Iran sends conflicting signals on US deal as Trump raises prospect of strikes

The proposed agreement concerns Iran’s nuclear program and the conditions for ending the diplomatic crisis with Washington. The main dispute involves what each side must do, and whether those commitments happen simultaneously or in a particular sequence. Iran has denied that formal nuclear negotiations with Washington are currently underway, so the article presents the deal as a deadlocked diplomatic effort rather than a completed negotiation.

Russia is unusually positioned because it is both close to Tehran and willing to communicate with Washington. Putin said Russia would do everything it could to help resolve the crisis. He later conveyed Tehran’s position to Donald Trump, although neither the message nor Washington’s response became public.

Moscow may also offer a practical nuclear arrangement. Russian officials have indicated that Russia could receive Iran’s 60% enriched uranium. Iran rejects transferring that material abroad. Russia can carry messages and support dialogue, but Iranian commentators doubt it can overcome the fundamental disagreements alone.

Enrichment means increasing the share of the uranium-235 isotope in uranium. At 60%, Iran’s material is highly enriched compared with the lower levels commonly associated with civilian reactor fuel. It is still below the roughly 90% level generally associated with weapons-grade uranium, so 60% material is not itself a nuclear weapon.

The concern is that moving from 60% to weapons-grade requires less additional enrichment than starting from natural uranium. This makes the stockpile more sensitive in negotiations. The article identifies Iran’s 60% inventory as a central obstacle and says Russian officials have discussed receiving it.

Tehran says the material will remain inside Iran as a national asset for domestic use. Iranian commentators disagree over its diplomatic importance, but the issue directly affects what limits Iran might accept and whether Washington would consider an agreement credible.

Iranian figures cited in the article put the stockpile at 440 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60%. The article does not provide a comparison with earlier Iranian stockpiles or state exactly how much material could ultimately produce. Its significance comes from the stockpile’s enrichment level and its central place in the diplomatic dispute.

Russian officials, including Sergei Ryabkov, have indicated that Moscow could receive the material. Such a transfer could address a major concern about Iran’s nuclear program. Iran, however, has rejected sending the uranium abroad. Mohsen Rezaei told Pakistan’s army chief that none of Iran’s enriched material would leave the country.

The stockpile therefore has both technical and political importance. Iranian commentators call it a national asset and, in one conservative analysis, a form of deterrence. Continued refusal to transfer it would leave a major obstacle unresolved and make agreement harder.

The core disagreement is about sequencing. Iran and the United States have not agreed on whether one side must act before the other, or whether commitments should be made together. They also disagree about the scope of those commitments, meaning how broad and demanding an eventual agreement would be.

Uranium is the clearest practical example. Russian officials have suggested receiving Iran’s stockpile enriched to 60%. Tehran rejects transferring the material abroad and says none of it will leave the country. That position conflicts with a step that could reassure Washington about Iran’s nuclear activities.

These disputes explain why Moscow’s role remains limited. Iranian outlets say Russia can pass messages, consult both capitals, and support a political solution. But they also warn that no intermediary can guarantee success while the basic terms remain unsettled. Iran has additionally denied that nuclear negotiations with Washington are underway.

If Iran continues refusing to transfer its enriched uranium abroad, one of the most concrete proposals for reducing concern about its nuclear program will remain unavailable. The article describes the stockpile as a central obstacle. Its continued presence would therefore keep the negotiation focused on a dispute that neither Tehran nor Washington has resolved.

Russia has indicated that it is prepared to receive the material. That offer could reduce the amount of highly enriched uranium held inside Iran and provide a practical confidence-building step. Iran rejects the idea, however, and Mohsen Rezaei said none of the country’s enriched material would leave. Tehran calls it a national asset intended for domestic use.

The result would not automatically end diplomacy. Russia could continue conveying messages and supporting talks. But Iranian commentators warn that mediation cannot overcome fundamental disagreements. The deadlock could persist, while some commentators fear renewed conflict if uncertainty continues.

Russia’s role need not be limited to formally mediating between Tehran and Washington. Iranian commentary identifies several practical functions: conveying messages, consulting with both governments, and supporting a political solution. These activities could keep communication open even when direct diplomacy is stalled.

Moscow could also become involved in the nuclear issue without acting as a traditional mediator. Russian officials have discussed receiving Iran’s uranium enriched to 60%. In addition, Lavrov said Russian specialists who left the Bushehr nuclear power plant during the war were gradually returning. That gives Russia a technical connection as well as a diplomatic one.

Still, the article presents clear limits. Rouydad24 found little evidence of a comprehensive Russian plan. Other commentators said Moscow’s approach may depend on negotiations with Washington over Ukraine. Russia can facilitate contact and offer practical arrangements, but it cannot settle the fundamental differences by itself.

Deterrence does not always depend on possessing an operational nuclear weapon. A stockpile enriched to 60% can create uncertainty about how quickly a country might advance its nuclear capability. That uncertainty may make an adversary judge military action as riskier or more costly, even if the stockpile cannot itself be used as a weapon.

The conservative newspaper Khorasan made this argument about Iran. It said Iran did not possess a nuclear deterrent, but that its highly enriched uranium still acted as a form of deterrence by increasing the risks of further United States escalation. In that view, the stockpile affects strategic calculations without being an actual bomb.

This interpretation also explains Tehran’s refusal to transfer the material. Iranian officials describe it as a national asset for domestic use. The stockpile’s political value therefore extends beyond technical concerns, making negotiations more difficult and potentially raising the stakes of continued deadlock.