design also allows commanders to accept more operational risk than with crewed vessels.

The broader effect could be a more persistent defensive screen around surface fleets. However, the article describes rapid field rearming as highly desired, not as a confirmed capability for every system. Companies must still demonstrate integrated systems, followed by operational testing planned for early 2027.

The Pentagon is seeking production-ready boats that can integrate weapons already in service or development. That approach supports the solicitation’s rapid acquisition goal. Rather than requiring a completely new missile and vessel together, companies can focus on combining an existing effect with a new uncrewed platform.

The listed options include the AGM-114L Longbow Hellfire, AGM-179 JAGM, APKWS, and Stinger missiles. They are intended to counter aerial threats, while some integrations also support anti-surface operations. Saildrone, BlackSea Technologies, and L3Harris have demonstrated relevant combinations or integration opportunities described in the article.

This strategy does not eliminate testing. Companies must demonstrate their integrated systems within 30 days of selection, and operational testing is planned at Joint Expeditionary Base Little Creek in early 2027. The effort can therefore move quickly while still evaluating how weapons, sensors, autonomy, and boats work together.

A cost-exchange ratio describes the relative expense of an attack and the defense used against it. If a low-cost drone requires a far more expensive missile or major warship response, the defender may spend more to defeat each threat than the attacker spent creating it. That imbalance can favor the attacker over time.

The solicitation says the ratio for detecting and neutralizing asymmetric maritime and airborne threats is heavily skewed in the adversary’s favor. It identifies explosive USVs, Group 1–3 UAS, helicopters, go-fast vessels, and low-flying aerial vectors as examples. These systems can threaten surface-fleet operations despite their comparatively low cost.

The proposed armed USVs are intended to improve that balance. They would carry existing weapons, operate with limited crews, and add loss-tolerant platforms around surface fleets. The article does not provide specific dollar costs for individual threats, missiles, or vessels, but it frames cost efficiency as a central reason for the effort.