2 ECs complained against poll panel officer, but Cabinet Secretariat took no action: RTI

The complaints focused on Maneesh Garg’s handling of administrative authority inside the Election Commission. Sukhbir Singh Sandhu and Vivek Joshi said Garg changed the work allocation of officers senior or equivalent to him without consulting the Commission or those officers. They also alleged that he breached the 2023 law governing the chief election commissioner and other election commissioners.

The alleged changes followed Garg’s appointment as link officer of the deputy election commissioner (Administration). The commissioners said he acted despite repeated oral and written instructions not to make such changes without prior discussion or approval. Joshi separately alleged that the Administration Division did not give him a file he had requested.

The concern was especially serious because the allocation could centralise changes to voter records instead of leaving them with state-level officials. The Election Commission later said Garg’s orders were never implemented after directions from the two commissioners.

Two commissioners complained to the Cabinet Secretary: Sukhbir Singh Sandhu and Vivek Joshi. Their joint concern was not simply that Garg issued an order, but that he altered the internal distribution of authority without the Commission’s approval. They said the move affected officers senior or equivalent to Garg.

The specific allocation order reportedly could have concentrated power over changes to voter records at the central level. The commissioners believed state-level officials should continue handling those changes. They also said Garg made the changes without consulting either the Commission or the officers concerned.

The orders were not ultimately implemented. On September 26, the Election Commission said the two commissioners had directed that result. Thus, the dispute involved two complainants, one officer, and a proposed shift in how sensitive voter-record work was assigned, rather than a completed transfer of operational control.

The Cabinet Secretariat did not act because it treated the letters as personal communications rather than formal messages from the Election Commission. A note said the complaints deserved seriousness, but action without an official communication from the full Commission could interfere with the body’s independent functioning.

This position followed an initial proposal to seek the chief election commissioner’s opinion. A later note cited Section 18 of the 2023 Act, which says the Commission should act unanimously where possible and settle differences by majority. It also noted that Garg, although appointed by the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet, was now governed by the Commission’s rules.

The Secretariat therefore recommended acknowledgements to both commissioners, copying the chief election commissioner’s office. This meant the complaints were recorded but not investigated or acted upon by the executive. The disputed orders themselves had already been stopped and were never implemented.

The Election Commission of India is the constitutional body that administers the country’s election process. In the article’s context, it is the institution whose internal work, rules, and guidelines govern officers serving within it. Its constitutional status gives the Commission an independent position rather than making it an ordinary executive department.

That status mattered because the Cabinet Secretariat was considering complaints about an officer appointed by the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet. The Secretariat’s note said the officer was nevertheless serving under the Election Commission’s rules and guidelines. It warned that executive action based on individual commissioners’ letters could interfere with the Commission.

The constitutional design therefore creates a boundary between government administration and election management. The article links that boundary to independent and transparent functioning. It also records that the Commission’s business is governed by Section 18 of the 2023 Act, including unanimity where possible and majority decisions when differences remain.

The 2023 law provides an internal method for handling disagreements among Election Commission members. Section 18 says the Commission should conduct its business unanimously as far as possible. This encourages members to resolve issues collectively before turning to a vote.

If consensus cannot be reached, the law provides a clear mechanism: differences of opinion are settled by a majority decision. In this case, the Cabinet note used that provision to explain why letters from individual commissioners were not automatically formal communications from the Commission as a whole.

The rule shaped the Cabinet Secretariat’s response. Officials said executive action might be inappropriate without an official Commission-wide communication, because the matter could first be handled through the Commission’s own decision-making process. The article does not state whether the commissioners formally invoked a majority decision on these complaints.

The article points to an internal route: present the complaints as an official communication from the Election Commission as a whole. That would keep the dispute within the constitutional body instead of asking the executive to act on separate personal letters. The chief election commissioner’s opinion could also have been formally sought.

The key mechanism was Section 18 of the 2023 Act. Members should try to reach unanimity, but if they disagree, a majority decision settles the issue. Internal consultation, approval, and a recorded Commission decision would therefore provide a formal path for examining the alleged work-allocation changes.

This route would also clarify institutional responsibility. The article does not say that these steps were completed, so it cannot establish what decision they would have produced. It does show that the Cabinet Secretariat viewed Commission-wide communication and internal rules as important safeguards against executive interference.

Protecting the Election Commission from executive interference matters because elections require an institution that can make decisions independently and transparently. If the executive could direct the Commission’s internal work whenever members disagreed, confidence in the election process could be weakened. The article presents independence as a deliberate constitutional safeguard.

The dispute illustrates the boundary. Garg was appointed by the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet, but the Cabinet Secretariat noted that he was now an officer of the Election Commission. His work and conduct were therefore governed by the Commission’s rules and guidelines, not simply by the appointing authority.

That separation also explains why the Secretariat declined to act on individual letters. It feared intervention could itself undermine the Commission. The practical implication is that complaints should ordinarily move through the Commission’s own procedures, including collective communication and the unanimity-or-majority process described in Section 18.