Central Bank of India reports unauthorised transactions worth ₹13.97 crore, FIR filed

Central Bank of India told police that unknown persons diverted ₹13.97 crore from its settlement account with the Reserve Bank of India. The alleged breach involved payment messages moving through IFTAS’s central SFMS server. It matters because the bank said the transfers did not appear in its usual banking records or channels.

The transfers happened over three days. Six were made on October 15, 88 on October 16 and 93 on October 17. The money was routed to 36 bank accounts. The bank’s internal team reportedly found none of the 187 transactions in branches, internet banking, mobile banking, its core banking system or its RTGS settlement account.

The bank informed the RBI, IFTAS, Daksh, NCIIPC and CERT-In. Police registered a case of cheating and personation against unknown persons. Investigators said little was known about the transactions, making it difficult to determine exactly how the money was siphoned off.

SFMS stands for Structured Financial Messaging System. It carries payment messages that banks exchange through the RBI’s RTGS and NEFT systems. In simple terms, it is the messaging layer that communicates payment instructions between participating banking systems. It matters because those messages help direct how funds should be settled.

The article describes a bank’s SFMS server sending a message to IFTAS’s central SFMS server during a normal RTGS payment. The central server is part of Indian Financial Technology and Allied Services, a wholly owned RBI subsidiary. The complaint alleges that unknown persons accessed this central system through the bank’s core banking SFMS server.

The article says partial traces of 10 accounts appeared in SFMS database logs, but their transaction IDs were absent from the bank’s records. That gap made the alleged diversion difficult to trace. The bank notified IFTAS, the RBI and cybersecurity authorities after discovering the problem.

The alleged incident was large in both value and activity. Central Bank of India reported that ₹13.97 crore was siphoned from its RBI settlement account. The money moved through 187 unauthorised transfers, showing that the alleged diversion was not a single payment but a series of transactions.

The transfers were sent to accounts at 36 banks. Six transfers took place on October 15, followed by 88 on October 16 and 93 on October 17. Together, those figures cover the entire three-day period identified in the FIR. The accounts named as payers reportedly did not belong to Central Bank of India.

The bank said its internal team could not locate the transactions in branches, internet banking, mobile banking, its core banking system, its RTGS settlement account or its SFMS server. Partial traces of 10 recipient accounts appeared in SFMS logs, but their transaction IDs were missing from bank records.

Central Bank of India was the affected bank and maintained a settlement account with the RBI, plus a separate RTGS settlement account. Its core banking system recorded customer payment instructions and connected to the bank’s SFMS server. Those systems normally support the bank’s RTGS payments.

The RBI was the settlement institution whose account was allegedly debited. IFTAS, or Indian Financial Technology and Allied Services, is described as a wholly owned RBI subsidiary. Its central SFMS server received messages from bank SFMS servers. The complaint alleges that unauthorised access reached this central server through the bank’s core banking SFMS server.

The article presents these entities as linked parts of one payment network. The bank initiated and recorded customer payments, the messaging systems carried instructions, and the RBI settlement account was debited. The alleged breach disrupted that expected relationship, because the reported transfers did not appear in the bank’s normal records.

A normal RTGS payment begins when the bank enters a customer’s payment slip into its core banking system. The customer’s account is debited, and the amount is credited to the bank’s RTGS settlement account. This creates the internal record that supports the payment instruction.

Next, a message travels from the bank’s SFMS server to IFTAS’s central SFMS server. The complaint says the amount is then debited from the bank’s settlement account with the RBI. The process therefore links the customer’s account, the bank’s internal systems, SFMS messages and the RBI settlement account.

This sequence matters because each stage should match the others. In the reported incident, the bank said it could not find the 187 transfers in its customer channels, core banking system, RTGS settlement account or SFMS server. The alleged access instead diverted money through the central SFMS route, according to the complaint.

When money moves without matching the bank’s ordinary records, the bank may lose funds without a clear customer instruction or internal transaction trail. The article says this alleged fraud cheated Central Bank of India and members of the public whose money was with it. It also created uncertainty about how the diversion occurred.

For example, the bank reported 187 transfers to 36 accounts, but its team found none in branches, internet banking, mobile banking, core banking, the RTGS settlement account or the SFMS server. Partial traces of 10 accounts appeared in SFMS database logs, yet the transaction IDs did not appear in bank records.

That mismatch can make recovery, reconciliation and investigation harder. A police officer said little was known about the transactions and that finding how the money was siphoned off was very difficult. The bank notified the RBI, IFTAS and cyber authorities, while police registered a case against unknown persons.

A settlement account is an account used to complete payment obligations between a bank and a settlement institution. In this case, Central Bank of India maintained such an account with the RBI. The article says money was allegedly diverted from that account, making it central to the reported incident.

In a sound payment process, the payment message, the bank’s internal records and the account balance should describe the same transaction. The bank’s normal RTGS process links a customer debit, a credit to the bank’s RTGS settlement account, an SFMS message and a debit from the RBI settlement account. Authentication controls should also confirm that the message is authorised. The article does not detail those controls.

Agreement among these records supports accurate settlement and investigation. Here, the bank said the transfers were absent from its main systems, while partial traces of 10 accounts appeared in SFMS logs. That mismatch shows why consistent records and strong access checks matter when money moves.