As Brazil votes again, Lula remains a crucial bulwark against Trump in the region

Brazil is holding the second round of its presidential election on October 25. The contest is between the incumbent, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, and challenger Flávio Bolsonaro. Its importance extends beyond Brazil because Brazil is South America’s largest country and a major regional political actor.

The article presents Lula’s government as resisting Donald Trump’s meddling and interference attempts. By contrast, Flávio Bolsonaro is publicly sympathetic to Trump and says he would join Trump’s Shield of the Americas security initiative. That choice could place Brazil inside a wider US-aligned regional bloc.

The article says the number of Trump-aligned presidents in the region rose from two or three in 2023 to 11 today. A Flávio victory would make 12. It could also affect regional security, economic policy, US influence, and Brazil’s industrial strategy.

Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva is Brazil’s current president and the candidate representing the incumbent government. The article presents his leadership as part of a regional effort to resist Donald Trump’s meddling and interference attempts. It also identifies reindustrialisation as one of Lula’s priorities.

Flávio Bolsonaro is the challenger and son of jailed former president Jair Bolsonaro. His approach is more closely tied to Washington. He has publicly expressed sympathy for Trump and said that, if elected, he would join Trump’s Shield of the Americas to fight narco-terrorism. His campaign materials reinforce that position.

The difference is therefore both diplomatic and economic. Lula is portrayed as defending greater autonomy and industrial policy. Flávio is associated with peripheral realism: accepting a subordinate relationship with the United States to gain advantages for powerful domestic sectors.

The article describes a sharp increase in presidents aligned with Donald Trump across South and Central America. In 2023, The Economist counted two or three such presidents in the region. Today, it counts 11.

The number is intended to show a political trend, not merely one election result. Trump-style leaders have recently gained power in several countries. The article links this growth to governments that may support right-wing populist agendas and closer alignment with the current US administration.

Brazil could become the next major addition to that group. If Flávio Bolsonaro defeats Lula on October 25, he would become the 12th Trump-aligned president in the region. Because Brazil is far larger than any other South American country, that shift would substantially advance regional alignment with Washington.

Peripheral realism is a theory about how weaker countries behave internationally. It begins with the belief that they possess limited economic, military, institutional, or diplomatic resources. Instead of acting as equals, they accept dependence on a stronger country and seek practical benefits from that relationship.

The article compares this relationship to becoming a wagon on the US locomotive. A smaller country may support Washington’s priorities, join its security initiatives, or shape policy around US interests. The expected mechanism is exchange: submission and alignment are traded for protection, access, or other advantages.

The article argues that these gains usually flow to ruling elites rather than society as a whole. Sovereign equality is weakened, while ordinary people bear the costs. Flávio Bolsonaro’s proposed participation in the Shield of the Americas is presented as a current example of this approach.

The article associates a Flávio Bolsonaro victory with three broad consequences. In security, Brazil could join Trump’s Shield of the Americas, an alliance presented as fighting organised crime. That move could open the way for greater US foreign intervention in international-security matters.

In the economy, proposed public-spending cuts of as much as 1.5% of GDP could push Brazil into recession. Laura Carvalho and Joseph Stiglitz warn that the cuts could hurt workers and small businesses and reduce tax revenue without solving the debt problem. These are projections, not reported outcomes.

Industrial policy could also change. Flávio’s coalition includes leading financial-market and agribusiness figures. The article predicts that these sectors would receive more attention, while industry would suffer. That would slow Brazil’s reindustrialisation, which the article identifies as one of Lula’s priorities.

The article presents peripheral realism as an established policy tradition, not a new campaign idea. In the 1990s, Argentine theorist Carlos Escudé, who mentored President Carlos Menem, advocated this school of thought. His example shows how a country might accept subordinate status to pursue practical advantages.

Costa Rica illustrates the security mechanism more directly. The article says Costa Rica relinquished its army and handed the security function to the United States. In this arrangement, a central element of sovereignty—maintaining an armed force to protect territory and people—is sacrificed in exchange for dependence on a stronger power.

Together, the examples show the theory’s cost. Governments may gain security or diplomatic benefits, but they give up independent capacity and accept asymmetry. The article argues that society generally bears the consequences, while ruling elites are more likely to receive the benefits.

Sovereign equality is the international-law principle that each state has equal legal status and authority over its own affairs, even when countries differ greatly in size, wealth, or military strength. It does not claim that all countries have equal power. It means power differences should not erase legal equality.

The article contrasts this principle with peripheral realism. Peripheral realism begins by accepting asymmetry between nations and then encourages weaker states to align with the strongest country. In practice, that can mean allowing another power greater influence over security, diplomacy, or economic choices.

This matters because legal equality supports independent decision-making and mutual respect among states. If submission becomes normal, a country may trade away parts of its sovereignty for short-term advantages. The article warns that those advantages often serve ruling elites, while society absorbs the broader political and economic costs.