A Feeling of a Failed Gamble: The Defeat in Serbia, the Surprise in Brazil—and the Significance for Israel

Brazil and Serbia produced two election defeats that mattered to Israel because both losing figures were viewed as dependable Israeli allies. The results came one day apart and left Jerusalem facing the loss of political partners, although the consequences differ between the two countries.

In Brazil, Senator Flavio Bolsonaro, the former president’s son, lost after promising closer diplomatic and military ties with Israel. He also pledged to move Brazil’s embassy to Jerusalem. In Serbia, former president Aleksandar Vučić conceded defeat in parliamentary elections. His period in power had produced what the article describes as a strategic partnership with Israel.

The Brazilian result mainly represents a missed opportunity, since relations are already at a low point under President Lula da Silva. Serbia is more consequential because cooperation is already extensive. The article says the future of both relationships is uncertain, but it does not treat the results as proof of a broad global anti-Israel trend.

A strategic partnership is a relationship in which countries cooperate closely over important, long-term interests. It usually reaches beyond personal diplomacy and involves practical links between industries, militaries, and governments. That matters because such ties can influence security and foreign policy even when political leadership changes.

The article describes Israel and Serbia this way because their cooperation had become concrete. In September, Serbia opened a plant assembling Israeli drones with Elbit. During the war, Serbian arms exports to Israel grew dramatically. Serbia also flew munitions to Israel in an unprecedented air bridge intended to replenish supplies used in fighting Hamas and Hezbollah.

This partnership was especially significant because Serbia supported Israel while other countries imposed arms embargoes. Existing contracts will not disappear overnight, the article notes. Still, the incoming government’s position is unclear, so the partnership may be tested if Serbia moves toward a more European and more critical policy on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The event described was a compact international shock rather than one coordinated election wave. Two election outcomes arrived one day apart, and both removed or weakened political figures regarded as close friends of Israel. The timing made the results appear connected, even though the article stresses that their causes were local.

The first election was in Brazil, in South America, where Senator Flavio Bolsonaro lost. The second was in Serbia, in Europe, where former president Aleksandar Vučić admitted defeat in parliamentary elections. Thus, the episode covered two elections, two countries, and two continents.

The article warns against reading too much into the geography. Israel was not the central issue in either campaign, and it is difficult to infer public attitudes toward Israel from the results. Serbia’s vote followed two years of protests, while Brazil’s contest was decided between two nearly equal camps. The outcomes therefore do not establish a single worldwide trend.

The two relationships were not equally developed. Serbia had built practical military and industrial cooperation with Israel under Aleksandar Vučić. Brazil, by contrast, represented a possible future expansion under Flavio Bolsonaro, whose defeat blocked promises rather than dismantling an established alliance.

Serbia opened a plant for assembling Israeli drones with Elbit. During the war, Serbian arms exports to Israel increased dramatically. Serbia also sent munitions by air in an unprecedented air bridge, helping replace explosives, shells, missiles, bombs, and interceptors used by the Israeli military against Hamas and Hezbollah. Bolsonaro promised expanded diplomatic and military ties and a Jerusalem embassy.

Brazil’s existing relationship was already strained under Lula da Silva, who compared the Gaza war with the Holocaust and Israeli soldiers with Nazis. Israel declared him persona non grata, and neither country currently has an ambassador in the other’s diplomatic mission. Netanyahu’s support for Bolsonaro further deepened the break with Lula.

When a government replaces a leader who personally supported Israel, relations may lose political momentum even if formal agreements remain. The article presents this as the main weakness of Netanyahu’s foreign policy: it relies heavily on personal and ideological ties with leaders rather than durable support from states and institutions.

Serbia shows the sharper risk. Existing contracts continue for now, but the new governing force’s attitude toward Israel is unknown. If Serbia follows an EU accession path, European pressure could pull Belgrade toward a more critical position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Brazil shows a different consequence: Bolsonaro’s defeat ends a promised diplomatic upgrade while relations with Lula are already frozen and hostile.

The article does not predict an immediate collapse. Contracts do not vanish overnight, and the election results were driven mainly by domestic issues. But some of the infrastructure built around individual leaders may erode. Israel could therefore lose influence unless it strengthens broader, institutional relationships with states.

Serbia’s possible route toward European Union membership could reshape its foreign-policy choices. The article says the president of the European Commission has already indicated that the EU is ready to support reforms and Serbia’s accession path. Membership-oriented governments may therefore face stronger pressure to align with broader European positions.

The key mechanism is political direction. The article describes the European line on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as more critical than Serbia’s current posture. If EU integration becomes a central priority, Belgrade could move closer to that position. This would affect the partnership Israel developed with Vučić, even though existing contracts would remain in place for now.

The outcome is uncertain because the new student-backed list’s position on Israel is not clear. The article says agreements do not disappear overnight, but the previous “romance” between Israel and Serbia will be challenged. European integration could therefore create gradual pressure rather than an immediate diplomatic break.

Institutional alliances are generally more durable because they rest on governments, agencies, contracts, and shared national interests. These structures continue operating after an election. Personal relationships depend on one leader’s ideology, trust, and political survival. Once that leader leaves, successors may see fewer reasons to preserve the same closeness.

The article uses Israel’s ties with Serbia and Brazil as examples. Netanyahu built relationships with leaders viewed as especially friendly to Israel. Serbia developed drone production, arms cooperation, and wartime support. Bolsonaro promised stronger Brazilian ties and an embassy move to Jerusalem. Yet Vučić’s defeat and Bolsonaro’s loss immediately created uncertainty or ended a possible upgrade.

The lesson extends beyond these countries, including Europe and the United States, according to the article. Personal diplomacy can open doors, but it cannot replace broad alliances between states. Israel’s influence is safer when cooperation is embedded in institutions and enjoys support across political camps, rather than depending mainly on one successful leader.