Israel's elections and not so great expectations for peace

The Knesset is Israel’s national legislature. Its 120 members are elected by voters and must support a government for it to operate. The key threshold is 61 seats, or more than half the chamber. This makes coalition-building central to Israeli politics.

After an election, the president gives the task of forming a government to the Knesset member judged most likely to win the chamber’s confidence. That person normally needs agreements with several parties. A party can therefore lead without controlling enough seats alone, while a smaller party can become essential to a coalition.

The October 27 vote is expected to produce no clear majority. Netanyahu’s camp is projected at 50 seats, while Gadi Eisenkot’s camp is projected at 52–56. About 20 seats could belong to parties without a clear tie to either side, making the Knesset’s role decisive in choosing Israel’s next government.

Israel’s Knesset contains 120 seats. A government needs support from at least 61 members, which is more than half the chamber. This majority allows it to win the Knesset’s confidence and govern with a stronger chance of passing legislation.

Because no party is expected to approach 61 seats alone, coalition agreements matter. Netanyahu’s Likud relies on ultra-Orthodox and far-right allies. His main rivals would also need partners, including parties that may disagree over security, Palestinian statehood, religious exemptions and domestic policy. The arithmetic is therefore more important than simply identifying the biggest party.

Current polling illustrates the problem. Netanyahu’s camp is projected to win 50 seats. Eisenkot’s camp is projected to win between 52 and 56. Arab parties are expected to win 14–16 seats, but Eisenkot’s bloc says it will not work with them. The remaining seats could determine whether any coalition reaches 61.

The largest party can fail because Israel’s government depends on a majority coalition, not on winning the most seats. The president assigns the task to whichever Knesset member appears most likely to secure the chamber’s confidence. That requires reaching agreements with enough other parties to pass the 61-seat threshold.

For example, Netanyahu’s camp is projected at 50 seats, while Eisenkot’s camp is projected at 52–56. Neither reaches 61. Arab parties could hold 14–16 seats, but Eisenkot’s bloc says it will not work with them. Netanyahu may also struggle if Arab representation prevents his allies from reaching a majority.

This system makes political compatibility crucial. Parties may share some policies but reject cooperation because of disagreements over religion, judicial independence, Palestinian statehood or military service. The election therefore produces a negotiation over partners, not simply a winner-takes-all result.

The balance of power could rest with parties that are not firmly aligned with either main camp. The article identifies Arab parties as the most important group, with Palestinian citizens of Israel expected to give them 14–16 seats. Smaller parties without a clear commitment could also matter if the main blocs remain below 61.

Mansour Abbas’s Islamist Ra’am is open to negotiations. The Joint List says it could support a government from outside without joining it. In return, it demands action against crime in Arab communities, an end to home demolitions and progress toward Palestinian statehood. These demands could become bargaining points in coalition talks.

Their influence has limits. Eisenkot’s bloc has said it will not work with Arab parties, even though their seats could cost Netanyahu a majority. The final result will show whether any bloc can find acceptable partners, outside supporters or another route to Knesset confidence.

When no political bloc commands 61 seats, the election does not immediately produce a government. The president assigns the task of forming one to the Knesset member considered most likely to win the chamber’s confidence. That member must negotiate with other parties and assemble a workable coalition.

The current numbers show why this matters. Netanyahu’s camp is projected at 50 seats, and Eisenkot’s camp at 52–56. Around 20 seats belong to parties with no clear tie to either side. Arab parties may hold 14–16 seats, but Eisenkot’s bloc rejects cooperation with them. These positions can make the negotiations difficult.

If the designated candidate cannot win confidence, the task can pass to another candidate under Israel’s political process. If coalition-building still fails, the country may need another election rather than immediately obtaining a stable government. The article specifically establishes the president’s role, while these further procedural consequences reflect established Israeli parliamentary practice.

The judicial dispute matters because it concerns the balance between elected politicians and independent courts. In 2023, Netanyahu’s government attempted an overhaul that would have reduced judicial oversight and increased politicians’ influence over judges. Supporters and opponents therefore see the issue as shaping how democracy checks government power.

A law changing how judges are appointed is set to take effect after the election. Gadi Eisenkot promises to reverse it, along with measures that weaken the attorney general. The example shows the mechanism clearly: changing appointment rules can affect who selects judges, while reducing oversight can make government decisions harder to challenge.

The election could decide whether those changes remain or are reversed. It could also determine whether future governments face stronger legal scrutiny. Because neither main camp is expected to win 61 seats alone, the final judicial direction may depend on coalition partners and their conditions, not only on Netanyahu or Eisenkot’s own platform.

The occupation refers here to Israel’s control over Palestinian territory. Israeli settlements are communities established by Israelis in territory Palestinians claim for a future state. A two-state solution means creating a Palestinian state alongside Israel. These questions matter because they determine land, security control and Palestinian political rights.

The candidates offer different versions of the future. Netanyahu and Naftali Bennett oppose Palestinian statehood. Eisenkot supports autonomy, or a “state-minus,” under Israeli security dominance. The Democrats support a demilitarized Palestinian state, with Israeli security control in sensitive areas, and oppose annexation. Arab parties also support Palestinian statehood.

These disagreements make compromise harder because the sides differ over the destination as well as the route. The article notes that nearly two-thirds of Israelis oppose a two-state solution. Even a new coalition could therefore continue conflict-focused policies, while disputes over settlements and settler violence would remain obstacles to negotiations and peace.