Israel elections: Can Netanyahu turn security gains into a political victory?

Netanyahu is defending his leadership through the military campaigns conducted after October 7. He presents the operations against Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran, along with the wider confrontation with Iran, as evidence that his government protects Israel in an unusually dangerous period. This matters because security remains a central concern for conservative and nationalist voters.

The mechanism is political as well as military. Netanyahu’s supporters judge him not only by the failures that preceded October 7, but also by what happened afterward. Dr Ashok Sharma said the campaigns demonstrated Israel’s military capabilities and determination to confront regional threats. Netanyahu uses that record to argue that experience matters during wartime.

The argument faces a direct challenge. Critics say October 7 happened under Netanyahu’s watch and exposed failures in intelligence, preparedness and threat assessment. The election therefore tests whether voters give greater weight to the subsequent campaigns or to accountability for the attack and its aftermath.

The Knesset is Israel’s national legislature, made up of 120 seats. The number matters because a government needs support from at least 61 members to hold a majority. That majority gives the prime minister and coalition enough backing to pass legislation and survive key parliamentary votes.

In this election, seats are more important than simply finishing first. A party can win the largest number of seats but still lack the support needed to govern. For example, the polls put Yashar ahead of Likud, yet neither the projected Netanyahu coalition nor the main opposition bloc reaches 61 seats.

That threshold makes coalition-building decisive. Parties must combine their seats or win outside support to cross the majority line. The current projections show why the election may not produce a clear governing side: Netanyahu’s coalition is near 50 seats, while the main opposition bloc is estimated at 52 to 56.

The projections show a close election without a clear majority. Netanyahu’s coalition is expected to win about 50 of the Knesset’s 120 seats. The main opposition bloc is estimated at 52 to 56 seats. Arab-led parties could secure another 14 to 16 seats, but the article does not say they would automatically join either major bloc.

The key mechanism is the 61-seat threshold. Netanyahu’s coalition would be about 11 seats short. The opposition bloc would be between 5 and 9 seats short. If treated as a separate group, Arab-led parties would be 45 to 47 seats below a majority, though their seats could matter in coalition negotiations or parliamentary support arrangements.

These are projections, not results. Yashar is forecast at roughly 22 to 23 seats, ahead of Likud’s 19 to 21. The final outcome will depend on negotiations, because neither principal side is projected to govern alone.

Gadi Eisenkot is a former chief of the Israel Defence Forces who served from 2015 to 2019. He joined the wartime government after the October 7 attack, then left in June 2024, saying political considerations were influencing decisions about the war. He later broke with Benny Gantz and founded Yashar in September 2025.

His military background is important because Israeli voters often judge leaders through security concerns. Eisenkot can criticise Netanyahu’s handling of the war without presenting himself as a conventional left-wing challenger. He supports a hard line on Hamas and argues for more effective security leadership, while also demanding accountability for the failures before October 7.

That combination gives him a distinct challenge. He offers change without abandoning security priorities. The polls place Yashar ahead of Likud, at about 22 to 23 seats compared with 19 to 21, but his divided opposition still faces difficulty forming a government.

The October 7 attack is the central test of Netanyahu’s leadership because it happened while he was prime minister. Hamas-led militants killed about 1,200 people and took 251 hostages, according to Israeli figures. The assault exposed failures in intelligence, military preparedness and the government’s assessment of Hamas’s intentions.

Opposition parties want an independent state commission of inquiry. Such an investigation could examine decisions by Netanyahu’s government, as well as the military and intelligence services. Its findings could clarify who knew what, which warnings were acted upon, and why the security system failed. Netanyahu has resisted this investigation, keeping accountability at the centre of the campaign.

Voters may therefore weigh two competing records. Supporters emphasise the later campaigns against Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran. Critics say no military success erases responsibility for the attack or the lack of an adequate explanation. The election will show which interpretation carries greater political force.

No party or bloc reaching 61 seats would mean that the election has produced no automatic government. The largest party would not necessarily govern. Instead, political leaders would need to combine parliamentary support through coalition negotiations or another arrangement that can command a majority.

The mechanism follows from the Knesset’s 120 seats. A government needs support from at least 61 members to function with a majority. That support can come from several parties with different priorities. It may also require agreements with parties outside the main coalition, making policy compromises and leadership decisions especially important.

The article’s projections make this possibility central. Netanyahu’s coalition is estimated at about 50 seats, while the opposition bloc is projected at 52 to 56. If negotiations cannot produce a viable government, Israel could hold another election. That consequence is established political background, not a specific outcome stated in the article.

Israel uses proportional representation for its Knesset elections. Voters support parties, and those parties receive seats broadly in line with their share of the vote. The system is designed to represent different political groups rather than guarantee that the largest party governs alone.

The key mechanism is fragmentation. With 120 seats divided among several parties, even the leading party usually falls well below the 61-seat majority threshold. Parties must therefore negotiate after the election and combine their seats into a governing coalition. Smaller parties can become important because their seats may determine whether a coalition crosses 61.

The article’s projections show this effect clearly. Yashar is forecast to win about 22 to 23 seats and Likud 19 to 21, far short of a majority. Netanyahu’s coalition is projected at about 50 seats, while the opposition bloc reaches 52 to 56. These figures explain why coalition politics, rather than simply finishing first, will determine the outcome. This system explanation uses established background beyond the article.