Air Force needs 1,509 combat-ready jets by 2035, service tells Congress

The 1,509 figure represents fighters the Air Force expects to have available as combat-ready in 2035. They would support a moderate-risk operational profile. The term matters because the total is not simply every fighter owned by the service. It is a planning figure tied to expected operations.

The article does not define exactly what makes an aircraft “combat-ready.” It does show that the Air Force is reconsidering how it counts ready fighters after lessons from the war against Iran. The report therefore focuses on force availability, not only fleet size.

That distinction affects the target’s credibility and cost. Aging aircraft may remain in the inventory but require more maintenance, while newer aircraft can face modernization or production delays. The Air Force says it needs 1,509 combat-ready aircraft, but reaching that number depends on funding, deliveries, and how readiness is measured.

The Air Force’s 2035 fighter requirement ranges from 1,509 combat-ready aircraft for a moderate-risk posture to 1,723 for low risk. That gap shows how strongly the required fleet size changes with the level of operational risk officials accept. The figures come from the fiscal 2026 fighter force structure report.

The 1,723-aircraft low-risk projection is 214 higher than the moderate-risk target. It is also 165 above last year’s 1,558 estimate. However, last year’s report did not include a moderate-risk figure, so the article cannot establish a direct year-to-year comparison for the 1,509 target.

Lt. Gen. David Tabor said officials generally do not plan for low risk. They instead aim for a moderate level of risk. Even so, both projections face funding and industrial limits. F-35 modernization delays and F-15EX production problems could make the planned numbers difficult to deliver.

A low-risk posture would require the Air Force to plan for 1,723 combat-ready fighters by 2035. The service considers that a larger requirement than its normal planning standard. Its more relevant target is 1,509 aircraft for a moderate-risk operational profile.

Lt. Gen. David Tabor explained the policy directly: officials “generally don’t plan to low risk.” They aim for “a moderate level of risk.” The article does not give a detailed formula for that choice, but the numbers show the trade-off. Accepting moderate risk lowers the required fleet by 214 aircraft.

That choice also reflects practical limits. Fighter procurement competes with nuclear modernization and other priorities. Congress has historically resisted some planned retirements, which keeps older aircraft in service and raises maintenance costs. The moderate target is therefore a planning balance, not a guarantee that the Air Force can fund or receive all 1,509 fighters.

The war against Iran influenced the new analysis by giving the Air Force lessons about combat readiness and force structure. The report makes a renewed case for changing how combat-ready fighters are counted. That suggests wartime experience exposed limits in the previous method.

The article does not provide a loss total, identify particular combat losses, or explain the precise counting change. It therefore cannot support a more detailed account of how aircraft losses affected the model. It only establishes that the war’s lessons were important enough to revisit the methodology.

The result is a revised 2026 analysis with both moderate- and low-risk projections. It estimates 1,509 aircraft for moderate risk and 1,723 for low risk by 2035. Because the earlier report lacked a moderate-risk estimate, the Air Force says exact comparisons remain uncertain while its analysis continues to be refreshed.

The 1,509-aircraft goal depends on reliable congressional funding. If lawmakers provide less money than the Air Force requests, the service may not buy enough replacement fighters or sustain the aircraft counted as combat-ready. The target is therefore a requirement, not a guaranteed fleet outcome.

Congress can also reject planned divestments. When that happens, the Air Force must keep some older aircraft longer than officials want. Those aircraft require additional maintenance spending. The money and personnel needed to support them can compete with purchases of F-35s, F-15EXs, and future platforms.

The FY27 budget already shows pressure. It includes 24 F-15EXs and 24 F-35s in the base budget, while the Air Force hopes reconciliation adds 14 F-35s. If reconciliation fails, officials may shift other money, but Tabor said the baseline premise is that the service needs it all.

Congress is central because its appropriations determine how much money the Air Force can commit to fighters and supporting work. The Air Force can identify a 1,509-aircraft requirement, but it cannot purchase, maintain, or modernize that force without congressional authority and funding.

The FY27 budget illustrates the mechanism. The Air Force included 24 F-15EXs and 24 F-35s in its base budget. It is also counting on reconciliation for 14 additional F-35s. If that bill fails, officials could shift money from other priorities, but Tabor said those alternatives are undesirable.

Tabor described total obligation authority, or TOA, as the money available to carry out the plan. Congress also influences the fleet by rejecting retirements. That can force the service to spend more on older aircraft. Multi-year procurement could help by giving industry a more predictable future demand signal.

The procurement system links several steps. The Air Force identifies a force requirement, Congress provides appropriations and obligation authority, and manufacturers use those commitments to produce and deliver aircraft. A planned fleet therefore depends on money, contracts, factory output, modernization, and timely acceptance.

The article gives two examples. F-35 modernization setbacks have delayed the program. Production struggles have postponed Boeing’s F-15EX deliveries. Even when the Air Force includes aircraft in its budget, those problems can leave fewer combat-ready fighters available than the plan assumes.

Industry capacity is another constraint. Boeing says it is investing across its production system and expanding team training to increase F-15EX output. Lockheed Martin says it is advancing F-35 Block 4 modernization and plans to deliver 156 aircraft in 2026. Multi-year procurement could give manufacturers a more predictable demand signal, but the agreements are still under negotiation.