As President Paul Biya returns to Cameroon, can he still rule?

Ruling while frequently absent means Biya formally remains president, but much day-to-day governance is delegated to ministers and officials. The arrangement matters because his physical absence creates uncertainty about decision-making, accountability, and his ability to respond to crises.

The article says analysts believe Biya largely delegates governance to his cabinet. He has spent extensive periods at a hotel in Switzerland and was away for 74 days during his latest absence. His office still issued decrees, including military promotions and transfers, showing that government actions could continue without him visibly present.

The current reality is more uncertain than clearly powerless. After returning, Biya made few visible moves, and no cabinet or vice president was announced. Online jokes suggested he might soon return to Geneva. The pattern has therefore intensified questions about whether Cameroon is being actively governed and who could manage a transition.

Paul Biya has been president of Cameroon since 1982. That gives him more than four decades in power and makes him Africa’s longest-serving president, according to the article. He is also described as Africa’s oldest leader and one of the world’s longest-ruling leaders.

His latest absence lasted 74 days. Biya left for Geneva on June 7, and his office called the trip a short private stay. He returned to Cameroon on August 20. The period was especially notable because he had been away for 42 days in 2024, making this absence substantially longer.

The length of the absence renewed questions about his health and leadership. Officials denied reports that he had been hospitalised in Geneva, but the limited video of his return did not reassure many Cameroonians. His age, travel pattern, and lack of immediate government announcements have sharpened succession concerns.

The main delayed decisions are a cabinet reshuffle and the appointment of a vice president. Biya was re-elected for an eighth term in disputed elections in October last year, but he still had not announced a new government when the article was published. Many Cameroonians hoped action would follow his return.

The delay is significant because a new cabinet would show how Biya intends to organize government after the election. A vice president could also provide a visible leader who remains in Cameroon. During Biya’s absence, his office issued decrees promoting five colonels and reorganizing military transfers, but these were limited actions rather than a wider political reset.

Since his August 20 return, little has happened publicly. The lack of announcements has frustrated people and encouraged jokes that he is only visiting Cameroon. It also strengthens questions about whether Biya can still rule actively and who is positioning themselves for the future.

The appointment matters because Cameroon has no vice president despite Biya’s long absences and the uncertainty surrounding his health. Many Cameroonians want a senior official who stays in the country and can provide visible leadership when the president is abroad.

The article presents the vice president as a possible successor. Biya is 93, has ruled since 1982, and was away for 74 days during his latest trip. His office denied hospitalisation reports, but the limited footage of his return left people unconvinced. A resident vice president could therefore reassure the public and reduce uncertainty about who is responsible.

The political effect would depend on whom Biya appoints. Likely successors are already jostling for influence, while no appointment has been made. The article does not state that a vice president would automatically replace Biya, so the role’s exact succession power remains unspecified. Its importance is mainly political and practical.

The article presents Biya’s system as highly centralized around a president who has ruled since 1982, while much daily administration is delegated to the cabinet. Over time, his leadership has also become defined by long stays abroad, especially in Switzerland, and by uncertainty over who governs when he is away.

Under his rule, Boko Haram attacks have continued in northern Cameroon, separatists have remained active in the west, and the economy has largely stagnated despite oil wealth. Analysts say he runs the country on “autopilot,” while opposition leaders accuse him of relying heavily on a cabinet rather than visibly directing government.

The article also describes a political system marked by disputed elections, protests, and force. Biya’s latest re-election triggered protests that security forces violently suppressed, with rights groups reporting at least 48 deaths. It does not explain how institutions or political practices differed before 1982, so the comparison is limited.

The article does not state Cameroon’s constitutional rules for replacing a president who cannot continue governing. It names no formal interim officeholder, timetable, or automatic transfer mechanism. Therefore, it cannot establish exactly who would take power or how a legal transition would work.

The political alternatives visible in the article are less formal. Biya could appoint a vice president, preferably someone who remains in Cameroon, and he could announce a new cabinet. Potential successors are already competing for influence. Opposition leader Issa Tchiroma Bakary also claimed victory in the disputed election, although he was forced into exile in The Gambia.

In general, constitutional systems may use an interim successor, a designated deputy, or a new election, but the article does not confirm which option applies in Cameroon. Any peaceful transfer would therefore depend on the constitution, political parties, state institutions, and acceptance of the result. Those details require information beyond this article.

Succession rules determine who may temporarily exercise presidential authority, how a vacancy is recognized, and whether a replacement or election follows. Political parties shape whether leaders accept those rules, while courts, election bodies, parliament, the cabinet, and security forces can either uphold or undermine a peaceful transfer.

The article gives a warning example. Biya’s re-election for an eighth term was disputed, and opposition leader Issa Tchiroma Bakary claimed victory. Protests followed and were violently suppressed, with rights groups reporting at least 48 deaths. These events show how contested legitimacy can make formal institutions less persuasive.

The article does not provide Cameroon’s detailed succession laws or explain which institutions would act first. It does show that no vice president has been appointed, while Biya’s absence and health rumours continue. A stable transition would therefore require clear procedures, party acceptance, credible institutions, and restraint by security forces, but the source does not say whether those conditions exist.