Israel election 2026: Netanyahu may be weak but the right wing remains as strong as ever
Netanyahu can be personally weakened without the Israeli right losing its broader electoral strength. Voters may blame him for the 7 October failure, his conduct during the Gaza war, or the political damage caused by his judicial reforms. But those same voters may still support strong security policies, settlements, and hard-line positions toward Palestinians. The clearest example is Likud’s expected decline. The party may lose 10 to 15 seats, about a third of its current total. At the same time, at least three far-right parties that include Palestinian deportation in their agendas are expected to win around 20 seats together. This shows how support can move between right-wing parties without moving to the left. The opposition also lacks a unified alternative. Its main shared goals are removing Netanyahu and requiring ultra-Orthodox men to serve in the army. Several opposition parties are themselves right wing, hawkish, or supportive of settlements. Netanyahu may therefore become weaker personally while the right-wing bloc remains politically dominant.
Why might Benjamin Netanyahu lose support personally while Israel’s broader right-wing bloc remains strong?
Netanyahu can be personally weakened without the Israeli right losing its broader electoral strength. Voters may blame him for the 7 October failure, his conduct during the Gaza war, or the political damage caused by his judicial reforms. But those same voters may still support strong security policies, settlements, and hard-line positions toward Palestinians.
The clearest example is Likud’s expected decline. The party may lose 10 to 15 seats, about a third of its current total. At the same time, at least three far-right parties that include Palestinian deportation in their agendas are expected to win around 20 seats together. This shows how support can move between right-wing parties without moving to the left.
The opposition also lacks a unified alternative. Its main shared goals are removing Netanyahu and requiring ultra-Orthodox men to serve in the army. Several opposition parties are themselves right wing, hawkish, or supportive of settlements. Netanyahu may therefore become weaker personally while the right-wing bloc remains politically dominant.
How many seats do the three far-right parties are expected to win, and how many seats are needed for a majority in the Knesset?
The article estimates that at least three far-right parties will win around 20 seats together. That is roughly a sixth of the total, making them a significant bloc even if they cannot govern alone. Their shared agenda includes the deportation of Palestinians, according to the article.
Israel’s Knesset has 120 seats. A governing coalition needs at least 61 seats to hold a majority. The far-right parties therefore fall well short of governing independently, but their seats can be decisive when larger parties negotiate to build a coalition. They may also push a government toward harder policies.
The article does not give the 61-seat figure, but it describes Netanyahu’s coalition partners and the importance of the right-wing bloc. Around 20 seats could help preserve a right-led government if combined with other right-wing or religious parties. Conversely, opposition parties would need enough seats and partners to reach 61 without them.
What is the Knesset, and why is the threshold of 61 seats so important in forming Israel’s government?
The Knesset is Israel’s national parliament. Its elected members form the legislature and determine which political group can assemble a government. Because elections distribute seats among many parties, one party often cannot govern alone. Coalition negotiations are therefore central to Israeli politics.
The crucial threshold is 61 seats, more than half of the Knesset’s 120 members. A leader needs the support of parties holding at least that many seats to form a majority coalition. The coalition then relies on those partners to pass laws and survive parliamentary votes. A party can be the largest without having enough seats to govern alone.
This explains why Netanyahu’s personal weakness does not automatically end right-wing rule. Likud may lose 10 to 15 seats, but Netanyahu or another right-wing leader could remain in power if allied parties together reach 61. The article’s focus on coalition partners reflects this arithmetic.
Which parties and political figures make up the opposition, and what limited goals do they share?
Israel’s opposition is not a unified ideological bloc. It includes Naftali Bennett, who leads Together, Avigdor Lieberman, who leads Israel Is Our Home, and Gabi Eisenkot, a former military chief of staff presented as a centre-left hope. Other opposition parties are also part of the contest.
Their cooperation rests on two limited goals. They agree that Netanyahu must leave office and that the ultra-Orthodox should serve in the army. Beyond those points, their positions differ sharply. Bennett and Lieberman are former defence ministers under Netanyahu, while Eisenkot has tried to present himself as a different kind of alternative.
The opposition’s lack of a clear shared programme matters because it weakens its ability to offer a broad governing vision. Bennett and Lieberman are described as racist, settlement-supporting, and hawkish. Eisenkot also supports developing existing settlements and has right-wing figures on his list, making the opposition less clearly left wing than it may appear.
What political and security challenges could an Eisenkot-led government face from armed settlers in the West Bank?
An Eisenkot-led government could face a direct challenge from powerful settlers in the occupied West Bank. Eisenkot has promised to return settlements to military control and reverse Bezalel Smotrich’s reforms, which the article describes as a form of de-facto annexation. That would put the government against influential right-wing forces.
The mechanism is both political and security-based. Settlers have hundreds, if not thousands, of armed militiamen and strong connections inside the army. They could use violence and organised resistance to undermine government orders. The article says even conservative commentators believe the army has lost control of the West Bank.
Eisenkot could therefore face a settler rebellion soon after taking office. Attacks on Palestinians could grow as settlers try to demonstrate that he lacks leverage. The army’s response would be crucial, especially because its loyalties in a confrontation with settlers are described as uncertain. A unity government with Netanyahu could become one possible way to reduce that pressure.
How did Netanyahu’s judicial reforms, the 7 October attack, and the Gaza war shape public opposition to him?
Netanyahu’s judicial reforms created a major domestic backlash. Hundreds of thousands of Israelis mobilised against them, making the reforms a central source of opposition. The protests showed that his leadership could provoke sustained public resistance even before the latest election campaign.
The 7 October 2023 Hamas-led attack added another source of anger. The article says the election debate includes questions about Netanyahu’s conduct and whether he knew an assault was coming. During the Gaza war, protesters also blamed him for relentlessly pursuing the war despite the danger to Israeli captives held in Gaza.
These events might have been expected to weaken Netanyahu and the right wing. Instead, the article describes a muted election with no demonstrations or mass mobilisation. Some voters support Netanyahu or his coalition partners despite 7 October and the war, or because of them. The crises therefore damaged Netanyahu personally without clearly dislodging the broader right-wing outlook.
How does Israel’s coalition-based electoral system allow a leader to remain prime minister even when their own party loses many seats?
Israel’s coalition-based system allows the prime minister to depend on several parties rather than on a single party majority. Voters distribute Knesset seats among competing lists, and the leader who can gather enough parliamentary support may form the government. This makes coalition bargaining as important as a party’s individual result.
The article gives the clearest example: Likud is expected to lose 10 to 15 seats, around a third of its current total. That would weaken Netanyahu inside his own party and reduce its influence. But right-wing and religious parties could still supply enough seats for a coalition. Their support may matter more than Likud’s losses alone.
The critical number is 61 in the 120-seat Knesset. If Netanyahu’s party and partners reach that threshold, he can remain prime minister despite Likud’s decline. If they cannot, another leader could try to build a different coalition. The article therefore distinguishes Netanyahu’s personal weakness from the right’s overall strength.
This brief was written by AI from the original reporting and checked by other models. Names, figures and quotes come from the source; read it for full context.
Read more in the JupiteX app
Pulse is free. New stories every 4 hours, each one broken into the questions that explain it.
Or read more news on the web