Ukraine: Perils for Kyiv in revived peace talks

Efforts have revived through a new round of US-led diplomacy involving Ukraine, Russia, Europe, and China. The goal is to restart negotiations, discuss Ukraine’s future, and explore security arrangements after the war. This matters because Kyiv and its European allies fear decisions could be made without them.

On 20 October, US envoy Stephen Witkoff met President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and European representatives in Oslo. The proposed process has two tracks: Ukraine’s security, European integration, and reconstruction; then Russia’s relationship with the West. The next day, Witkoff met Vladimir Putin in St Petersburg. Moscow accepted technical three-way talks in principle, possibly for mid-November.

Putin also proposed meeting US President Donald Trump and Xi Jinping at the APEC summit in Shenzhen on 18–19 November. Such a summit could produce understandings about Ukraine while sidelining Kyiv and Europe. Russia still shows no clear readiness for peace, and its bombing campaign continues. Moscow seeks control of all Donbas, a compliant government in Kyiv, and security terms favouring Russia rather than Ukraine.

Three-way technical talks are working-level negotiations involving Russia, Ukraine, and the United States. They would examine practical arrangements for ending the war, rather than necessarily produce a final peace treaty.

On 21 October, Russian adviser Yuri Ushakov said Moscow had agreed in principle to resume these talks, possibly in mid-November. The format could let the three governments test specific proposals while leaving harder political decisions for their leaders. The article does not specify their agenda.

These talks are not yet a confirmed settlement process, and Russia has not shown readiness to end the war except on its terms. Ushakov called European and Ukrainian security ideas “not very useful,” while Moscow prioritises a post-war security system. That uncertainty worries Kyiv and Europe about being excluded.

The reported process has two separate tracks because the parties are discussing different postwar problems. One concerns Ukraine’s future, including security guarantees, closer European integration, and economic reconstruction. The other concerns repairing Russia’s relationship with Western countries, including possible new European security arrangements.

The distinction appeared after US envoy Stephen Witkoff met President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and European representatives in Oslo on 20 October. The first track would strengthen Ukraine after the war. The second could reshape Europe’s wider security order and potentially give Moscow greater influence.

Important details remain undisclosed, especially Ukraine’s possible territorial concessions and the proposed security system. After meeting Putin, Russian adviser Yuri Ushakov said the European and Ukrainian ideas were “not very useful.” He said Moscow’s priority was building security arrangements for Russia and Ukraine after the conflict. This leaves Kyiv concerned about decisions being made over its head.

Russia’s settlement goals go beyond stopping the fighting. The Kremlin wants control of the entire Donbas, including territory Ukraine still holds, and a compliant government in Kyiv. These demands would require Ukraine to surrender sovereign land and limit its political independence.

The article also highlights Moscow’s call for a new “security system for Russia and Ukraine” after the war. Foreign affairs adviser Yuri Ushakov said European and Ukrainian proposals were “not very useful.” This suggests Russia seeks arrangements addressing its security claims while preserving influence over Ukraine.

No agreement has clarified the required concessions. Russia continues its aerial bombing campaign, aiming to weaken Kyiv before serious negotiations. Moscow may join US-led talks, but there is no clear sign it will accept peace except on its own terms. A proposed Trump-Putin-Xi summit could sideline Kyiv and European allies.

Excluding Kyiv could let outside powers decide Ukraine’s borders, security, and political future without its consent. That could weaken sovereignty and leave Europe facing an unstable security order. The article says Russia appears willing to engage only on its own terms.

Moscow’s proposed three-way summit with Donald Trump and Xi Jinping at November’s APEC meeting in Shenzhen illustrates the danger. Russia could use it to negotiate over Kyiv and its European allies. Moscow seeks control of the whole Donbas, requiring Ukraine to surrender territory it still holds, and a compliant government in Kyiv. An undefined postwar “security system” could limit Ukraine’s independence.

Nothing is settled: Russia agreed in principle to resume technical talks, possibly in mid-November, but called European and Ukrainian ideas “not very useful.” Meanwhile, its aerial bombing campaign aims to bring Kyiv to its knees and improve Moscow’s leverage. Without Ukrainian participation and credible guarantees, an imposed deal could formalize territorial loss and invite renewed pressure.

NATO membership is not the only route to deterrence. Ukraine could seek binding defense treaties with major powers, long-term weapons commitments, and European integration. These would matter only if partners promised automatic military action, not merely political support.

A useful model is the United States–South Korea alliance: a bilateral defense treaty is backed by American troops, joint planning, and shared military capability. Ukraine could seek comparable arrangements with the United States and European states, plus air-defense networks, arms stockpiles, and a multinational force. These measures would raise the cost of renewed Russian attack.

The article says talks may discuss Ukraine’s security guarantees and closer European integration, but gives no details. Russia instead stresses a postwar “security system” for Russia and Ukraine, while rejecting European and Ukrainian ideas as “not very useful.” Ukraine therefore needs guarantees that are specific, funded, and enforceable, rather than promises vulnerable to changing politics.

Neutrality means a state stays out of wars and military alliances, while avoiding military support for combatants. It can lower immediate tensions, but it may also remove a country’s access to powerful partners and weaken its protection.

Ukraine is the clearest current example. A neutrality demand could keep Kyiv outside Western defence arrangements and limit its security ties. That changes Europe’s balance because Ukraine would have fewer outside supports, while Russia could gain greater influence over its neighbour. Moscow says postwar arrangements must include a “security system” for Russia and Ukraine.

The issue is live in diplomacy. Witkoff met Zelenskyy and European representatives in Oslo on 20 October, then met Putin in St Petersburg. Russia agreed in principle to resume three-way talks, but called European and Ukrainian ideas “not very useful”. A neutral Ukraine could therefore reduce Western leverage, especially if Kyiv and Europe are excluded from decisions.