Former CJI D Y Chandrachud was more deferential to govt than needed, says Justice Kaul

Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul’s criticism concerns how India’s top judges are selected. He alleged that former CJI D Y Chandrachud was too accommodating toward the government during consultations on judicial appointments. Kaul said consultation itself was not wrong, but its timing mattered. In his view, the collegium should first make its decision and consult the government afterward.

Kaul recalled that Chandrachud allegedly asked during a collegium meeting whether he should telephone the government about proposed appointments. Kaul said such advance contact could influence discussions and create problems. He also claimed that a case about delays in implementing collegium recommendations was withdrawn from his bench under government pressure.

Chandrachud rejected the broader suggestion of disagreement, saying no collegium member ever dissented over any Supreme Court appointment during his tenure. Sources likewise said the resolutions were unanimous and signed by all members. The dispute highlights continuing tension between judicial independence and executive consultation.

The Supreme Court collegium is an internal group of senior judges that recommends appointments and transfers in India’s higher judiciary. As a matter of established practice, it is led by the Chief Justice of India and includes other senior Supreme Court judges. Its purpose is to give the judiciary a central role in choosing judges, instead of leaving selection entirely to the executive government.

The collegium examines candidates and records its recommendations through resolutions. Those recommendations are sent to the government, which can raise concerns or delay action. The article describes a dispute over alleged delays in implementing such resolutions. A bench questioned why certain recommended transfers and appointments had not been completed.

The collegium system is meant to protect judicial autonomy, but it can also face criticism over transparency and accountability. In this case, Chandrachud said Supreme Court appointment resolutions during his tenure were unanimous. Kaul questioned whether government views were sometimes sought too early.

Justice D Y Chandrachud rejected the suggestion that government pressure had produced disagreements within the collegium over Supreme Court appointments. His direct response was that there had never been a dissent by any collegium member over any name during discussions for appointments to the Supreme Court.

Sources cited in the report gave a similar account. They said resolutions passed during Chandrachud’s tenure were unanimous and signed by all collegium members. This response addresses the allegation that Chandrachud’s dealings with the government weakened the collegium’s decision-making. It focuses on the formal outcome of appointments rather than on the private consultations Kaul described.

The disagreement therefore remains about process as well as results. Kaul objected to government views being sought before collegium discussions were complete. Chandrachud emphasized consensus in the final resolutions. The article does not report any recorded dissent over a Supreme Court appointment during his tenure.

Six recommended candidates were central to the case about delays in implementing collegium resolutions. The group included four judges from Gujarat High Court and two Sikh lawyers recommended for appointment to Punjab and Haryana High Court. The article presents these figures as examples of names whose recommendations had not been acted on.

On November 20, 2023, a bench headed by Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul and including Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia questioned the government’s alleged pick-and-choose policy. The bench asked why the Centre had not transferred the four Gujarat High Court judges or appointed the two lawyers for Punjab and Haryana High Court.

The case was later removed from Kaul’s bench and, according to the article, had not been listed during the following three years. Kaul said the removal troubled him because the case had been assigned to him years earlier. The episode became part of his wider criticism of government handling of collegium recommendations.

Judicial independence depends partly on judges being able to make appointment decisions without seeking executive approval in advance. If government views are obtained before the collegium reaches its own decision, members may feel pressure to avoid candidates the government might reject. That can make the judiciary less independent in practice, even if final resolutions remain unanimous.

Kaul said consultation with the government was not inherently wrong. His concern was timing. He argued that the collegium should first decide which names to recommend, and only then consult the government. He said Chandrachud allegedly asked whether he should telephone the government about proposed appointments during a collegium meeting.

The article shows why this process matters. Sources said all Supreme Court appointment resolutions during Chandrachud’s tenure were unanimous, yet Kaul still objected to advance consultations. The broader implication is that formal consensus may not fully answer concerns about informal influence, transparency, or executive pressure.

India’s collegium-based process places the judiciary at the center of recommending judges for higher courts. A system of direct government selection would instead give ministers or the executive primary control over identifying and choosing candidates. The difference matters because judges may later review government actions, so the appointment process can affect perceived impartiality.

In the collegium model, senior judges discuss candidates and issue recommendations. The government receives those resolutions and can respond, but the judiciary’s recommendation is the starting point. The article’s dispute illustrates this relationship: Kaul objected to government views being sought before the collegium had decided, while Chandrachud’s response stressed unanimous collegium resolutions.

Neither model removes the need for accountability or careful scrutiny. The collegium can be criticized for opaque discussions, while direct executive selection can raise concerns about political influence. The article focuses on preserving a meaningful judicial role while determining when government consultation should occur.

Separation of powers divides public authority among institutions so that no single branch controls everything. Courts need some independence from the executive because they may have to examine government actions, protect legal rights, and decide disputes involving the state. If judges depend on the government for their positions or advancement, their decisions may appear influenced even when they are legally sound.

The article connects this principle to judicial appointments. Kaul said government consultation should come after the collegium makes its decision, not before. He feared that advance discussions could create pressure and affect the process. The concern is not that consultation is always improper, but that the executive should not dominate the judiciary’s internal choices.

Judicial independence does not mean complete isolation from government. The article notes that consultation can be appropriate. The key issue is balance: the government may participate in the appointment process, but courts must retain enough autonomy to scrutinize executive conduct fairly and confidently.