Maldives entering Pak orbit? Muizzu signs defence deals, calls for Saarc revival

The agreements mark a broad expansion of Maldives-Pakistan cooperation, with defence and maritime security adding a strategic layer. They matter because the Maldives sits near important Indian Ocean shipping routes, while Pakistan wants stronger regional partnerships and the Maldives is seeking wider diplomatic and economic options.

At their October 21 meeting, President Mohamed Muizzu and Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif witnessed 20 memorandums of understanding and agreements. The areas included defence, maritime security, law enforcement, civil aviation, health, education, agriculture, fisheries, tourism and technical training. Defence and security training were listed as priorities.

The exact text of each agreement was not provided in the article, so their detailed obligations remain unclear. The visit did, however, include talks between Muizzu and army chief Asim Munir on regional security, defence cooperation, institutional links and military exchanges. These contacts could deepen practical cooperation, while also attracting attention from India.

Maldives and Pakistan signed or exchanged 20 agreements during Muizzu’s three-day visit. They covered strategic areas such as defence and maritime security, alongside trade, policing, aviation, health, education, agriculture, fisheries, tourism and technical training.

The trade target is especially striking. The countries want to increase bilateral trade from approximately $13 million to $200 million within two years. That is a rise of about $187 million. In proportional terms, $200 million is roughly 15.4 times $13 million, assuming the starting figure is exact enough for comparison.

The target is ambitious because current bilateral trade is limited. Reaching it would require a major expansion in commercial activity, possibly supported by the new agreements and closer institutional ties. The article does not specify which goods or services would drive the increase, so the target’s practical path remains undefined.

Saarc stands for the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation. Its members are Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. The grouping provides a regional framework for cooperation among these South Asian states.

Its broad purpose is to promote economic, social and cultural cooperation, improve regional development and address shared challenges collectively. Muizzu highlighted this idea during his Pakistan visit, saying the region had strong potential to act together. The article identifies regional cooperation, connectivity and contacts as related priorities.

The organisation has struggled to function because India-Pakistan tensions have blocked summit-level engagement. The article says Saarc has remained largely inactive since the 2016 Islamabad summit was cancelled after the Uri terrorist attack. Muizzu’s call for revival puts the group back into diplomatic discussion, but progress depends heavily on the relationship between New Delhi and Islamabad. The membership list and formal aims come from established background knowledge, not the article itself.

Saarc has been largely inactive because its members have been unable to overcome deep India-Pakistan tensions. The immediate turning point was the cancellation of the planned 2016 Islamabad summit after the Uri terrorist attack. The article describes the attack as being carried out by Pakistani terrorists.

India responded by saying regional cooperation, connectivity and contacts could move forward only in an atmosphere free of terror. That position made summit-level engagement conditional on improved security conditions. Pakistan and India’s disputes therefore affected the entire regional organisation, not only their bilateral relationship.

The last Saarc summit actually held was in Kathmandu in 2014. Since the 2016 cancellation, no new summit has restored momentum, and the grouping has remained largely dormant. Muizzu’s proposal to revive Saarc creates a diplomatic opening, but the article gives no evidence that India and Pakistan have resolved the disagreements blocking regular regional meetings.

India has traditionally viewed the Maldives and nearby waters as part of its immediate strategic neighbourhood. If Pakistan develops sustained defence and maritime-security ties there, New Delhi could face a more competitive diplomatic and security environment in the central Indian Ocean. That would not automatically displace India, but it could complicate its influence.

The mechanism would be practical cooperation. The new agreements include defence and maritime security, while Muizzu and Asim Munir discussed regional security, institutional links and professional military exchanges. Such ties can build access, training relationships and regular official contact. The article does not state that Pakistan will establish a military presence in the Maldives.

The consequences therefore remain uncertain. Maldives-Pakistan cooperation could give Malé more diplomatic choices, while India may need to maintain its effort to repair strained bilateral relations. Muizzu’s government already replaced Indian military personnel with civilian technical staff in May 2024, showing how security arrangements can affect India’s position.

The Maldives matters strategically because it is an island nation located along vital Indian Ocean shipping routes. Those waters connect major commercial and energy flows, so developments around the archipelago can matter to countries that depend on reliable maritime movement. The article places the islands directly within India’s immediate strategic neighbourhood.

Location is the key mechanism. States with relationships in the Maldives can build cooperation around maritime security, surveillance, emergency response and access. India previously maintained military personnel there to operate and maintain aircraft used for humanitarian assistance and medical evacuations. That role shows the islands’ importance beyond combat strategy.

The article does not quantify shipping volumes or describe foreign bases. It does show that India has traditionally held strong influence around the Maldives, while Pakistan is now seeking closer defence and maritime links. Any change in partnerships could therefore affect regional calculations, even though the eventual impact remains unclear.

A small country can use relationships with competing regional powers as a form of strategic balancing. It may cooperate with one partner on security, another on trade, and both on diplomacy. This can reduce dependence on any single country and strengthen its bargaining position.

The mechanism is diversification. The Maldives has strained and then worked to repair ties with India, while Muizzu’s visit opened deeper links with Pakistan. The 20 agreements cover defence, maritime security, trade, education, tourism and training. A broader network can provide assistance, investment, skills and political options, although each partnership may bring expectations.

This approach does not guarantee independence. Rival powers may compete for influence, and security agreements can create sensitivities with neighbours. In the Maldives’ case, Muizzu’s Pakistan outreach comes after the “India Out” campaign and the replacement of Indian military personnel with civilian technical staff. The article shows balancing in practice, but does not assess its eventual success.