David Seymour has no issue with Māori customary rights - just ‘activist’ judges

Act’s “one law for all” package aims to make legal rights clearer and more uniform. It would add three principles to the Constitution Act: Parliament is sovereign, the rule of law is fundamental, and all New Zealanders are equal before the law. It would also protect property rights under the Bill of Rights Act.

The proposal would stop new statutes using vague Treaty of Waitangi clauses. It would also amend the Legislation Act so judges could not override clear statutory language while interpreting laws. Act says this would reduce uncertainty and perceived judicial overreach.

Seymour links the changes to productivity. He argues that uncertainty over Treaty obligations can delay resource-management decisions, infrastructure, housing, and investment. The package follows Act’s defeated Treaty Principles Bill, which failed at its second reading during the term described.

“Judicial activism” is not defined in the article as a formal legal rule. In Act’s argument, it describes judges interpreting broad or unclear Treaty wording in ways that expand legal obligations. Seymour believes this creates uncertainty about rights, responsibilities, and government decisions.

The article gives resource management and customary rights as examples. Act says vague Treaty clauses can allow courts to influence how Māori engagement or property claims operate. Seymour argues that courts have interpreted the Foreshore and Seabed Act and Marine and Coastal Area Act widely, beyond what he considers their original intent.

The issue matters because Parliament writes the statutes, while judges interpret them. Act’s proposal would require judges not to override clear statutory language. It would also discourage vague Treaty references in future laws, potentially narrowing the room for judicial interpretation.

Māori customary rights are traditional rights that may be recognised through common law. The article links them to taonga, meaning treasures or resources, and to possible interests in the foreshore, seabed, freshwater, and genetic resources. These rights concern ownership or control questions, rather than only consultation.

The article uses the Ngāti Apa case as an example. It says the case discovered customary rights under an English legal system. Professor Andrew Geddis explains that the common-law position in 1840 was to continue recognising the property of people already living in the country. Parliament later gave legal force to Māori engagement rights through legislation.

Act says it accepts customary rights in specific instances but objects to what it sees as broad judicial interpretations. The article does not decide who owns freshwater or genetic resources. It presents these as unresolved questions involving property law and Treaty interpretation.

No total is stated in the supplied article. It discusses Act’s objection to “vague” Treaty of Waitangi clauses in new statutes, but it does not count how many existing New Zealand laws contain such references. A precise answer cannot be drawn from the text.

The article instead explains why Act considers the issue important. Seymour says Treaty obligations can create uncertainty in resource management and other areas. He argues that unclear legal language can make it harder to know who has rights, who must be consulted, and whether investment or development can proceed.

Act’s proposal would stop vague Treaty clauses in new statutes and would restrict judges from overriding clear statutory language. However, the article supplies no baseline number and no estimate of how many laws would be affected. Any figure would require information outside the provided source.

The Ngāti Apa court case in 2003 concerned whether Māori customary rights could exist in the foreshore and seabed. The article says those rights were discovered under an English legal system. Seymour says he accepts customary rights when they arise through that legal framework.

The case sparked the foreshore and seabed furore because it raised the possibility that customary property interests could be legally recognised. The article connects the dispute to the Foreshore and Seabed Act and later the Marine and Coastal Area Act, or Maca. These laws addressed the political and legal consequences of the issue.

Seymour argues that the matter later “metastasised” through broad court interpretations. He says the courts moved beyond ordinary common-law property rights. The coalition Government subsequently changed Maca, supposedly restoring it to its original intent, although the supplied text ends before explaining those changes.

If implemented, Act’s proposals would give clearer priority to Parliament’s wording. The Legislation Act would say judges cannot override clear statutory language. New laws would also avoid vague Treaty clauses, reducing the scope for courts to infer broad obligations from general references.

The likely mechanism is a sharper distinction between Parliament’s choices and judicial interpretation. Property rights would receive protection under the Bill of Rights Act. Customary rights could still be recognised where common law or legislation supports them, but judges would have less room to extend unclear statutory provisions.

The article presents this as a way to create legal certainty and support investment, infrastructure, and resource management. It also records opposition to Act’s position: Māori rights to taonga may themselves be property rights, while Treaty-based engagement can be created by Parliament. The exact effects would depend on the wording Parliament enacted.

Parliament creates statutes and chooses whether to give Treaty-based rights legal force. The article says Māori engagement rights were not ordered by courts into the Resource Management Act; governments chose to include them in legislation. Act’s proposal would also affirm Parliament’s sovereignty.

Courts interpret legislation and may recognise rights under the Treaty or common law. Common law is the inherited legal system in which existing property rights were recognised. Professor Andrew Geddis says the 1840 position was that laws already applying would continue, including recognition of property held by people who were already there.

Parliament can change the law after a court ruling because it controls legislation. The article connects Ngāti Apa with later Foreshore and Seabed and Marine and Coastal Area laws. It also says governments changed Maca after concerns about judicial overreach, supposedly restoring its original intent.