Abiy Ahmed Calls Sea Access an Existential Issue for Ethiopia's 130 Million People - Somali News today Live

For a landlocked country, access to the sea means securing dependable use of coastal ports and shipping routes outside its own territory. Ethiopia has no coastline, so it cannot directly operate a national seaport on the Red Sea. Sea access therefore affects trade, economic growth, and national self-reliance.

Ethiopia currently relies on Djibouti for more than 90 percent of its import and export trade. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed says the absence of ports prevents Ethiopia from becoming self-sufficient and competing more strongly in the global economy. The issue is not only physical access to water. It also involves negotiated rights, commercial arrangements, and control over reliable routes to international markets.

The Ankara Declaration created a framework for Ethiopia and Somalia to discuss such access without compromising Somalia’s sovereignty. Somali officials say Ethiopia can use Somali territory and ports through mutually beneficial commercial agreements. The unresolved question is how those arrangements will work in practice while avoiding renewed regional tensions.

More than 90 percent of Ethiopia’s import and export trade currently depends on Djibouti. This is the clearest measure of Ethiopia’s reliance on a neighboring country for access to international shipping. Because Ethiopia is landlocked, its goods must move through foreign territory and ports before reaching global markets.

The arrangement gives Djibouti a central role in Ethiopia’s trade system. Abiy Ahmed argues that this dependence limits Ethiopia’s economic expansion and international competitiveness. He describes ports as essential to sustained advancement and self-reliance, saying their absence is the main factor holding Ethiopia back from competing fully in the global economy.

The figure also explains why Addis Ababa is pursuing other options. Ethiopia has explored arrangements involving Somaliland and Somalia, while tensions with Eritrea have intensified. The Ankara Declaration now provides a framework for negotiations with Somalia, where officials have proposed commercial access through Somali territory and ports.

Ethiopia lost its coastline when Eritrea gained independence in 1993. The separation removed Ethiopia’s direct access to the Red Sea and left it as the world’s most populous landlocked country. Since then, Ethiopia has needed neighboring countries’ territory and ports to move imports and exports by sea.

The article presents this history as central to today’s political debate. Abiy Ahmed publicly asks who made the decision that caused Ethiopia to lose the Red Sea. He says the issue is simultaneously legal, historical, geographical, and economic, and argues that it must be handled calmly and thoughtfully.

That loss still shapes Ethiopia’s security and economic strategy. The country now depends on Djibouti for more than 90 percent of its trade and has pursued sea-access discussions involving Somaliland and Somalia. Its claims and negotiations have also contributed to sharper tensions with Eritrea, which views Ethiopia’s maritime ambitions as a threat to its sovereignty.

In January 2024, Ethiopia signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Somaliland. The arrangement granted Addis Ababa access to a 20-kilometer coastal strip at the port of Berbera for 50 years. In return, Ethiopia offered the possibility of recognizing Somaliland’s independence. The agreement aimed to give landlocked Ethiopia a direct maritime foothold.

Somalia rejected the arrangement as a blatant violation of its sovereignty. Mogadishu maintains that Somaliland is part of Somalia and that any Ethiopian sea-access agreement must be negotiated directly with the Federal Government of Somalia. Somalia also insists that such an arrangement must respect Somali territorial integrity.

The disagreement became a regional crisis. Ethiopia has moved carefully toward possible recognition because it fears a security collapse in Somalia. Its ambassador warned that Somalia could demand the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops, giving Al-Shabaab greater freedom to attack Somalia and Somaliland, with possible spillover into Ethiopia.

The Ankara Declaration, reached after Turkish-mediated talks in December 2025, set rules for resolving Ethiopia’s sea-access question. Ethiopia and Somalia reaffirmed their respect for each other’s sovereignty, unity, independence, and territorial integrity. They also agreed that future talks on sea access would not compromise Somalia’s sovereignty.

This changed the expected negotiating channel. Instead of relying on an arrangement with Somaliland, Ethiopia is supposed to work through discussions with Mogadishu. Somalia’s State Minister for Foreign Affairs said the declaration and later technical negotiations are now the current path. He also said Ethiopia could obtain reliable access through Somali territory and ports under commercial agreements.

The declaration did not itself provide a completed port deal. It created a political framework for further negotiations. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud said Somalia had no objection to Ethiopia securing commercial sea access through joint port agreements. The next step is therefore implementation through mutually acceptable commercial terms.

The article identifies commercial agreements through Somalia as the main alternative. Ethiopia could obtain reliable access by using Somali territory and ports under arrangements negotiated directly with Mogadishu. Such deals would address Ethiopia’s need for shipping access while recognizing Somalia’s sovereignty.

Somalia’s State Minister for Foreign Affairs specifically described commercial agreements serving both countries’ interests. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud likewise said Somalia had no objection to Ethiopia securing access through joint port agreements. The key mechanism would be negotiated use of ports and transport routes, rather than a separate territorial arrangement with Somaliland.

This approach is now tied to the Ankara Declaration. The declaration requires future discussions to respect Somalia’s unity, independence, and territorial integrity. It does not state that a final commercial deal has been completed. Further technical negotiations are needed, but the framework offers a path that could reduce the dispute surrounding the 2024 Somaliland MoU.

Ports and shipping routes matter because they connect a country’s businesses and consumers to international trade. For Ethiopia, which has no coastline, reliable port access is tied directly to economic expansion and competitiveness. Abiy Ahmed describes the absence of ports as the main barrier to self-sufficiency and sustained national advancement.

Territorial sovereignty matters because access must be legally and politically accepted by the country controlling the coastline. Ethiopia’s dependence on Djibouti for more than 90 percent of its trade shows the practical risk of relying on one external route. The dispute over the Somaliland MoU demonstrates how a port arrangement can become a sovereignty crisis when the recognized government rejects it.

National security is also involved. Somalia warned that recognition of Somaliland could affect Ethiopian troops and allow Al-Shabaab greater freedom to attack. Eritrea has accused Ethiopia of pursuing sovereign sea access through force if necessary. The Ankara Declaration seeks to keep future access commercial and respectful of sovereignty.