Ex-CJI Chandrachud was ‘too deferential’ to Centre in judicial appointments: Former SC judge

The central accusation was about how the Collegium handled government pressure. Kaul said Chandrachud was “too deferential to the government” in judicial appointments. He believed the Chief Justice should protect the Collegium’s independent decision-making rather than seek government approval in advance.

Kaul described a meeting to fill six vacancies. Five names had already been agreed upon. Chandrachud then proposed a sixth name and, according to Kaul, wondered whether he should telephone the government to check its view. Kaul objected, saying this could not happen during a Collegium process. The five agreed names were approved, while the sixth was not.

Kaul also described a dispute over a candidate from a minority faith. He said the government asked about religious representation and the candidate’s caste. Chandrachud said he could not respond without reading the memoir, while stressing that their Collegium relationship remained respectful and constructive.

The Collegium is the Supreme Court’s system for recommending judges to the Supreme Court and High Courts. It is made up of senior judges, led by the Chief Justice of India. Its core purpose is to reduce direct political control over who joins the higher judiciary and to protect judicial independence.

In practice, Collegium members discuss candidates, assess their suitability, and recommend names. The government receives those recommendations and can seek clarifications or return names for reconsideration. The article describes Kaul and Chandrachud discussing six vacancies, agreeing on five names, and rejecting a sixth proposed name.

The system remains controversial because it gives judges a leading role without a fully public selection process. The article highlights this tension. Kaul said governments can exert pressure, while Chandrachud described Collegium discussions as respectful and reasoned. The balance depends on independence, transparency, and constitutional limits.

Kaul described a Collegium exercise to fill six judicial vacancies. The members had agreed beforehand on five candidates. This created a settled position before the formal meeting began.

On the way to that meeting, Chandrachud proposed a sixth name, according to Kaul. The other judges resisted the proposal. Kaul suspected that the candidate had been suggested at the government’s instance. Chandrachud then reportedly wondered whether to telephone the government and check its view. Kaul objected to that step, arguing that the Collegium should not seek such approval during its deliberations.

The result was that the five previously agreed names were approved, while the sixth name was not. The episode matters because it illustrates the disagreement between the judges over whether government preferences should enter the process before the Collegium reaches a formal decision.

Kaul believed the Collegium must deliberate independently before considering outside pressure. Seeking the government’s “nod” before formally evaluating a candidate could make the judges appear dependent on the executive. That would weaken the purpose of having a judicial appointment mechanism in the first place.

His concern arose during a discussion about six vacancies. Five names had already been settled. Chandrachud proposed a sixth candidate and, according to Kaul, considered telephoning the government to check its view. Kaul said he took Chandrachud aside and told him that such a step made no sense in the middle of a Collegium meeting.

Kaul’s broader warning was that governments will use any opening to assert themselves. He argued that the challenge is to preserve institutional integrity while navigating political pressure. Chandrachud did not directly address the allegation, saying he needed to read the memoir, but described their Collegium relationship as respectful.

Judicial independence depends on judges being able to decide cases without fearing political consequences. If the government heavily influences appointments, future judges may be seen as owing their positions to political leaders. That perception alone can damage confidence in the courts, even when judges act independently.

The article gives a concrete warning. Kaul said the government asked about religious representation and the caste of a candidate from a minority faith. He objected to using such questions as part of the appointment process. If similar preferences dominate selection, candidates may be assessed for political acceptability instead of professional ability, integrity, and judicial judgment.

The consequences could include weaker institutional checks, less diversity, and more suspicion around court decisions. These are broader implications rather than outcomes reported in the article. The issue therefore calls for a process that protects independence while making appointments fair, credible, and accountable.

The article gives only a brief historical contrast. It says that before the Collegium was created, Chief Justices used to appoint judges. Kaul invoked that earlier practice while protesting government questions about a candidate, saying a Chief Justice could simply consult others and appoint judges directly.

The broader history comes from established constitutional law. Supreme Court decisions commonly known as the Judges Cases interpreted the Constitution’s consultation process. Over time, those rulings established that senior judges, rather than the elected government alone, would recommend appointments. The system became known as the Collegium.

This changed the institutional balance. Appointment decisions moved from one Chief Justice’s leading role to collective judicial recommendations, while the government retained a role in processing them. The article’s dispute shows that the newer system still faces pressure over how much influence the government should have before the Collegium reaches its own decision.

Judges help choose future judges because courts need protection from political retaliation and interference. This supports judicial independence. Elected governments, however, represent the public and control major state institutions. Their role can provide scrutiny and accountability, especially when appointments affect the country’s constitutional system.

The article shows the tension in practical terms. Kaul said governments may assert themselves if given an opening. He objected when Chandrachud allegedly considered checking the government’s view before the Collegium formally considered a candidate. At the same time, the government raised questions about minority representation and the candidate’s caste, showing how executive involvement can shape discussions.

A workable balance requires independent judicial recommendations, clear reasons, and limited, reviewable government participation. The article does not set out reforms. It does show that institutional integrity depends on resisting improper pressure while maintaining respectful dialogue between the Collegium and the government.