New Pramana ban in US, Swiss-Asia crypto ties deepen: Asia Express

The Department of Homeland Security ordered federal civilian agencies to remove Pramana products from their information-technology systems. The order also covers Pramana affiliates and third-party products or services developed using Pramana implementations. Affected agencies cannot make new purchases.

The order reaches beyond a single application. It includes related companies and outside products that use Pramana technology. DHS warned that government employees’ and contractors’ use could expose sensitive information to China. That information could include details about US citizens and federal programs.

The measure is a federal-government cybersecurity response, not a general US ban described in the article. It shows officials are treating foreign-developed AI tools as a possible information risk inside government systems. Agencies must remove covered products and avoid new purchases, while the broader concern about access to sensitive data remains.

The article identifies Pramana through its products, affiliates, and implementations used in third-party services. It does not provide a detailed technical definition of the company or explain how its systems are built. In this context, Pramana is a foreign-developed AI technology used through products and services.

US officials’ concern centers on information exposure. The Department of Homeland Security warned that government employees’ and contractors’ use of Pramana could potentially reveal sensitive details to China. Those details could involve US citizens and federal programs. That risk is why federal civilian agencies were ordered to remove covered products.

The article does not say that a specific leak occurred. Instead, it describes a precaution based on spying fears and possible access to sensitive information. The immediate consequence is restricted government use. Agencies must remove covered tools and cannot make new purchases, including related third-party services.

The US Treasury has proposed expanding controls on outbound investment. The rules would block investment in artificial intelligence projects, described in the article as “Super Intelligence” projects, and certain high-risk semiconductor projects in specified foreign countries. They would mainly target China but also cover Russia, Iran, North Korea, and Cuba.

The proposal would implement the COINS Act from December 2025 and expand the Outbound Investment Security Program that began in January 2025. It builds on earlier restrictions against selling high-powered AI chips to China. The article frames the measures as geopolitical controls on sensitive technology and capital.

The proposal is broader than a China-only policy, but the article does not list every investment threshold or exemption. It says the rules would cover the named countries, AI projects, and certain high-risk semiconductors. Companies investing abroad would need to assess whether their projects fall within the program and reporting requirements.

The article gives a clear consequence for breaking the reporting rules: a financial penalty. The US Treasury announced its first penalty this month, totaling $200,000. The case involved Amidi, LLC and a failure to report an investment by its Chinese subsidiary.

That subsidiary had invested in Shanghai Qiongche Intelligent Technology, also known as Noematrix. The company operates in embodied AI and robotics, fields connected to the broader technology concerns behind the outbound-investment program. The penalty shows that Treasury is enforcing reporting obligations, not merely proposing restrictions.

The article does not describe additional penalties, criminal charges, or the exact calculation behind the amount. It does show that companies may be punished when they fail to report covered investments. As the rules expand to more countries and technologies, firms will need stronger review and reporting processes for foreign AI and semiconductor deals.

A yen-backed stablecoin is designed to maintain a value linked to the yen. A won-backed stablecoin is designed to track the South Korean won. The article does not explain their reserve arrangements, but it presents both as tools for digital payments and settlement. Their appeal is direct movement of currency-linked value through blockchain-based systems.

Shinhan Card, SBI VC Trade, and SBI XDC Network APAC will test yen stablecoin card payments, wallet-to-wallet payments, and cross-border trade settlement. Separately, Injective and BDACS plan a won-backed stablecoin for tokenized-asset markets. That could let institutions settle without relying on US dollar stablecoins.

These projects are still tests or plans, not established nationwide payment systems. The companies will also assess anti-money-laundering and fraud controls. Kakao, KakaoBank, and KakaoPay are building won stablecoin infrastructure, initially aimed at shopping and gifting.

Tokenization puts financial assets or claims onto digital records maintained with distributed-ledger technology, or DLT. South Korea’s plans focus on using a won-backed stablecoin to settle trades in tokenized assets. Malaysia’s central bank has launched a DLT platform for tokenized bonds. The article gives no further Malaysian technical details.

In South Korea, Injective and BDACS signed a memorandum of understanding. Their proposed system could let institutions settle tokenized-asset transactions using a won stablecoin instead of relying on US dollar stablecoins. The blockchain record would connect the asset transaction with a digital payment instrument.

Malaysia’s platform shows a central bank applying DLT to bonds, but the article does not explain its settlement process or participants. Both developments remain initiatives rather than proof of broad adoption. If they progress, they could link digital asset records with conventional institutional finance while keeping settlement in local currencies.

Anti-money-laundering controls help identify suspicious movement of funds, while fraud controls help detect unauthorized or deceptive payments. Cross-border systems need both because payments can involve several companies, wallets, countries, and settlement networks. The article specifically says the yen stablecoin test will assess these controls.

Stablecoins are digital assets designed to maintain a link to a currency such as the yen or won. They can be used in card payments, wallet-to-wallet transfers, and trade settlement. Ordinary bank money is generally represented as balances in bank accounts and moves through banking payment systems. The article does not detail the legal or reserve structure of either form.

The projects described remain tests and plans. Shinhan Card and SBI will examine controls alongside payment functions, while Injective and BDACS are exploring institutional settlement. Strong monitoring will matter if these systems expand across borders, because payment speed must be matched by reliable checks.