How Brazil's changing working class is reshaping the presidential race

Brazil's working class is no longer centered mainly on factories, unions, and collective action. Millions now work in services, delivery, driving, market stalls, or small businesses. This matters because Lula's political strength was built among industrial workers and through union organizing. The new workforce does not automatically respond to that older coalition.

Osasco shows the mechanism clearly. Factories closed, while malls and delivery-app companies expanded. Metalworkers' union leader Gilberto Almazan says workers now want more freedom over their days and hours. Some voters also blame inflation, taxes, crime, corruption, debt, and government spending. Those frustrations pushed some former Lula supporters toward Flávio Bolsonaro or away from voting.

The result was a first-round Bolsonaro victory in Osasco, even though the municipality backed Lula in 2022. Nationally, abstention reached 33 million, further hurting Lula's campaign. Lula is trying to mobilize voters, especially students, while Bolsonaro offers spending and tax cuts but promises to retain some welfare programs.

Osasco changed because its economic and social base changed. It was once strongly associated with industrial employment and metalworkers' unions. After heavy deindustrialisation, factories closed and the workforce became more service-based. The city now has shopping malls, delivery-app companies, market sellers, drivers, and other individual workers. That weakened the direct connection between Lula and local working-class voters.

The political mechanism was frustration combined with uncertainty. Voters described high taxes, inflation, household pressure, crime, corruption, and dissatisfaction with the economy. Some could not name a specific Bolsonaro policy but wanted to try something different. Tairine, who sells hot dogs, said that nothing had changed for poor people and planned to vote for Bolsonaro. Gisele Bonfim also moved from Lula to Bolsonaro because he represented change.

Osasco therefore backed Bolsonaro in the first round, despite voting for Lula in 2022. The switch shows how economic transformation can alter political loyalties. It also signals the challenge Lula faces in rebuilding support among workers outside traditional unions and factories.

Thirty-three million people did not vote in Brazil's first round. The article calls this the highest abstention since 1998. Voting is compulsory, so nonvoters can incur a fine, yet many still stayed away. The scale mattered because a presidential result depends not only on persuading voters, but also on bringing supporters to polling stations.

Lula's campaign was particularly affected. The article says some frustrated voters abstained rather than choosing Bolsonaro. Others actively supported something new. In Osasco, for example, Tairine had previously abstained but planned to vote for Bolsonaro, while Gisele Bonfim moved from supporting Lula to backing his opponent. These choices reduced Lula's support and strengthened Bolsonaro's first-round position.

Bolsonaro won the first round, and the two candidates proceeded to a runoff. Lula's campaign responded by trying to mobilize hundreds of thousands of people, particularly students. High abstention therefore became both an explanation for the first-round result and a central target of the campaign before Sunday.

The gig economy is a pattern of individualised work. In the article, it includes driving for Uber, delivering food, running a market stall, and providing beauty treatments at home. People often organise their own work instead of holding conventional factory jobs. The work can be connected to an app, but it can also mean operating a small personal business.

That differs from the factory-based system once common in Osasco. Industrial workers shared workplaces, employers, and occupational interests. Metal, chemical, and textile factories supported unions and collective action. After those factories disappeared, malls, delivery companies, and service work expanded. Workers became more dispersed and often controlled their own schedules, making the old industrial model less central.

The shift changed politics as well as employment. Union leader Gilberto Almazan calls it “Uber-isation” and says many workers want freedom and flexible hours. Lula's traditional support came from organised industrial labor and welfare politics. The new workforce may therefore require different ways of building political support and representing workers.

Deindustrialization changed the workplace that had helped create Lula's political base. Industrial workers once gathered in factories and unions, where they could organize strikes, negotiate collectively, and build shared political demands. Lula's story as a metalworker and union leader made him a powerful symbol of that world. When factories closed, the social foundation supporting that identity weakened.

Osasco demonstrates the mechanism. Metal, chemical, and textile factories disappeared, while five malls were built. The city gained service workers, delivery workers, market sellers, and people running small businesses. Gilberto Almazan, who leads a metalworkers' union, says the union movement is stuck in the “Middle Ages” and struggling to keep up. Workers are now more dispersed and often seek flexible schedules.

This affected Lula's coalition by making its traditional language and institutions less universal. Lula remains associated with workers' rights and welfare programs, but some newer workers prefer individual freedom. The article presents this as a major reason former supporters turned away, abstained, or considered Bolsonaro's promise of change.

Gig workers may prefer individual work because it gives them more control over their days and hours. The article describes people driving, delivering, selling products, or providing beauty treatments independently. Their work is not organized around one factory or a single large employer. That makes flexibility a more immediate concern than the collective workplace identity associated with industrial unions.

Gilberto Almazan explains the contrast directly. He says many workers need “more freedom, flexibility of days and hours,” rather than the welfare and collective action Lula offered. A market seller can use a portable card machine and work directly with customers. A driver or delivery worker can similarly organize work around personal needs. The article presents this as a shift toward individualised labor.

This does not mean every gig worker rejects unions or welfare. It means Lula's older political offer may feel less closely matched to their daily reality. Parties seeking their support must address flexible work, economic pressure, and independence, while still responding to concerns about taxes, prices, debt, and public services.

Economic progress does not automatically feel like financial security. During Lula's current presidency, unemployment fell to a record low and Brazil left the UN's Hunger Map. Yet prices also rose, while household debt and interest rates remained high. Families can be better off by broad measures but still feel squeezed when income disappears into necessities, loans, taxes, and monthly payments.

The article calls this a crisis of “expectations.” Robson, a municipal civil servant from Pernambuco, says people face a choice between paying a car installment and putting food on the table. Tairine points to taxes on “everything” she buys and says inflation makes life difficult for poor people. These experiences make national improvements feel distant or incomplete.

That gap helps explain political frustration. Voters may acknowledge progress while blaming the government for current costs, deficits, public spending, or economic management. Some abstain, while others seek change. The election therefore turns on lived household pressure as much as on headline employment and poverty indicators.