Defence Forces to seek more than 550 armoured vehicles from France

Ireland is planning to buy three French vehicle types: the Griffon, a six-wheel armoured personnel carrier; the smaller, four-wheel Serval; and the Jaguar, an armoured fighting vehicle with a large turreted gun. Together, they would give the Army much more protected mobility and firepower than its current light-infantry structure.

The purchase would take place under France’s Scorpion Programme. It is described as a government-to-government scheme. The new vehicles would complement Ireland’s existing Mowag armoured personnel carriers, which recently received a €95 million midlife refit. The programme would also involve French support, including likely initial training in France and help maintaining the vehicles.

The plan remains under assessment. Vehicle specifications, numbers, costs, training arrangements and support requirements have not been finalised. The Government still needs to complete negotiations and approval processes before any purchase can proceed.

Military planners are expected to recommend more than 550 armoured vehicles for Ireland’s Defence Forces. This is a major increase from earlier estimates of between 300 and 400 vehicles. The larger figure reflects an ambition to create a complete armoured capability rather than acquire only a limited number of protected vehicles.

The proposed fleet would be large enough to equip an entire brigade of about 4,000 troops. It would include Griffon carriers, smaller Serval vehicles and Jaguar fighting vehicles. These would operate alongside the Army’s existing Mowag armoured personnel carriers, which have recently undergone a €95 million midlife refit.

The scale also creates practical challenges. Ireland would need enough trained personnel, storage, infrastructure and maintenance capacity to support the fleet. The Department of Defence says fleet size and other details remain subject to negotiations, assessment and approval, so the final number could still change.

Ireland’s Army is currently described as a light infantry force with limited armoured elements. More than 550 new vehicles would change that balance. Soldiers could move in protected carriers, while Jaguar vehicles would add turreted-gun firepower. The result would be a force better prepared for organised, conventional combat rather than mainly peacekeeping duties.

The key mechanism is scale. The proposed fleet could equip an entire brigade of about 4,000 troops. Griffons would provide protected transport, Servals would offer smaller armoured mobility, and Jaguars would supply heavier combat capability. Together, these vehicles would create a more integrated armoured formation rather than isolated vehicle units.

The transformation would not come from vehicles alone. It would require doctrine, training, infrastructure, personnel and interoperability, all of which the Department of Defence says must be integrated. Experts warn that Ireland currently lacks the maintenance specialists and experience needed to manage such a large capability.

The proposed vehicles serve two connected purposes. First, they would help the Defence Forces provide the home defence of Ireland. Second, they would support participation in EU expeditionary operations, including the EU Rapid Deployment Capability, also known as the EU Battlegroup.

Armour also matters for overseas peacekeeping. The article points to highly unstable areas such as the Sahel region in Africa. Protected vehicles could give Irish soldiers greater protection while moving and operating in dangerous environments. The fleet would therefore support both combat readiness and the safety of personnel on missions that are not conventional wars.

This dual role explains why the programme is broader than a simple vehicle replacement. Ireland wants a force capable of limited conventional war fighting, EU deployments and protected peacekeeping. However, the plan remains unfinished. Numbers, roles, training, support arrangements, costs and timelines are still being assessed and negotiated.

A military vehicle’s price covers only the initial acquisition. Ireland would also have to pay for maintenance, spare parts, specialist staff, training, facilities and long-term support. Those costs continue for as long as the vehicles remain in service, so the total can greatly exceed the contract price.

Belgium provides the article’s clearest example. In 2018, it agreed to buy 442 Scorpion vehicles from France for an announced €1.6 billion. Last year, Belgium’s Court of Auditors said the vehicles’ total lifetime cost would exceed €14 billion. That estimate included €60 million a year for maintenance.

Ireland’s proposed fleet would be larger than Belgium’s purchase, at more than 550 vehicles, although its final price and structure are not yet known. Alan Kearney called the procurement cost “a drop in the ocean” beside lifetime expenses. The eventual bill will depend on support arrangements and government funding.

Operating more than 550 armoured vehicles requires much more than crews and fuel. Ireland would need maintenance workshops, storage, spare-parts systems, repair arrangements and infrastructure large enough for a brigade-sized fleet. It would also need doctrine, training and interoperability systems so the vehicles can work effectively with other forces.

France is expected to provide significant assistance. Some initial training may take place in France, and French support will be important for maintenance. The mechanism is a whole-of-capability approach: vehicle procurement must be planned together with training, personnel, infrastructure, doctrine and support rather than treated as a standalone purchase.

The current position is difficult. Alan Kearney said the Army is short of enlisted personnel specialising in vehicle maintenance. Numbers are growing slowly, but experience takes years to develop. The Department of Defence says these requirements remain under negotiation, while the programme is still in its assessment phase.

Previous Irish procurement problems raise questions about whether the Defence Forces can manage a much larger, more complex fleet. The article reports maintenance and spare-parts difficulties with the Mowag fleet. It also describes an incident in Syria in 2013 when two machine guns broke during a firefight with Islamic forces.

Other examples are more recent. The State’s spending watchdog found that buying 27 light armoured vehicles in 2008 wasted millions of taxpayer funds. In the Air Corps, all four PC-12 aircraft bought in 2020 for close to €50 million are out of service because of maintenance issues. These cases show how support failures can reduce operational availability and waste money.

The risks are especially serious for the proposed armoured fleet. Ireland lacks enough experienced maintenance personnel, while training and infrastructure take years to build. The Department says it has learned lessons and is using a whole-of-capability approach, but the programme remains under assessment.