Opinion: India should welcome Musk’s Starlink – but ensure that it holds the switch

Starlink is a satellite internet service operated by Elon Musk’s SpaceX. It uses many satellites orbiting relatively close to Earth to provide broadband access. This matters because internet connections do not always need a nearby cable, mobile tower, or fibre network. Satellite coverage can reach remote and difficult terrain.

A user’s terminal sends data to a satellite overhead. The satellite relays that traffic through other satellites or a ground gateway connected to the wider internet. Because low-Earth-orbit satellites are closer than traditional high-altitude satellites, they can generally offer faster responses. The article describes Starlink as a service using low-orbit satellites for high-speed broadband.

India has licensed Starlink, Jio Satcom, and Eutelsat OneWeb, but all three still await security clearance before spectrum is assigned. Starlink could help connect villages, mountains, forests, island territories, and other underserved areas. Its value therefore depends not only on coverage, but also on rules controlling data, security, and service interruptions.

India’s internet totals conceal a major access gap. The country had nearly 1.09 billion internet subscriptions at the end of March, but subscriptions are not evenly distributed. About 38% of Indians, nearly 58 crore people, were still not active internet users, according to the Internet and Mobile Association of India.

The urban-rural difference is stark. Cities had about 127 subscriptions for every 100 people. Rural India had only about 48 subscriptions per 100 people. These figures describe subscriptions rather than unique individuals, so they show unequal access but do not mean every urban person has a separate connection.

The gap matters because many people outside cities live in places where networks are harder to build. Satellite broadband could help close that divide, especially in mountains, forested districts, the North East, and island territories. The article argues that India should pursue the technology quickly while ensuring fair access and public accountability.

Traditional internet infrastructure needs physical cables, fibre routes, or mobile towers. Building those networks can be slow and expensive in difficult terrain. India has villages in the mountains, forested districts, the North East, and island territories where extending ground infrastructure is especially challenging. Satellite internet can provide coverage without waiting for every cable or tower to be installed.

The article gives practical examples. A farmer could check crop prices online. A student could attend a digital class. A relief team responding after a cyclone could communicate and access information. Low-Earth-orbit satellites can connect terminals in such locations to the internet through space and ground gateways.

This makes satellite service valuable for inclusion and resilience. It could help narrow India’s urban-rural divide and support emergency work. Yet the same infrastructure also creates security questions. India must therefore expand access while ensuring that traffic, data, interception, and service restrictions remain governed by Indian law.

India has three licensed satellite internet operators: Elon Musk’s Starlink, Reliance Jio’s Jio Satcom, and the Bharti-backed Eutelsat OneWeb. Licensing alone does not let them begin full service. Each must complete the remaining regulatory process set by the Indian government.

The immediate requirement is security clearance. The government said all three operators are broadly at the same stage and are awaiting that clearance before spectrum is assigned. Spectrum is the radio-frequency resource that allows satellite and ground systems to communicate. Without the relevant assignment, an operator cannot provide service under the planned Indian framework.

This directly challenges Musk’s accusation that unnamed oligarchs were blocking Starlink. The government called his claim baseless and misconceived. The wider issue remains how approvals, spectrum pricing, and security rules will be applied. The article calls for transparent timelines, equal treatment, and no unexplained fast-tracking or delay for any applicant.

When a private company controls a satellite network, it may also control whether essential communications continue. That creates a sovereignty risk. A government, military, or emergency service could depend on infrastructure that an executive can restrict, disable, or leave unavailable. The decision may be driven by a company’s policy rather than the country’s law.

Ukraine shows the danger. Starlink became the backbone of Ukrainian battlefield communications in 2022. Ukrainian units reportedly lost service as they advanced into territory recaptured from Russia. Ukraine also sought coverage near Crimea for a naval drone operation, but Musk declined to enable it. In March 2025, he said Ukraine’s entire front line would collapse if he turned Starlink off.

India has faced smaller warning signs. Starlink equipment was recovered from a militant camp in Manipur, and smugglers used the service near the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Musk said Starlink beams were turned off over India. That was reassuring, but showed that the company could make the decision.

The strongest alternative to dependence on one satellite operator is real plurality. India could maintain several providers and avoid placing the country’s communications in one company’s hands. Competition alone is not enough; the operators must also face the same security, data, interception, and service-control rules.

The article specifically proposes room for public-sector Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited, start-ups, and capacity built with the Indian Space Research Organisation. These could operate alongside global companies such as Starlink and domestic conglomerates such as Reliance Jio and Bharti-backed Eutelsat OneWeb. Multiple providers would create more options if one network failed or restricted service.

This approach would not eliminate every risk. If control simply shifted from one foreign billionaire to a few domestic conglomerates, accountability would still be limited. India therefore needs transparent licensing, public timelines, equal enforcement, and oversight that is lawful and narrow. A diverse market should support resilience without creating several private kill-switches.

Spectrum and communications networks are more than commercial products. They carry public information, emergency coordination, military communications, and ordinary citizens’ access to services. If an operator can decide whether coverage works across a country, that operator can affect national security and public life. Control therefore becomes a question of sovereignty.

Ukraine provides the article’s clearest example. Starlink supported battlefield communications, while Musk declined requested coverage near Crimea and later said Ukraine’s front line would collapse if he switched the service off. In India, Musk’s statement that Starlink beams were turned off over Indian territory similarly showed that a company could determine availability.

Sovereignty does not require excluding foreign companies. It requires Indian rules, enforcement, and accountability. The article supports gateways and data storage in India, lawful interception, limited restrictions during hostilities, and domestic equipment production. It also rejects a blanket government kill-switch, favouring narrow, temporary interventions reviewed by Parliament or courts.