Funding, force-structure issues could hinder Hegseth’s new autonomous command

AUTOWARCOM stands for U.S. Autonomous Warfare Command. It is planned as a functional combatant command focused on autonomous warfare. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said it would become the Pentagon’s official purchaser of autonomous technology. The command matters because the Pentagon wants to develop and field autonomous systems faster.

Its role would likely extend beyond buying equipment. John G. Ferrari said it could bring together scattered organizations, focus them with funding, and help get systems to warfighters. He also suggested the command may oversee related training and doctrine. Hegseth described an approach based on repeated learning and adaptation.

The plan remains incomplete. Hegseth gave the Pentagon a full year to start the command, but the department has little existing force structure for it. The Army has already created an autonomy command, while the Navy and Air Force have not publicly described equivalent plans.

The money to start AUTOWARCOM is supposed to come from a reconciliation bill. That bill is an unusual funding vehicle for launching a combatant command. The article identifies the funding source but does not describe a separate approved appropriation already available to the Pentagon.

The uncertainty comes from the bill’s political status. Its passage is described as being in doubt and far from assured. That means the command’s planned budget depends on legislation that may fail or be delayed. Funding is therefore not merely an administrative detail; it is a basic condition for getting the new organization started.

This uncertainty could affect staffing, authorities, technology purchases, and coordination with the military services. Hegseth gave the Pentagon a full year to start AUTOWARCOM, but that timetable may be harder to meet if the reconciliation bill does not pass. The article does not identify an alternative funding plan.

Cyber Command and Special Operations Command are earlier examples of functional combatant commands. They could draw on existing force structures. AUTOWARCOM would work in the opposite direction. It would need to help create the organizations, personnel, and arrangements required for autonomous warfare.

The plan calls for service component commands where none currently exist. It also calls for a new autonomous-warfare corps of officers and enlisted service members. Neither Hegseth’s creation memo nor the operational roadmap explains how those specialties would fit into existing units. That leaves major questions about command relationships and integration.

This difference creates practical and organizational risks. The Army quickly rebranded its Futures and Concepts Command as Futures and Autonomy Command. The Navy and Air Force referred questions about their component plans to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The new command therefore has direction, but limited established structure.

The article identifies three military services involved in organizing autonomous-warfare structures under AUTOWARCOM: the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Each service would need to coordinate with the new command or establish a service component command. The article does not describe a separate Marine Corps plan.

The Army moved first. One day after AUTOWARCOM was announced, it said it would promptly bring online its own autonomy command. It then rebranded Futures and Concepts Command as Futures and Autonomy Command. That created a staffed and funded component with minimal friction.

The Navy and Air Force were less specific. When Defense One asked about their plans, both services referred the questions to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. This leaves the three-service structure uneven: the Army has an identified organization, while the Navy and Air Force plans remain undisclosed in the article.

The planned force structure has two major elements. First, AUTOWARCOM would need service component commands, including organizations connected to the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Second, it would need a new autonomous-warfare corps made up of officers and enlisted service members.

These elements would provide the command with dedicated people and service-level links. The Army offers an early example. It rebranded Futures and Concepts Command as Futures and Autonomy Command, producing a fully staffed and funded component with minimal friction. The article does not provide equivalent Navy or Air Force structures.

The central problem is integration. Hegseth’s memo and the operational roadmap do not explain how the new specialties will fit with existing units. John G. Ferrari expects AUTOWARCOM may focus on training and doctrine, while Mark Cancian warned that operations must remain closely integrated with operating forces. The final design is therefore still unsettled.

Combatant commands typically operate forces. AUTOWARCOM, however, is described as the Pentagon’s official purchaser of autonomous technology. Mark Cancian said making a four-star combatant command responsible mainly for acquisition would require a wide range of new acquisition authorities.

Operating forces and buying systems involve different mechanisms. An operating command directs units during missions and integrates them with other forces. An acquisition-focused organization develops technology, creates systems, and then transfers them to the services. Cancian said that handoff model makes sense for autonomous capabilities.

He pointed to the Missile Defense Agency as a potentially better model. It is a three-star command with its own significant budget. Cancian opposed having AUTOWARCOM take over drone operations across all services, because those operations need close coordination with operating forces. The final command design could therefore determine whether it speeds development or complicates operations.

Purchasing a system does not automatically make it useful in combat. Warfighters must know how to employ it, units must understand its role, and commanders must integrate it with ongoing operations. John G. Ferrari summarized the problem by saying buying is easy while using is hard.

That is why AUTOWARCOM may need responsibility for training and doctrine. Ferrari said the command could pull together scattered organizations, focus them with money, and get autonomous systems into warfighters’ hands. Those activities connect development with practical military use. They also require coordination across services and existing units.

Mark Cancian added that drone operations must be tightly coordinated and integrated with operating forces. He warned that a centralized command far from those forces could be a bad arrangement if it took over their operations. AUTOWARCOM’s success will therefore depend on how it connects technology, training, doctrine, and fielded units.