‘I killed lots of terrorists, but it didn’t make me feel better’: The trauma haunting Israel's elections

The headline points to trauma caused by war, especially the experience of killing, witnessing violence and surviving danger. Post-traumatic stress can affect soldiers long after combat ends. It can also spread through families and communities exposed to attacks, loss and constant fear. That makes trauma both a personal health issue and a political force.

One France 24 headline quotes a soldier saying, “I killed lots of terrorists, but it didn’t make me feel better.” The statement shows that military success does not necessarily remove guilt, grief or emotional pain. Symptoms can include nightmares, intrusive memories, anger, numbness and avoiding reminders of what happened.

Israel’s election coverage presents fear as a major motivation, particularly among Palestinian citizens, while October 7 remains central to national politics. Voters may therefore judge leaders through security, responsibility and their handling of the war. The consequences could include stronger demands for protection, accountability and mental-health support.

The October 7 attack was a Hamas-led assault from Gaza into southern Israel. About 1,200 people were killed, according to widely established figures, and around 250 people were taken hostage. The attack included killings, kidnappings and attacks on communities and a music festival. It was the deadliest day for Israel in decades.

Its political importance comes from what followed. Israel launched a major war in Gaza, while families of hostages demanded action and answers. The attack also triggered arguments over intelligence failures, military preparedness, hostage negotiations and the government’s responsibility. These issues connect security policy directly to voters’ lives.

The Times headline describes October 7 as being “at the heart” of Israel’s elections. That means parties are likely to be judged on how they explain the failure, conduct the war and plan for future security. It also keeps trauma, accountability and the hostages central to coalition negotiations and public debate.

Post-traumatic stress disorder, or PTSD, is a mental-health condition that can develop after a person experiences or witnesses extreme danger, violence or death. The nervous system can remain stuck in an emergency state even when the threat has ended. PTSD may affect sleep, concentration, relationships, mood and a person’s sense of safety.

War can create repeated exposure to combat, dead bodies, civilian suffering and decisions about using lethal force. A soldier may replay events, avoid reminders, become constantly watchful or feel guilt and shame. The France 24 headline captures this problem through a soldier who says killing terrorists did not make him feel better. Not everyone exposed to war develops PTSD.

Treatment can include trauma-focused therapy, medication or both. Families and communities also need support, because distress can affect people who were not soldiers but experienced attacks or loss. Israel’s election coverage makes the issue politically visible by linking personal trauma with national security and the consequences of October 7.

Israel’s Palestinian citizens vote in the same national parliamentary election as other citizens. Their parties receive seats according to their share of the vote, provided they pass the electoral threshold. Higher turnout can therefore change which parties enter the Knesset and how many seats each bloc receives. It does not automatically choose a prime minister.

The Guardian headline calls fear the “biggest motivation” behind high turnout among Palestinian citizens. If more voters support Arab or anti-Netanyahu parties, Netanyahu’s allies could lose seats. Even a small shift may decide whether his bloc reaches 61 seats. Arab parties could also become important outside supporters or coalition partners, depending on their policy demands.

The result would depend on turnout, the parties’ vote shares and coalition choices after counting. A stronger Palestinian vote could prevent Netanyahu from forming a government, but it could also produce a fragmented Knesset. Leaders would then need negotiations, compromises or another election if no workable majority emerges.

Benjamin Netanyahu leads Likud and seeks to keep control of the government. Major rivals have included Benny Gantz’s National Unity and Yair Lapid’s Yesh Atid, alongside smaller parties competing for seats. The exact line-up depends on the election, but Israeli politics is usually a contest among blocs rather than two parties alone.

A party needs partners because the Knesset has 120 seats and a government needs support from at least 61 members. Netanyahu’s bloc may look to religious and right-wing parties. Rivals may need centrist, left-leaning or Arab parties. Parties can join a formal coalition, support a government from outside or refuse cooperation, depending on policy and political strategy.

The headlines describe a deeply divided Israel, with October 7 and security shaping the contest. That division makes coalition bargaining especially important. The winner is not simply the party with the most seats; the prime minister is the leader most able to assemble a majority. If negotiations fail, Israel may face another election.

The Knesset is Israel’s 120-member parliament. Its members are elected through a nationwide party-list system. After the votes are counted, the president asks a leader who appears capable of forming a government to try. That leader must build a coalition whose parties control at least 61 seats.

For example, a party winning 40 seats would still be 21 short of a governing majority. It would need agreements with other parties, possibly including religious, nationalist, centrist or Arab factions. Those partners can demand ministerial posts or policy commitments. Coalition deals therefore determine not only who governs, but also what that government can pass.

The 61-seat figure is the key arithmetic behind the election coverage of Netanyahu and his opponents. If Netanyahu’s bloc reaches 61, he can seek to form a government. If it falls short, rivals may try to assemble a different majority. A failed effort can lead to prolonged negotiations or another election.

Under proportional representation, voters choose party lists rather than a single constituency candidate. Parties receive Knesset seats in proportion to their national vote share, subject to an electoral threshold. This gives smaller political movements a route into parliament and allows several viewpoints to be represented.

For instance, if no party wins more than half of the 120 seats, the largest party cannot govern alone. It must negotiate with smaller parties whose seats can carry it past the 61-seat majority line. Those partners may seek influence over budgets, religious policy, security or other priorities. The system turns coalition-building into a normal part of governing.

This structure helps explain why Israel’s elections can produce uncertainty even when one party finishes first. The headlines describe a deeply divided country and competing blocs over October 7, security and turnout. After voting, the crucial question is therefore which combination of parties can cooperate, not merely which party tops the poll.