Iran's Hardliners Push for Nuclear Weapons as U.S. War Drags On

Iran’s public debate has shifted from rejecting nuclear weapons to openly considering them. Officials once cited Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s religious edict against weapons of mass destruction. Now, war, sanctions, and threats against nuclear sites have made weaponization a visible political argument.

Lawmaker Ahmad Bakhshayesh Ardestani said Iran had already paid a price for its nuclear program and should produce weapons. Hossein Ali Haji-Deligani called the lack of nuclear deterrence a major weakness. Mohsen Rezaei said pursuing nuclear weapons was not off the table. Conservative commentator Davud Modarresian argued a bomb mattered more than food.

The shift does not mean Iran has announced a weapons program. Other officials oppose weaponization publicly. Mohammad Mokhber said Iran already has deterrence through regional influence and its ability to disrupt the Strait of Hormuz. The debate now reflects a sharper divide between those seeking survival through nuclear arms and those relying on existing strategic tools.

Enriching uranium means increasing the share of uranium-235, the isotope that can sustain a nuclear chain reaction. Civilian nuclear power generally uses low-enriched uranium as reactor fuel. A nuclear weapon requires much more highly enriched material and a separate weapon-design process. The same basic technology can support both paths, which makes enrichment politically sensitive.

The article says Iran has long claimed its program is purely civilian. It also says Iran has ramped up enrichment since the United States left the 2015 agreement. US and Israeli officials say Iran moved thousands of centrifuges to the deep underground Pickaxe Mountain site. Centrifuges separate uranium isotopes by spinning gas at high speed.

Enrichment alone does not prove that Iran is building a bomb. Safeguards, declared facilities, enrichment levels, stockpiles, and weapon-related work help distinguish civilian use from military intent. The article provides no technical enrichment levels or confirmed weapons decision, so the precise status cannot be established from its facts.

Iran’s nuclear infrastructure is large enough to include multiple nuclear facilities, enrichment equipment, and a deep underground site. However, the article does not provide a total number of centrifuges, facilities, or stored uranium. That means its overall scale cannot be measured precisely from the available facts.

The clearest figure is at Pickaxe Mountain. US and Israeli officials say Iran moved thousands of centrifuges there. Centrifuges enrich uranium by separating uranium isotopes. Putting them deep underground can make a facility harder to damage, although the article does not explain the site’s construction or exact capacity.

The current picture is therefore substantial but incomplete. The underground location is central to the dispute because Washington is reportedly weighing strikes against it. Any further attack could affect Iran’s remaining enrichment capability, while demands for a meaningful reduction in that capability remain a major obstacle in indirect talks.

The war changed how some Iranian leaders view nuclear weapons. Israel and the United States struck Iranian nuclear facilities, while later attacks killed Supreme Leader Khamenei and senior security and military figures. Civilian infrastructure was also hit. These events made the threat of state survival feel immediate to advocates of weaponization.

Kamal Kharazi had already warned in 2024 that Iran might review its nuclear doctrine if it faced an existential threat. After the war began, Davud Modarresian called a bomb a guarantee of national survival. Ahmad Bakhshayesh Ardestani said Iran had already paid a price for its nuclear program. Their argument is that nuclear capability could discourage an attack by raising its potential cost.

This remains a contested view, not an announced policy. Mohammad Mokhber said regionalizing the conflict and controlling the Strait of Hormuz already provided deterrence. The debate may intensify if Washington resumes major strikes or continues demanding deep cuts to Iran’s enrichment capacity.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty requires non-nuclear states not to build nuclear weapons. It also places their peaceful nuclear activities under safeguards and guarantees access to civilian nuclear technology. Iran signed the treaty in 1968 and ratified it in 1970. The arrangement aims to separate peaceful nuclear use from weapons development.

The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action added limits on Iran’s nuclear program. In exchange, Iran was offered sanctions relief. The agreement involved the United States and other global powers. Its basic mechanism was a trade: restrictions and monitoring for economic benefits and restored access to relief from sanctions.

The article says that President Donald Trump unilaterally withdrew the United States from the accord in 2018. Iran then ramped up uranium enrichment, while continuing to say its program was civilian. Current US demands include a meaningful reduction in enrichment capacity, showing that the earlier bargain remains central to the dispute.

Leaving the NPT would remove a major treaty commitment that Iran has accepted since signing in 1968 and ratifying in 1970. Openly building weapons would also contradict the treaty’s rule that non-nuclear states must not acquire them. Politically, it would signal that Iran had abandoned the existing nonproliferation framework.

The article does not describe a specific withdrawal procedure or automatic punishment. Under established international practice, other governments could pursue emergency diplomacy, sanctions, inspections, or pressure through international institutions. The United States and Israel could also view weaponization as justification for stronger action, especially after already striking Iranian nuclear facilities.

The consequences would therefore be severe but not fully predictable from the article. Iran could face deeper isolation and economic pressure, while talks would become harder. It could also accelerate the security dilemma: Iran would seek protection through weapons, while its opponents might intensify efforts to stop that outcome.

Nuclear deterrence means trying to prevent an attack by convincing an opponent that retaliation would be too costly. The threat does not require using the weapon. Its intended effect comes from the fear that an attack could trigger devastating consequences. This is why some Iranian advocates describe a bomb as protection against existential threats.

The article gives two competing examples. Davud Modarresian called a nuclear bomb a guarantee of Iran’s survival. Mohammad Mokhber rejected that logic, saying Iran’s regional policy and control over the Strait of Hormuz already provide deterrence. He argued that a bomb might kill 50,000 to 100,000 people, while control of the strait affects billions.

Deterrence is not a guarantee because opponents may still strike, misread intentions, or accept risks. Nuclear weapons can also provoke arms competition and harsher isolation. Iran’s current war demonstrates the debate: advocates see vulnerability, while opponents argue that other forms of power can discourage attacks without weaponization.