Iran has plans to target Gulf undersea cables if attacked again, officials say

Undersea communications cables are long physical lines laid across the seabed. Most use fiber-optic strands, which carry data as rapid pulses of light. They connect networks in different countries and support internet access, phone calls, financial transfers, video, and cloud services. The internet is therefore partly a network of physical infrastructure, not just software.

A cable usually runs between coastal landing stations. At each station, equipment converts signals and links the cable to national and international networks. Data can travel through several connected cables before reaching its destination. Fiber optics can carry vast amounts of information quickly, making them central to global communications.

The article focuses on Gulf cables because damage could slow internet services and disrupt financial transactions, e-commerce, and cloud computing. It does not describe the cables' technical design, but established telecommunications knowledge explains their role. Iran's officials warned that undersea cables could be targeted if Iran were attacked again.

Iranian officials reportedly drew up plans to target undersea communications cables in the Gulf if the United States and Israel attacked Iran again. Yadollah Javani, a senior Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps official, said Iran could target seven major internet cables beneath the Strait of Hormuz.

The seven cables are described as lying beneath the Strait of Hormuz, the waterway linking the Gulf with the Gulf of Oman. The article gives no cable names, landing points, seabed routes, or exact positions. It also does not say whether all seven belong to one system or to separate systems. Those details cannot be established from the source.

The threat covers more than the seven cables specifically mentioned. Iranian officials referred broadly to Gulf undersea communications cables and other digital infrastructure. One official said Iran would seek to prevent repairs after attacks. The warning therefore concerns both physical damage and the possibility of prolonged disruption to regional communications.

Modern digital services depend on continuous connections between users, businesses, data centres, and financial networks. Undersea cables carry large volumes of data between countries. If several are cut, the remaining routes may have to handle traffic they were not designed to absorb. Some services could become slower, unstable, or unreachable.

The key mechanism is loss of capacity and redundancy. Networks normally reroute data when one path fails, but multiple simultaneous failures reduce available alternatives. Congestion can delay internet traffic. Financial systems may struggle to exchange transaction data, while online shops and cloud applications may lose access to customers, servers, or stored information.

The article specifically says multiple Gulf cable cuts could slow internet services and disrupt financial transactions, e-commerce, and cloud computing. It does not quantify the likely outage or identify particular companies. The severity would depend on which cables were damaged, how much traffic they carried, and how quickly operators restored service.

The Gulf is important to digital infrastructure because it contains major communications links serving countries around the region. The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow maritime passage between the Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. The article identifies seven major internet cables beneath it, making the area a reported concentration of important connectivity.

A cable route through a constrained passage can matter because many networks may depend on nearby links, landing stations, and regional facilities. The article also says Washington's Gulf allies have invested heavily in undersea cable infrastructure. Damage could therefore affect communications serving governments, businesses, and residents across multiple countries.

The source does not provide traffic volumes, cable ownership, or a map of the routes. It does establish that Iranian officials view the infrastructure as a potential target during renewed conflict. Mohsen Rezaei separately warned that US-linked digital infrastructure across the Gulf, including data centres and AI facilities, could also be targeted.

Repairing a damaged undersea cable requires locating the fault, sending a specialized vessel, recovering the cable, and restoring the broken section. Until that happens, networks must rely on other routes or operate with reduced capacity. If several cables are unavailable, each additional delay can increase congestion and uncertainty.

Preventing repairs removes the normal recovery process. A damaged cable may continue to be an outage rather than a short interruption. Operators could reroute some traffic, but alternative paths may have limited capacity or may also be exposed to conflict. Services depending on stable international links could remain slow or unreliable.

The article directly states that one Iranian official said Tehran would aim to prevent repairs after any attacks. The stated purpose would be to prolong disruptions, including internet outages. The source does not provide an expected repair timetable, identify repair operators, or explain how repairs would be blocked.

Data can sometimes be rerouted through other undersea cables that avoid the Gulf. Countries may also use terrestrial fiber across neighboring states, satellite links, or microwave connections for selected traffic. These options can provide resilience when a primary cable fails, but they do not necessarily match its capacity, speed, or geographic reach.

The mechanism is network rerouting. Internet operators redirect traffic through surviving paths, often automatically. That can preserve some connectivity, yet the replacement routes may become congested. Satellites can reach places without cables, but they generally provide less total capacity and may have higher delays. Terrestrial routes can also depend on borders, equipment, and functioning power systems.

The article does not name alternative cables, routes, or technologies. It only warns that multiple cuts could slow Gulf internet services and disrupt financial transactions, e-commerce, and cloud computing. The practical effect would depend on available backup capacity and whether repairs could proceed.

The internet is a system of connected physical networks. Data needs a path to travel, equipment to direct it, and electricity to operate that equipment. Undersea cables provide high-capacity links between countries. Landing stations connect them to national networks, while data centres store and process information. Without those physical systems, digital services cannot function.

A cloud application still depends on servers, routers, fibre links, cooling systems, and power. Satellites also require ground stations and user equipment, and they cannot replace every high-capacity cable connection. When a cable fails, networks may reroute traffic, but the alternatives still rely on physical infrastructure and may have limited capacity.

The article illustrates this dependence through its warning about Gulf cables, data centres, and AI facilities. It says multiple cable cuts could disrupt internet services, financial transactions, e-commerce, and cloud computing. The source does not compare cable capacity with satellites, but established network engineering explains why both remain complementary technologies.