Are Lebanese Shi'ites abandoning Hezbollah? Poll shows majority favor disarming group - analysis

The September survey found that most respondents wanted Hezbollah's arsenal transferred to the Lebanese state. Specifically, 66.4% supported state control, compared with 29.6% who preferred Hezbollah to retain its weapons. This matters because Hezbollah has long argued that its arsenal is necessary to defend Lebanon against Israel.

The survey also linked weapons control to wider questions about national authority. Some 71.1% said decisions about war and peace should rest exclusively with the Lebanese state. Only 5.9% wanted Hezbollah's leadership to have a greater role in determining Lebanon's future.

These figures show dissatisfaction with Hezbollah's independent military role, but they do not prove that the group has lost its community base. The article reports that 59.5% still expressed varying levels of trust in Hezbollah. Its political power, social services, employment, and financial networks remain important to many Shi'ite families.

Statistics Lebanon conducted the September survey among 800 Lebanese Shi'ites. It measured views on Hezbollah's weapons, wartime performance, leadership, and security institutions. The sample gives the findings a defined scale, though the article does not describe how respondents were selected or how the poll was conducted.

The clearest result concerned weapons. Some 66.4% supported transferring Hezbollah's arsenal to the Lebanese state, while 29.6% supported keeping it with Hezbollah. Trust in security institutions showed an even sharper divide: 78.5% trusted the Lebanese Armed Forces, and 51.1% called it the institution best suited to guarantee long-term security.

Only 16.5% selected Hezbollah as the best security guarantor. Yet the group still retained broad support in other areas. Overall, 59.5% expressed some level of trust in Hezbollah, including 37.1% with a great deal of trust. The results therefore reveal criticism without complete political separation.

Hezbollah is described as a terrorist organization that also operates through political influence, social services, financial institutions, and community networks. It has built enough power to influence Lebanon's state while maintaining its own armed force. This combination makes it more than a conventional political party in the article's account.

Its stated reason for keeping the arsenal is defense against Israel. Hezbollah has argued that its weapons are essential for protecting Lebanon. The survey directly challenged that claim, since 66.4% of Shi'ite respondents supported transferring the weapons to the Lebanese state, and only 16.5% chose Hezbollah as the best long-term security guarantor.

The article also gives deeper reasons for the arsenal's endurance. Hezbollah's political power, social and economic networks, and history of representing marginalized Shi'ites help sustain it. Intimidation has discouraged opposition, while some families depend on Hezbollah for employment and assistance. The article does not provide a separate legal definition of the group.

Shi'ite residents can criticize Hezbollah's wartime performance without abandoning the systems that support daily life. The September survey found that 67.4% believed Hezbollah had failed to achieve its war objectives or had achieved only some of them. Another 42.1% expressed disappointment, anger, or concern about its leadership and the conflict's consequences.

At the same time, Hezbollah's networks remain useful and deeply established. The article says the group provides social services, financial institutions, political influence, employment, and assistance. Some Shi'ite families depend on those benefits, even when they believe Hezbollah's wars have damaged their security.

This creates a relationship based on both criticism and dependence. Overall, 59.5% still expressed varying degrees of trust in Hezbollah, including 37.1% with a great deal of trust. The article therefore presents dissatisfaction as a pressure on Hezbollah, not proof that its community support networks have disappeared.

The contrast is unusually large. A May 2026 survey cited by the INSS found that 87.5% of Shiite respondents opposed disarming Hezbollah, while only 7.9% supported surrendering its weapons. The September survey instead found 66.4% supporting transfer to the Lebanese state. The article does not resolve why the results differ.

Several documented differences could affect interpretation. The surveys were conducted at different times, in May and September, and were reported by different organizations: Information International and Statistics Lebanon. The article also notes that questions or agendas may have shaped responses. It gives the September sample as 800 Shi'ites but does not provide the earlier survey's sample size or full questionnaire.

Therefore, the figures should not be treated as directly interchangeable. Changes in events, wording, sampling, or sponsorship could influence answers, but the article does not identify the decisive factor. The disagreement itself shows that Hezbollah's support is difficult to measure precisely.

Hezbollah's influence rests on more than military power. The article says it built social and economic networks, financial institutions, political influence, and services over decades. It also benefited from the historical marginalization of Lebanon's Shi'ites. Together, these structures allowed Hezbollah to present itself as a protector and provider within the community.

The organization’s wartime role reinforced that position, but also created costs. Hezbollah says its arsenal defends Lebanon against Israel, yet the September survey found that 67.4% believed it had failed or only partly achieved its war objectives. Residents also feared that Hezbollah-linked facilities could become Israeli targets, as reported in the example from Tyre.

Its influence therefore remains durable but contested. Some families still rely on Hezbollah for employment and assistance, and 59.5% retained some trust in it. The article says weakening Hezbollah would require a stronger Lebanese army and Western and Gulf financial help so the state could replace its services.

A state has exclusive authority over decisions about war, peace, and national security when its institutions control the country's armed power. A separate organization with its own arsenal can make or shape those decisions independently. In the article, 71.1% of respondents said war and peace decisions should rest exclusively with the Lebanese state.

Hezbollah's arsenal creates this challenge because the group argues that its weapons are necessary to defend Lebanon against Israel. The article also reports that only 5.9% wanted Hezbollah's leadership to have a greater role in determining Lebanon's future. These figures show public concern about an armed group having authority beyond ordinary political participation.

The situation remains unresolved. The Lebanese Armed Forces had the confidence of 78.5% of respondents, compared with 16.5% for Hezbollah as a security guarantor. Researchers cited in the article said a stronger army and outside financial assistance would be needed for the state to replace Hezbollah's services and influence.