Bunkers, ransoms and threats of mutilation: Peru’s kidnapping surge - EL PAÍS English

Jenss Lara, a 31-year-old gold trader, was kidnapped after leaving a night out in Trujillo. Men posing as police officers stopped his pickup, beat him, restrained him and forced him into another car. They demanded $2 million from his family.

Lara was taken to a cramped bunker with no natural light or ventilation. Captors threatened to cut off his fingers, forced him to make proof-of-life videos and kept extending payment deadlines. He spent almost 36 hours there before being told he might leave alive.

Four other people were in Lara’s pickup when the abduction began. The article does not explain whether they were kidnapped, released, injured or questioned. That missing detail limits what can be concluded about the group’s fate, while Lara’s testimony reveals the gang’s ransom methods.

Kidnapping for ransom is the forced capture and confinement of a person to make relatives or associates pay for release. It turns a victim’s safety and freedom into leverage. Extortion also uses threats to obtain money, but it commonly targets people or businesses without taking them captive.

Lara’s case shows the difference clearly. The gang hid him in a bunker, demanded $2 million and threatened to mutilate him if payment did not arrive. In Trujillo, gangs such as Los Pulpos have also demanded “protection money” from merchants. Those merchants are pressured, but the article does not describe them being held in cells.

Both crimes can support organized criminal enterprises. Kidnapping creates an immediate, high-value demand tied to one captive. Extortion can produce repeated payments from a wider group. The article presents both as serious problems in Trujillo, alongside contract killings.

The kidnappers’ demands could reach millions of dollars. In Lara’s case, a caller said the job was worth $2 million and insisted that his family pay, borrow or otherwise find the money. The article does not give a confirmed amount actually paid.

Captivity also varied sharply. Lara spent almost 36 hours in the bunker before receiving signs that he might survive. Another victim described 11 days in captivity, during which he was tortured and lost two fingers. These periods show how ransom operations can combine intense short-term pressure with prolonged abuse.

The differing lengths may reflect the kidnappers’ bargaining process, but the article does not explain why one captivity lasted longer than another. It does show a common mechanism: confinement, repeated demands, deadlines and threats were used to force families toward payment.

Proof-of-life videos show families that a captive is still alive, but they also display the danger surrounding that person. Deadlines add a countdown. Threats of mutilation make the consequences personal and visible, pushing relatives to act under extreme emotional pressure.

Lara was forced to record a video warning his father that payment was due by 8 p.m. If the money did not arrive, captors said they would begin cutting off his fingers. At 7:58 p.m., one asked which hand he used more. The deadline was then extended to midnight, followed by another video showing that his hands remained intact.

This method creates repeated crises rather than one negotiation. Families must respond to each new demand while fearing that delay will cause permanent injury or death. In Lara’s case, the captors also used a later reassuring message, saying he might leave alive, to keep the pressure and uncertainty going.

Trujillo became a center of organized crime because criminal groups established durable ways to make money there. The article describes years of contract killings and extortion. It identifies Los Pulpos as a gang that turned demands for merchants’ “protection money” into a criminal enterprise.

The city’s large population and location on Peru’s northern coast are part of the article’s setting, but the text does not say they caused the crime surge. It presents Trujillo as a city of one million people where gangs have operated through threats, killings and extortion. Kidnapping has added another high-value method.

The current response shows the continuing seriousness of the problem. Trujillo has been under a state of emergency since 2024. In October, Peru’s president announced a Unified Command joining the Armed Forces and National Police against organized crime. The article does not assess whether that response has succeeded.

The source does not describe Lara’s father’s decisions in enough detail to explain why he negotiated. It says captors forced Lara to address his father in proof-of-life videos and demanded money, but it does not say whether the father contacted police, sought help or made any payment.

In ransom kidnappings generally, relatives may negotiate because captors threaten immediate harm and control information about the victim’s condition. A family may fear that delay, confrontation or outside intervention will provoke violence. Those are established possibilities, not facts reported about Lara’s father.

The uncertainty matters because the kidnappers designed their demands to dominate the family’s choices. They imposed deadlines, threatened to cut off fingers and sent a second video to show that the threat remained active. The article leaves the father’s response, and the final outcome of negotiations, unstated.

Gangs turn crime into a continuing business by repeating methods that generate money and control. Extortion can bring regular payments from merchants. Contract killings provide a paid service. Kidnapping adds large ransom demands, using a captive and the family’s fear as leverage.

The article names Los Pulpos, which emerged in Trujillo and made merchants’ “protection money” into a criminal enterprise. Lara’s kidnappers added a bunker, false police identities, torture, proof-of-life videos and mutilation threats. These tools helped them control the victim while pressuring his family to find $2 million.

Together, these crimes create a broader system rather than isolated incidents. Extortion keeps pressure on local businesses, while kidnapping can produce a major payout. Contract killings show another service gangs can sell. The state of emergency and new Unified Command indicate that Peru is trying to disrupt this organized criminal model.