US envoy accuses Druze sheikh of using its backing to persecute other members of the community

US envoy Tom Barrack said his main concern was “a particular Druze sheikh,” though he did not identify him. He accused the leader of exploiting the belief that Israel backed him and that Washington was aligned with him. Barrack said this influence was being used to persecute other members of the Druze community.

The remarks came amid tensions around Hikmat al-Hijri, a prominent spiritual leader in Sweida. Hijri opposes Damascus’s authority, has called for Israeli support, and advocates independence from Syria. His supporters also raised Israeli flags at a Sweida rally earlier this month.

Barrack rejected claims that Washington supports the sheikh, calling them “absolutely wrong.” His comments show how perceived foreign backing can deepen internal divisions. They also risk increasing tensions between Hijri’s supporters, Damascus, Israel, and other Druze groups.

The Druze are a distinct, Arabic-speaking religious community whose members live mainly in Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and Jordan. Their faith developed from an Islamic intellectual tradition but has its own beliefs and communal identity. They are not simply a political bloc; different leaders and communities can take different positions.

In Syria, Sweida is the community’s principal centre and lies in the country’s south. It has become especially important because Hikmat al-Hijri, a prominent Druze spiritual leader there, opposes Damascus’s authority. His supporters have backed self-determination and displayed Israeli flags at a rally.

That combination makes Sweida strategically sensitive. It borders areas affected by Syrian government control, Israeli military activity, armed factions, and illicit trade allegations. The article describes competing claims over protection, autonomy, foreign support, and community leadership, making Sweida a key pressure point in southern Syria.

The article does not provide a population count. Widely cited estimates place the global Druze population at roughly one million or somewhat more, concentrated in four nearby countries. Syria is generally considered home to the largest community, followed by Lebanon, Israel, and Jordan.

Approximate country figures are 700,000 to 800,000 in Syria, 250,000 to 300,000 in Lebanon, about 150,000 in Israel, and roughly 20,000 to 30,000 in Jordan. Numbers vary because censuses use different methods and some estimates count citizens, residents, or wider communities differently.

Geographically, Syrian Druze are concentrated in Sweida and nearby southern areas, with smaller communities around Damascus and elsewhere. Lebanese Druze live mainly in Mount Lebanon and nearby districts. Israel’s communities are concentrated in the Galilee, Carmel, and Golan Heights, while Jordan’s are smaller and mostly northern. These links give the community regional significance.

Hikmat al-Hijri has declared that the move toward self-determination cannot be reversed. His stated goal is a fully independent administration for Jabal Bashan. The proposed administration would be entirely distinct from the government in Damascus, rather than simply receiving limited local powers.

This position challenges Damascus because it rejects the central government’s authority over the area. It also turns a dispute over local security and representation into a question about territory and sovereignty. Hijri’s opposition to Damascus, together with his calls for Israeli support, has made his leadership especially controversial.

The article links the independence drive to the “Bashan administration,” which denies Barrack’s accusations about captagon production. If the project advances, it could harden political divisions inside Syria and increase outside involvement. The article does not state whether Damascus accepts the proposal or how it might respond.

Israel presents its military involvement in southern Syria as protection for the Druze. Barrack said Israel’s relationship with Druze communities is deeper than political interference, pointing to Druze in the Golan Heights and along the border. Israel also struck Syrian government forces during Sweida fighting in July 2025.

Syria views incursions as dangerous because they can provoke a military response. Barrack said Damascus has shown restraint, fearing that “the fire is going to explode” if Syria reacts to an Israeli incursion. He also said Israel uses a claimed buffer zone while Druze conduct themselves in ways he described as inappropriate.

The result is a dangerous cycle. Israeli actions are framed as protection, while Syria sees them as violations that could widen conflict. Continued mistrust, border tensions, and uncertainty over Syria’s new leadership make escalation harder to control, even as Barrack expects eventual Syrian-Israeli understanding.

If fighting expands among Druze factions, Damascus, and Israel, southern Syria could become a larger and more dangerous conflict zone. Local disputes over leadership and autonomy could combine with cross-border military action. That would make the area harder to govern and increase risks for civilians and nearby communities.

The mechanism is escalation. Druze factions may seek outside backing or use armed force; Damascus may try to restore authority; and Israel may intervene while describing its actions as protection. Barrack warned that a Syrian response to an Israeli incursion could make “the fire” explode. Alleged captagon revenues could further help armed groups obtain weapons.

The article says Syria and Israel are conducting trust-building talks and may eventually reach an understanding. But continuing mistrust remains. Without restraint or a political settlement, fighting could spread beyond Sweida, intensify regional tensions, and make negotiations more difficult.

Minority communities often seek protection when the central state cannot provide security or trusted representation. Foreign governments may offer political, military, or symbolic support, whether openly or through local partners. That support can strengthen a community’s bargaining position, but it can also deepen internal rivalries and make local leaders appear externally empowered.

Illicit economies add another source of power. Drug production or trafficking can provide money for weapons, salaries, and influence when formal institutions are weak. In this case, Barrack alleged that armed Druze factions in Sweida fund weapons through the captagon trade. The Bashan administration rejected the claim and said its community fought smuggling networks.

These forces can create a self-reinforcing cycle. Insecurity encourages communities to arm themselves, foreign involvement increases suspicion, and illicit revenue sustains armed actors. The article presents these as disputed and competing claims, not settled facts. Their interaction could further fragment Syria and complicate negotiations over authority.