As Israeli election looms, Trump advisers see opportunity beyond Netanyahu

Trump endorsed Netanyahu because the two have a close, familiar relationship, even though it has often been turbulent. Trump has never worked with another Israeli prime minister and does not personally know the other candidates. One adviser called Netanyahu “the devil he knows.” The endorsement also protected Trump politically in either election outcome.

If Netanyahu won or stayed on as caretaker prime minister, Trump could claim credit for helping him and use that leverage to seek concessions. If Netanyahu lost, Israel's new leaders would still have strong reasons to maintain good relations with the U.S. The endorsement could then become a footnote.

Some advisers opposed endorsing Netanyahu because they saw opportunities with a different government. They were frustrated by Netanyahu's approach to Trump's Gaza peace plan, Syria, Lebanon, and West Bank priorities. They also questioned his pre-war assessments and whether he remained the best partner for Trump's regional ambitions.

The Knesset is Israel's parliament. The article identifies it as a 120-member body. Its importance is practical: the government needs support from a majority of its members to govern and pass measures. That majority is 61 seats, making election results a contest over parliamentary support rather than simply the top party.

After the election, parties and blocs negotiate over forming a government. A prime minister needs enough lawmakers behind the government to reach or reliably maintain the 61-seat threshold. This is why coalition alliances matter. A party can perform strongly but still need partners to govern.

The article's polls showed neither main side clearly reaching 61 seats. Netanyahu's bloc was projected at 50 seats. Gadi Eisenkot's opposition bloc was projected at 52 to 56, while two Arab Israeli parties were projected at 14 to 16 combined. Those figures pointed toward bargaining or deadlock.

Israel's Knesset has 120 seats, so a governing majority requires 61. That threshold matters because a bloc below 61 cannot count on majority support by itself. It must attract partners, build a broader coalition, or find another arrangement that can survive parliamentary votes.

The final polls described in the article put Netanyahu's bloc at 50 seats. That was 11 short of a majority. Gadi Eisenkot's opposition bloc was projected to win between 52 and 56 seats, leaving it five to nine seats short. Two Arab Israeli parties were projected to receive another 14 to 16 seats, making them potentially important to coalition arithmetic.

The numbers suggested no clear governing path. They also showed a sharp decline for Netanyahu's Likud, projected at 20 seats compared with its current 32. Pro-Netanyahu Channel 14 was the outlier, forecasting 60 seats for his bloc, still one short of 61.

A bloc that cannot reach 61 seats lacks a clear parliamentary majority. It may still try to form a government by recruiting smaller parties or securing outside support. If competing blocs also fail, the election produces deadlock instead of a settled governing coalition.

The article points to this risk because Netanyahu's bloc was projected at 50 seats and Eisenkot's bloc at 52 to 56. It also says Netanyahu could remain in power as caretaker prime minister if he lost. That means the existing government may continue temporarily while leaders try to form a new one.

Under Israel's parliamentary system, coalition negotiations are the immediate next step. If they fail, established practice allows another government-formation attempt and can ultimately lead to another election. The precise outcome depends on constitutional procedures and political agreements, which the article does not detail. The central effect is continued uncertainty over who can govern.

Trump's advisers believed a government without Netanyahu's far-right coalition partners could be easier to negotiate with. The issue was not simply Netanyahu personally. It was also the influence of coalition partners on military policy, diplomacy, and relations with Palestinians and neighboring states.

In Gaza, Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner were frustrated by Netanyahu's reluctance to implement Trump's peace plan. Tom Barrack had similar concerns about Israel's approach to Damascus and continued operations in Syria. Marco Rubio's team thought Israel could do more to strengthen Lebanon's government and curb settler attacks in the West Bank.

A different coalition could give Israeli leaders more room to make compromises or support Trump's diplomatic goals. The article does not say that a new government would definitely cooperate. It says some U.S. officials viewed it as potentially easier to work with. Its composition, especially the coalition partners, would shape Trump's prospects for Gaza, Syria, Lebanon, and a Saudi agreement.

A hung parliament does not automatically end the government-forming process. Leaders can negotiate with smaller parties, seek outside backing, or assemble a coalition broad enough to pass the 61-seat threshold. The immediate goal is to create a government that can command parliamentary support.

A minority government is one option. It has fewer than 61 coalition seats but survives by winning support or abstentions from parties outside the coalition. A unity government is another, bringing major rival blocs into the same coalition. Those models can avoid an immediate election, but they require difficult agreements on policy and leadership.

If negotiations fail, another election is a further possibility under Israel's parliamentary system. The article itself emphasizes potential deadlock and says Netanyahu could remain caretaker prime minister. It does not specify which alternative would occur. The likely political question is whether parties prefer compromise, temporary minority rule, or returning the decision to voters.

In Israel's proportional parliamentary system, parties gain Knesset seats based broadly on their share of the vote. The prime minister therefore usually depends on several parties rather than one dominant winner. Governing power comes from assembling enough lawmakers to reach 61 of the 120 seats.

For example, the polls gave Netanyahu's bloc 50 seats and Eisenkot's bloc 52 to 56. Neither bloc reached 61, even though each represented a substantial share of the projected parliament. The two Arab Israeli parties were projected to hold another 14 to 16 seats, showing how smaller parties can become important during coalition negotiations.

This system turns elections into coalition-building contests. A party may win more seats than any rival and still lack a majority. Likud illustrates that distinction: it was projected at 20 seats, down from 32, while Netanyahu's broader bloc was projected at 50. Partners are therefore essential to forming a government and sustaining it.