The US should stay out of Saudi Arabia’s war

“Stay out” does not mean Washington has had no involvement. It means stopping short of directly joining Saudi Arabia’s bombing campaign or expanding U.S. military assistance. That distinction matters because support on the ground can still connect the United States to another country’s war and its consequences.

The article says Saudi Arabia asked President Donald Trump to resume airstrikes after his May 2025 truce with the Houthis. Trump resisted that request, but Washington had already sent 200 military and intelligence advisors to assist the Saudis. Those advisors make U.S. involvement real, even without American bombing.

A stricter nonintervention policy would reject new airstrikes and reconsider operational assistance. Annelle Sheline argues that the United States should stay out and instead push Saudi Arabia toward a negotiated truce. The immediate choice is therefore between deeper military participation and diplomatic pressure for talks.

The Houthis, officially known as Ansar Allah, are the armed Yemeni group at the center of the renewed conflict. They oppose Saudi Arabia and Yemen’s Saudi-backed government. Their role matters because they have repeatedly resisted military efforts to destroy them and have continued advancing inside Yemen.

The article describes their main recent tactic as drone and missile attacks. These attacks have targeted Saudi oil infrastructure and, more recently, civilian airports. The attacks killed 14 people, according to the article. The Houthis are therefore both a domestic Yemeni power and a force capable of striking across the border.

Their continued resistance shapes the policy debate in Washington and Riyadh. Earlier Saudi-led and U.S. campaigns did not stop their advances. The article presents that record as evidence that more force is unlikely to solve Yemen’s political crisis, while negotiations may offer a better path.

The recent violence has been large and deadly on both sides. According to the Yemen Data Project, Saudi Arabia carried out more than 250 air raids last month. Those raids killed over 150 civilians. The figures show that renewed fighting is not limited to military targets or isolated clashes.

The Houthis responded with drone and missile attacks aimed at Saudi oil infrastructure and, more recently, civilian airports. Those attacks killed 14 people, according to the article. The contrasting figures also show the conflict’s two main forms: Saudi airpower inside Yemen and Houthi strikes reaching important infrastructure and civilian locations.

The scale raises the stakes of any U.S. decision. Saudi Arabia wants Washington to resume airstrikes, while the United States has already sent 200 military and intelligence advisors. Further intervention could intensify the violence and revive the humanitarian disaster associated with the previous Saudi-led campaign.

The previous Saudi-led intervention became a humanitarian catastrophe rather than a successful solution. The article calls it one of the worst humanitarian crises in modern history. That history matters because renewed airstrikes could repeat the civilian suffering without settling Yemen’s political conflict.

The campaign was also aggravated by numerous alleged Saudi war crimes. The article links this record to a broader problem in U.S. policy: human rights reports may be cited against adversaries but ignored when allies face allegations. Military support can therefore continue even after serious abuses are documented.

The earlier war also failed strategically. Neither that campaign nor Washington’s more recent standoff with the Houthis did much to slow their advances in Yemen. The lesson presented here is not that the conflict lacks consequences, but that bombing and military assistance have produced enormous harm without delivering a political settlement.

Military campaigns failed because Yemen’s conflict is fundamentally political, not simply a problem of destroying one armed group. The article says the previous Saudi-led war and Washington’s recent standoff did little to slow Houthi advances. Force produced destruction, but not a settlement accepted by Yemen’s competing powers.

The Houthis repeatedly thwarted U.S. efforts to destroy them. Their drone and missile attacks continued, including strikes on Saudi oil infrastructure and civilian airports. This shows the gap between military pressure and political results: an opponent can survive attacks and retain the ability to retaliate.

The current reality makes another campaign risky. The article says history has shown there is no military solution to Yemen’s profound political crisis. Sheline therefore favors pushing Saudi Arabia toward a negotiated truce. Continuing the old strategy could recreate humanitarian damage while leaving the underlying conflict unresolved.

A negotiated truce would change the United States’ role from military partner to diplomatic pressure point. Instead of joining Saudi airstrikes, Washington could urge Saudi Arabia and the Houthis to stop fighting and address Yemen’s political crisis through talks. That matters because the article finds no military solution in the conflict’s history.

The concrete alternative comes from Annelle Sheline. She believes the United States should push the Saudis toward a negotiated truce. Her reasoning is direct: the Houthis have repeatedly resisted efforts to destroy them, while the previous Saudi-led war produced a vast humanitarian crisis and alleged war crimes.

A truce would not automatically resolve Yemen’s divisions. The article does not promise that negotiations would succeed. It does suggest that diplomacy could avoid repeating a failing pattern: U.S. support for military action that harms civilians, fails to stop Houthi advances, and leaves the political crisis intact.

Military interventionism is the practice of using a country’s armed forces, weapons, intelligence, or security assistance to influence conflict abroad. It matters because participation is broader than dropping bombs. A government can help sustain another country’s military campaign while avoiding the formal label of combatant.

The article gives Saudi Arabia as the example. Washington has already sent 200 military and intelligence advisors to assist the Saudis. The United States has also provided massive security assistance to authoritarian governments, including Saudi Arabia. These forms of support can improve an ally’s ability to fight and make U.S. policy part of the war’s wider consequences.

That connection is especially important when alleged war crimes and civilian deaths occur. The article says Saudi raids recently killed over 150 civilians and recalls earlier alleged Saudi war crimes. If Washington continues assistance, it may help a campaign it publicly describes as an ally’s war. Sheline calls for breaking with this interventionist cycle.