Will this election end the battle over drafting haredi men into the Israeli army? - analysis

Israel’s conscription system generally requires Jewish Israeli men to serve at 18. Haredi men have historically avoided service through long-term study in yeshivas, creating a de facto exemption. The dispute asks whether that arrangement can continue when other citizens are legally required to serve.

Haredi leaders say Torah study protects the Jewish state spiritually. They also fear army service could expose young men to secular and modern Orthodox settings and weaken their religious lifestyle. Critics argue that a growing exemption is unequal, especially when soldiers carry heavy military and economic burdens.

Since June 2023, no legal exemption exists for haredim, so haredi men face the same enlistment requirement as other non-haredi men. Enforcement remains politically explosive. Haredi protesters have blocked roads and fought with police, while wartime manpower needs have made the dispute harder to postpone.

The war began with Hamas’s deadly raids on October 7, 2023. Israel then fought on southern and northern fronts, sharply increasing the need for soldiers, especially in combat units. The pressure exposed the practical cost of having a large population outside the regular draft.

Hundreds of thousands of reservists were called up for extended periods. Between the war’s outbreak and the end of 2025, 28% of male reservists and 20% of female reservists served more than 150 days. Many standing-army soldiers remained for at least four extra months.

These demands hurt families and Israel’s economy. They also intensified arguments over fairness, because haredi men continued resisting enlistment while other Israelis buried battlefield dead or served repeated deployments. The war made postponement politically harder, and the October 27 elections could end decades of delay.

Most Jewish Israeli men are legally subject to compulsory service beginning at age 18. Men generally serve 32 months, while women generally serve 24 months, though some roles last longer. Medical, religious, family, and other legally recognized reasons can create exemptions or deferrals.

After compulsory service, most soldiers enter reserve units. Non-officers are generally liable for reserve duty until age 40, and officers until 45. Before the war, the usual cap was 54 days over three years, or 18 days per year on average. Current IDF policy allows combat soldiers up to 55 days annually.

War service has exceeded ordinary expectations. From October 7, 2023, through the end of 2025, 28% of male reservists and 20% of female reservists served more than 150 days. Israeli Arabs are generally not drafted, while Druze and Circassian men generally are.

Mainstream haredi leaders generally oppose army service because they believe full-time Torah study helps protect the Jewish state spiritually. For them, study is not merely education or employment. It is a religious contribution that can stand alongside military defense.

Their second concern is communal survival. Haredi officials view the IDF as a bastion of secularism and fear that young men serving alongside secular and modern Orthodox Jews may struggle to maintain a haredi lifestyle. Leaders worry some could weaken their practices or abandon the community altogether.

This position has become harder to sustain politically as military needs grow. Families of soldiers face long deployments, while haredi protesters resist enlistment. Still, the article notes that small groups of modernizing haredim appear more open to service, suggesting limited change within the broader opposition.

In 1948, Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion agreed to exempt about 400 yeshiva students. The stated purpose was to rebuild Torah scholarship after the Holocaust. What began as a narrow arrangement gradually expanded as military and political leaders tolerated it for practical and coalition-building reasons.

A major turning point came in 1977, when Menachem Begin’s government removed important limits on the haredi exemption. The number of draft-age haredi men outside the army then rose from roughly 7,000 in the late 1970s to tens of thousands by the 2020s.

The arrangement functioned as a de facto exemption, even though it was not always a simple formal exemption. Opposition grew in the 1980s and 1990s as the numbers increased. In 1998, the Supreme Court ruled the arrangement illegal unless legislation meeting constitutional equality standards anchored it.

The core problem was legal and political at once. Courts said a broad haredi exemption could not rest indefinitely on administrative practice. Governments therefore sought laws that would regulate enlistment, preserve Torah-study deferments, or phase in haredi service while satisfying equality requirements.

A prominent example was the Tal Law, enacted in 2002 after a commission process. It created a legal framework allowing yeshiva students to defer service and eventually choose alternatives, but the Supreme Court struck it down in 2012 as unequal. Governments then relied on new legislation, targets, transitional periods, and coalition agreements. These details are not included in the supplied article.

Later court rulings and political crises kept reopening the issue. Since June 2023, no legal haredi exemptions have remained, yet implementation still depends on enforcement and political choices. The article indicates that elections could end the long practice of postponement, but does not describe every alternative pursued.

Israel’s coalition system makes conscription policy a bargaining issue. A governing party usually needs partner parties to command a Knesset majority. Haredi parties can therefore press for continued Torah-study arrangements, while other partners demand equal service and court-compliant rules.

The historical mechanism is visible in the article’s account of gradual expansion. Leaders tolerated the arrangement for practical and coalition-building reasons, and the 1977 government removed important limits. This allowed the number of draft-age haredi men outside the army to grow from roughly 7,000 in the late 1970s to tens of thousands by the 2020s.

That political balance now faces wartime pressure. Other soldiers have served exceptionally long periods, and courts have rejected legally unequal arrangements. The article says the October 27 elections might end the familiar strategy of postponement, but it does not identify the likely coalition or policy outcome.