CoinDCX Admits Losses From Old Wallet Deposits, Denies Breach Of Active Wallets

The failure involved CoinDCX’s sweep process. The exchange used this process to move deposits mistakenly sent to old, compromised addresses so the funds could be secured and credited. That process stopped working for a period, creating operational losses that CoinDCX absorbed. The company did not disclose the amount or duration of the failure.

Users had continued depositing crypto into addresses compromised during the July 2025 incident. CoinDCX said it had notified users to use updated addresses in its app and website. It later identified the sweep failure on the morning of its update and said all affected deposits had been credited.

CoinDCX distinguished this problem from a fresh wallet breach. It said current central and user wallet addresses were unaffected, no funds from active wallets were compromised, and customer assets remained in segregated cold wallets. Trading continued as usual, although the exchange said it was still investigating flagged transactions.

A crypto wallet address is a string of letters and numbers that identifies where cryptocurrency can be sent on a blockchain. Exchanges give users deposit addresses so incoming assets can be associated with their accounts. The address itself can continue appearing usable even after the exchange replaces it, so users may rely on saved details, old records, or a previous transaction.

CoinDCX said some users continued depositing into addresses compromised during the July 2025 incident. The exchange had asked users to use updated addresses available through its app and website. It also regularly swept deposits sent to discontinued addresses, moving them so they could be secured and credited.

This creates a dangerous gap between an address being technically able to receive funds and being safe for deposits. CoinDCX said the sweep process failed temporarily, producing operational losses. It later said affected users’ deposits had been credited, including funds sent to discontinued addresses.

The article names two major figures, but it does not establish that they represent one combined loss. CoinDCX lost around $44 million in a July 2025 cyberattack. Separately, blockchain investigator Darcy flagged transfers of approximately $16 million from wallets linked to CoinDCX. CoinDCX did not confirm whether those transfers matched the operational losses it later disclosed.

The $44 million related to assets stolen when an internal operational account used to provide liquidity on a partner exchange was compromised. The roughly $16 million figure came from transactions that Darcy said were split across several addresses and routed to deposit addresses at Binance, OKX, and Gate.

The newly acknowledged operational loss remains unquantified. CoinDCX said the sweep process for deposits sent to discontinued addresses had failed, but it did not say how much was lost or how long the failure continued. Therefore, the article supports separate figures, not a confirmed total.

In July 2025, CoinDCX suffered a cyberattack involving an internal operational account. That account was used to provide liquidity on a partner exchange. The exchange said the attack resulted in losses of around $44 million. It later launched a recovery bounty programme to help trace and recover the stolen assets.

CoinDCX said the stolen cryptocurrency belonged to its treasury, not to customers. On that basis, it said customer funds were unaffected and that it would absorb the losses. This distinction separated the exchange’s own assets from customer holdings during the incident.

The later dispute involved old wallet addresses and a failed process for securing deposits sent to them. CoinDCX continued to say customer assets were held in segregated cold wallets and that active wallets were not compromised. It also said all affected deposits had been credited, while the amount of the new operational loss remained undisclosed.

Sweeping was CoinDCX’s control for handling deposits sent to discontinued addresses. The exchange said it regularly moved such deposits so they could be accounted for and secured. When that process failed, funds sent to old, compromised addresses were not handled as intended. That created operational losses without requiring an attacker to enter an active wallet.

The specific example was a deposit sent to an address compromised during the July 2025 incident. CoinDCX had told users to use updated addresses, but some users continued using the old ones. The sweep failure lasted an undisclosed period and was identified on the morning of the company’s update.

CoinDCX said current central and user wallet addresses were unaffected. It also said customer assets remained in segregated cold wallets and that all affected users’ crypto deposits were credited. The incident shows that deposit-routing controls can matter even when active storage remains secure.

CoinDCX said it absorbed the operational losses caused when its sweep process failed. The article does not say that users were charged for the losses. It says all affected users’ crypto deposits were credited, including deposits sent to discontinued addresses. That made the exchange responsible for the disclosed operational impact.

Segregated cold wallets describe a separation between customer assets and other holdings, with the assets stored in wallets kept offline. CoinDCX said customer assets remained in those wallets. It also said its current central and user wallet addresses were unaffected, and that no funds from active wallets had been compromised.

The distinction matters because deposits sent to old addresses created a separate operational problem. The exchange said the failure did not expose its active wallets or customer-asset stores. Still, the company had to absorb losses linked to securing and accounting for deposits that users sent to compromised, discontinued addresses.

The article does not explain the technical reason blockchain transfers are hard to reverse. Generally, a confirmed transaction is recorded on a distributed ledger and validated by the network. There is no single operator with a universal undo function. A sender can request a correction, but that does not automatically cancel a completed transfer.

This matters for CoinDCX because users continued sending crypto to old, compromised addresses. The exchange could warn users to use updated addresses, but it could not simply erase every transfer already sent. Its sweep process was therefore important: it was designed to move those deposits so they could be accounted for and secured.

CoinDCX said that process failed for a period and caused operational losses. It later said affected users were credited and that active wallets remained unaffected. The broader lesson is that address changes require careful user communication and reliable recovery procedures, because mistaken blockchain deposits may remain difficult to retrieve.