Xi’s Delhi visit: China’s new tone, old assumptions about India

The striking change was in the leaders’ language. After years of tension along the Himalayan border, Xi Jinping and Narendra Modi presented cooperation as a goal. Xi said China and India should be “partners rather than rivals.” Modi also spoke about improving ties. This created a more welcoming tone during Xi’s first India visit in seven years.

The setting was Xi’s meeting with Modi on 12 September, during the BRICS summit in New Delhi. Their words mattered because the two countries still disagree over territory, influence, and international status. A more positive public message can reduce friction and create room for talks, even when deeper disagreements remain.

The warmer tone does not prove that China’s underlying view of India has changed. The article says China’s longstanding assumptions about India’s rise persist. Trade, military power, border issues, and competing ambitions continue to shape the relationship. Partnership therefore appears possible, but it remains limited and cautious.

BRICS is a grouping of major emerging economies that cooperate on political and economic issues. Its summit brings national leaders together, making it an important place for direct diplomacy. China and India can discuss their relationship there without treating every disagreement as a separate bilateral crisis. The forum also links their relationship to broader questions about global influence and international institutions.

Xi Jinping met Narendra Modi on 12 September during the BRICS summit in New Delhi. Xi said China and India should be “partners rather than rivals.” The summit’s declaration also reiterated China’s support for India’s aspiration to play a greater role at the United Nations, including in the Security Council. These public statements showed a more constructive tone.

The summit cannot erase disputes over territory, influence, or status. However, it creates space for leaders to signal cooperation and acknowledge shared interests. That matters because China’s doubts about India’s rise persist, even as both governments seek better ties, trade access, and more dependable supply chains.

The power gap is substantial. World Bank figures put China’s 2025 economy at about $19.5 trillion, compared with nearly $4 trillion for India. SIPRI estimated China’s military spending at $336 billion, against India’s $92.1 billion. These figures help explain why Beijing may not treat New Delhi as an equal strategic competitor.

Trade is large but sharply unbalanced. Bilateral trade reached a record $155.6 billion in 2025, according to Chinese customs figures. India imported roughly $132 billion in Chinese goods during its 2025–26 financial year. That left India with a trade deficit of more than $100 billion. New Delhi wants better access to China’s market and more dependable supply chains.

The numbers shape the relationship, but they do not explain everything. The article links China’s view of India to history and cognitive biases as well as material power. India is therefore weaker in economic and military terms, yet still important because it can obstruct China’s wider ambitions in Asia.

The rivalry extends well beyond the Himalayan border. The article identifies disputes over territory, influence, and international status. Trade and military power also matter. India wants better access to China’s market and more dependable supply chains, while the huge trade deficit reflects an uneven economic relationship. These issues connect practical interests with questions of regional leadership.

The mechanism is mutual strategic mistrust. China is much larger economically and militarily, so Beijing may not see India as an equal competitor. Yet India can still obstruct China’s wider ambitions in Asia. India, meanwhile, seeks recognition for a greater international role, including a larger place at the United Nations. Each side therefore sees the other as significant, but not in the same way.

This makes partnership difficult even when leaders use friendly language. Cooperation can grow in trade or diplomacy, but disputes remain embedded in the relationship. Xi’s call for partnership changes the tone, not necessarily the assumptions behind China’s approach to India’s rise.

Historical experience shaped how Chinese thinkers interpreted India. China faced foreign domination and unequal treaties, but it was never formally ruled as a single colony in the way India was under Britain. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Chinese intellectuals often treated British-ruled India as a warning about what could happen to China. They described India as a wang guo, or “lost country.”

This comparison created a hierarchy in Chinese thinking. India represented subjugation, while China’s struggle for national survival encouraged ideas of strength, unity, and independence. Raj Verma also cites harsh descriptions by Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Lu Xun. These comments reflected empire, nationalism, and China’s political struggles rather than neutral assessments of India.

The legacy matters because dismissive views appeared before today’s economic gap. In 1978, China and India had relatively similar economies. Older attitudes therefore cannot be explained only by China’s current advantage. They may still influence strategic assumptions, although past remarks do not establish what Xi or Chinese citizens think today.

Treating India as a lesser power creates an asymmetric rivalry. China has greater economic and military resources, so it may not view India as an equal strategic competitor. Yet India still matters because it can obstruct Beijing’s wider ambitions in Asia. The result is a relationship in which China may look down on India while continuing to watch and manage it closely.

Manjeet S. Pardesi described this pattern in 2021 as India being a “lesser” rival in Chinese strategic thinking, but one capable of obstruction. The key mechanism is not simple equality. A weaker country can still affect a stronger country’s plans when its location, choices, or international partnerships complicate regional strategy. That makes India strategically relevant despite the power gap.

This helps explain why warmer language may coexist with suspicion. China can support India’s larger UN role, seek stable relations, and still resist India’s great-power ambitions. India’s importance is therefore likely to remain high, even if Beijing continues to frame the relationship as unequal.

A great power is generally understood as a country with substantial economic, military, diplomatic, and international influence. The status is not only about national wealth. It also involves the ability to shape regional and global rules, protect interests, and gain recognition from other states. For India, being treated as a great power would mean its growing capabilities were matched by international standing.

A permanent UN Security Council seat is one possible symbol and instrument of that recognition. It would place India among the states with the strongest formal role in major international security decisions. The article says the BRICS declaration reiterated China’s support for India’s aspiration to play a greater role at the United Nations, including in the Security Council. That support was diplomatically significant.

Recognition matters because India’s ambitions are part of its rivalry with China. China may acknowledge India’s importance while remaining doubtful about its rise. A larger UN role could strengthen India’s voice, but the article does not say that India will receive a permanent seat or that China’s support guarantees it.