Vucic's mission: Can Serbia's longtime leader secure new mandate? - analysis

Serbia is holding a parliamentary election on Sunday, described as one of its most consequential recent votes. The contest will determine which political bloc can form the country’s next government. It matters because the election follows nearly two years of unrest and tests whether Vucic still commands broad public support.

Vucic is seeking to return to the prime minister’s office. He held that position from 2014 to 2017, then became president. He resigned as president on September 27 before this election. His list, United Serbia, is led mainly by his Serbian Progressive Party and includes several smaller parties.

A United Serbia victory would give Vucic a new parliamentary mandate and could preserve his political influence. An Ipsos survey commissioned by his coalition showed it leading the student-backed list, 47.4% to 40%, although other polls suggested a closer race or opposition advantage.

Aleksandar Vucic is a Serbian political leader who has dominated national politics for more than a decade. He first served as prime minister from 2014 to 2017, then won the presidency. His influence matters because this election is also a judgment on his record and continued political authority.

Vucic helped found the Serbian Progressive Party almost two decades ago. He now leads United Serbia, a coalition made up predominantly of the party, alongside the Serbian Radical Party and several smaller groups. Supporters connect his leadership with infrastructure modernization, improved living standards, and stability after years of conflict and economic uncertainty.

His dominance is being tested by student-led demonstrations that followed the Novi Sad canopy collapse. Yet he enters the election with a substantial electoral base. An Ipsos survey placed United Serbia at 47.4%, ahead of the student-backed list at 40%, though other polls showed a tighter contest.

United Serbia is the coalition led by Aleksandar Vucic in Serbia’s parliamentary election. It is made up predominantly of his Serbian Progressive Party, or SNS, plus the Serbian Radical Party, PUPS, the Serbian People’s Party, the Workers’ Party, the People’s Peasant Party, and the United Peasant Party. Its size matters because it combines Vucic’s main political machine with several allied parties.

The coalition’s reported support came from an Ipsos survey published on Thursday. Among 3,624 respondents, United Serbia received 47.4%, while the student-backed list received 40%. The survey was commissioned by Vucic’s coalition, so its results must be viewed alongside other polls.

The numbers suggest that the governing bloc retains a sizable base despite two years of protests. However, the outcome remains uncertain. Other opinion polls have shown a considerably closer race or an opposition lead, meaning the reported advantage does not guarantee victory.

Student-led demonstrations began after the collapse of a railway station canopy in Novi Sad in November 2024. The disaster killed 16 people and became a powerful symbol of alleged failures in public administration. The protests matter because they developed into a sustained challenge to Vucic’s political dominance.

Protesters widely accused the authorities of corruption and negligence. They also argued that officials had failed to accept responsibility and provide adequate public accountability after the collapse. These grievances connected a specific infrastructure tragedy to broader concerns about how Serbia is governed and how public projects are overseen.

The demonstrations lasted almost two years, according to the article, and helped produce a student-backed electoral list. Their political impact remains uncertain. Vucic still benefits from voters who credit his government with modernizing infrastructure, while the opposition-backed movement has turned accountability into a central election issue.

A renewed mandate would likely preserve the foreign-policy approach associated with Vucic: productive relations with several powerful and competing countries. The article specifically highlights Serbia’s ties with the United States, Russia, China, and Israel. This matters because Serbia has used that flexibility to maintain diplomatic and economic connections while often taking positions different from other European governments.

Israel is the clearest example. Serbia supplied military equipment soon after the October 7 massacre, expanded defense cooperation, and planned a joint drone facility involving Elbit Systems. Trade, investment, and diplomatic engagement also grew, leading to a formal strategic partnership. Vucic’s reelection could therefore sustain that direction. The article also notes Serbian affinity for Donald Trump and positive US-Serb relations.

The source gives no specific information about the United Arab Emirates, so no evidence-based implication can be drawn there. It suggests continuity with Russia and China, but gives no detailed policy forecast. The main implication is likely continuation of Serbia’s multi-partner diplomacy.

Serbia’s balancing strategy is to maintain productive relations with countries that do not always share the same interests. The article presents this as a distinctive foreign policy under Vucic. It matters because Serbia can cooperate with the United States, Russia, China, and Israel without simply aligning itself with one external power.

The relationship with Israel shows how this works. Serbia supplied military equipment shortly after the October 7 massacre, despite criticism from European leaders. It then expanded defense technology and military-production cooperation, including plans for a joint drone facility with Israel’s Elbit Systems. At the same time, Serbia preserved broader ties with other major powers.

The article gives fewer concrete examples involving Russia and China, but says Serbia maintains productive relations with both. It also notes positive Serbian sentiment toward Donald Trump and a US-Serb relationship described as very good. The result is a flexible diplomatic posture, though the source does not detail its limits or future risks.

In a parliamentary system, the president usually represents the state, while the prime minister leads the government’s daily work. The prime minister normally depends on support from parliament to govern. The exact division of powers varies by country, but the offices have different constitutional and political roles.

Vucic’s career shows the significance of moving between them. He was prime minister from 2014 to 2017, then became president. After resigning as president on September 27, he entered this parliamentary election seeking the prime minister’s office again. He is also leading United Serbia, the coalition built mainly around his Serbian Progressive Party.

The move could return Vucic to the government’s central operating position while giving him a fresh parliamentary mandate. It also makes the election a direct test of his political strength after prolonged protests. If his coalition wins, his influence may continue even though he is changing offices.

A fresh public mandate means winning new electoral support to lead the government. In Serbia’s parliamentary election, that support would be expressed through votes for United Serbia and its allied parties. The idea matters because a government can use an election result to claim renewed legitimacy for its program and leadership.

For Vucic, the timing is especially important. Student-led protests began after the Novi Sad railway station canopy collapse killed 16 people in November 2024. Demonstrators accused the authorities of corruption, negligence, and a failure of public accountability. Nearly two years of unrest created pressure for a new political judgment.

A United Serbia victory would let Vucic argue that voters still support his record and direction. Supporters associate him with infrastructure modernization, better living standards, and stability. But the result is not certain: one Ipsos survey showed a lead, while other polls indicated a closer race or an opposition advantage.